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Chapter 1
1.1. Ways of including governance into land-use modeling
1.1.1. Scientific and societal relevance
Land use is characterized by arrangements, activities, and inputs by humans to produce, 
change, or maintain particular land-cover types (Di Gregorio and Jansen, 1998), establishing 
a direct interface between human behavior and observed land cover. Consequently, land use 
is generally the outcome of a complex process of interfacing biophysical, geographical, and 
socio-economic determinants (Kok and Veldkamp, 2001). It has therefore been recognized 
that multi-disciplinary research is crucial for the progress in land-use science (Veldkamp and 
Verburg, 2004), and that integration of social- and natural-science approaches is required 
to achieve improved understanding of how land use impacts on the ecosystems in which it 
is embedded (Veldkamp and Lambin, 2001; Brown et al., 2013). Owing to their quantitative 
nature, economic models (general- and partial equilibrium models in particular) have long 
since been integrated with land-use models (Irwin and Geoghegan, 2001), together with 
geographic information systems. However, a very important and extremely challenging 
component that is still largely missing from such integrated land-use models is how to model 
“Governance by governing” behavior (1.1.2.1. Governance, Table 1) that occurs not only for 
economic reasons but also for other governance-related reasons (Irwin and Geoghegan, 2001). 
An improved understanding of how complex processes of both socio-political and “Economic 
governance” (1.1.2.1. Governance, Table 1) shape land-use patterns would represent a 
crucial step forward. It could allow, for example, for land-use policies that are better suited 
to the high complexity common to governing behavior encountered across various levels 
of geographical spatial scale. Furthermore, given the increasing pressures of rising global 
food demand and agricultural land use on nature (Lambin et al., 2000; Verburg et al., 2013), 
an improved understanding of this complexity is desirable, so that further negative effects 
of these increasing pressures can be minimized. However, this requires further disciplinary 
integration of—and therefore reconciliation of fundamental differences between—social and 
natural science perspectives of governance and land use, respectively. In the social sciences, 
predominantly social-constructivist perspectives of governance have been adopted for 
meaningful interpretations of observed governing behavior (1.1.2.1. Governance, Table 1), 
consistent with viewing society as an abstract whole in which individuals create governance 
networks- and knowledge through social interactions.
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1.1.2. Background
1.1.2.1. Governance
Despite the clear added value of qualitative perspectives of governance (Table 1), such 
perspectives are only little concrete and do not provide any handholds for quantitative analysis. 
That is, the adoption of a more social-positivistic perspective of governance is unavoidable 
if we wish to integrate social-science based concepts of governance with quantitative 
natural-science based concepts of land use. Although hardly any social-positivistic concepts 
of governance have been developed due to its qualitative nature, the field of adaptive 
governance (Table 1, “Adaptive governance”) does have the ambitious goal of developing 
new concepts of governance that can handle the inherent complexity and unpredictability 
of dynamic social-ecological systems through self-organization and adaptation. Furthermore, 
the more modern descriptions of governance in Table 1 have been developed largely as a 
critique of state-centric governance, also referred to as hierarchical governance (Hill and 
Lynn, 2004), the government perspective (Rhodes, 1997), command and control systems of 
governance (Kooiman, 1993), or the classical-modernist approach of governance (Hajer and 
Wagenaar, 2003). Hitherto, however, the traditional provision of information to policymakers 
by science remains the foremost factor at the basis of real-world governance. 
Furthermore, as the research in this thesis is concerned with real-world effects of governance 
on land use it would not benefit from an attempt at integrating quantitative process-based 
relationships into social-constructivist perspectives of governance. Although land use is also 
studied from more qualitative perspectives, e.g., in the fields of land-use policy- or planning, 
or landscape architecture, quantitative studies usually do have a greater scientific impact. This 
derives from the importance of future projections and predictions of land use to integrated 
impact assessments regarding e.g., climate change, soil degradation, or loss of biodiversity. 
That is, these projections and predictions may only be obtained through quantitative studies 
(e.g., simulation models, scenario analyses, or empirical-statistical analyses). Moreover, real-
world governance of land results from policy designs that are directly or indirectly based 
on empirical numeric data (e.g., from such integrated impact assessments) that provide 
quantitative and verifiable evidence for concrete relationships, or critical conditions or 
thresholds relevant to specific phenomena. 
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Chapter 1
Therefore, objective and quantitative indicators of governance should be integrated into 
quantitative empirical-statistical- and process-based modeling approaches that attempt to 
explain how land-use patterns come to exist. This way, it might be possible to assess impacts 
of complex decision-making processes on land-use patterns using numeric data of quantified 
social-science concepts (both at an aggregate level and at the individual level), which might 
in turn allow for better real-world governance of such impacts across various levels of 
geographical spatial scale (Cash et al., 2006).
Table 1. Different qualitative perspectives of governance.
State-centric governance State-centric governance refers to the traditional viewpoint in which 
the state is the center of political power and authority (Rhodes, 1997; 
Pierre, 2000; Kooiman, 2003). The state exerts control over society, 
economy, and resources by setting the agenda of societal problems, 
deciding upon which policy goals and means to follow, and by top-down 
implementation of policies.
Good governance The earliest noteworthy form of ‘modern’ governance was in the 
field of economic development, where the World Bank and other 
international organizations emphasized the need for ‘sound’ or ‘good 
governance’. Stressing the political, administrative, and economic values 
of legitimacy and efficiency (Rhodes, 2000; Kaufmann et al., 2009), 
this entails reducing public spending; investing in health, education, 
and social security; promoting private sectors by regulatory reform; 
reinforcing private banking; tax reforms; and greater transparency 
and accountability in government-corporate relationships (Kiely, 1998; 
Philip, 1999; Rosenbaum and Shepherd, 2000; Woods, 2000).
Economic governance Economic governance is concerned with markets and their governing 
institutions. In this approach, the fields of new institutional economics 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996), economic sociology (Smelser and 
Swedberg, 1994), and comparative political economy (Hollingsworth 
and Boyer, 1997; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall, 1999) have been 
brought together by emphasizing that markets are not spontaneous 
social orders, but have to be created and maintained by institutions. 
These provide, monitor, and enforce rules which among other things 
regulate property rights, contracts, competition, and reduce risk, 
asymmetry of information, and uncertainty.
Governing without 
government
The possibility of governing without government stems from international 
relations theory (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Traditionally, 
international relations are seen to be characterized by competing and 
interdependent states that acknowledge no other authority than their 
own (Lieshout, 1995). However, international politics are decreasingly 
seen as solely being a cooperation between independent states. Rather, 
they are increasingly seen as new forms of international governance 
that sustain mechanisms designed to ensure coherence, stability, 
and safety (Rosenau, 2000). These mechanisms, traditionally found 
in governments, are increasingly found in international organizations, 
treaties, and regimes.
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Adaptive governance Adaptive governance refers to the self-organizational capacity of 
societies and communities. Pioneering work in this field was done 
by Ostrom (1990), studying the capacity of communities in different 
places and times to manage common-pool resources and prevent their 
depletion. Adaptive governance evolved from the original development 
of adaptive management of ecological systems, after having been put 
forward as an integrated, multidisciplinary approach for confronting 
complexity and uncertainty in natural-resource issues (Holling, 1978; 
Berkes and Folke, 1998; Gunderson, 1999; Folke et al., 2005).
Multi-level governance Multi-level governance has two distinct origins. It is seen as a 
modernization of the earlier regime concept in international relations 
theory (Hasenclever et al., 1997). Governance is strongly related to this 
concept: it refers to the substance of policies as well as to the power 
relations resulting from such policies (Krasner, 1983). ‘Multi-level’ refers 
to different government levels (e.g., European, national, subnational), 
but also to public and private actors involved at these levels. The other 
origin of multi-level governance can be found in the field of comparative 
public policy analysis of Europe (Rhodes and Mazey, 1995; Hurrel and 
Menon, 1996; Richardson, 1996; Bulmer, 1998; Peterson and Bomberg, 
1999). Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the importance of policy 
networks organized across different levels of government cannot be 
denied (Marks et al., 1996). Therefore, multi-level governance literature 
is deeply connected to governance-network literature in general 
(Héritier, 1999).
Governance by 
governing
Governance by governing is derived from the fact that “governing” 
encompasses all activities of social, political, and administrative actors 
that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control, or manage 
the pursuance and realization of public goods, and collective or individual 
goals (Kooiman, 1993; Kjaer, 2004). Based on this, Termeer et al. (2010) 
defined governance as all modes of governing, regardless of whether 
they were developed and enforced by markets (economic governance), 
hierarchies (government), or networks (multi-level governance).
1.1.2.2. Empirical-statistical- and process-based modeling
There are two possible approaches to the modeling of real-world governance in the context of 
land-use modeling: empirical-statistical (rule-based) modeling and process-based modeling. 
What separates these types of models from social-constructivist perspectives of governance 
is that they would allow for verifiable inferences whereas the latter do not. That is, the 
latter approach would take the importance of governance in land-use change processes as 
a starting point, whereas the former approach would frame this as a research question to 
be answered by empirical means. On the one hand, the more empirically specific the way 
in which research questions are formulated, the easier it is to answer them. Case studies for 
which numeric data can be obtained allow for specific and verifiable inferences. However, 
the degree of generality of such inferences is limited to the confines of study areas, valid 
only under study-specific conditions. On the other hand, the more general and abstract the 
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way in which research questions are formulated, the more difficult it is to answer them. 
However, the more general the conditions (e.g., spatial extent, behavioral assumptions) 
under which research questions can be answered the better. This means that a tradeoff has 
to be made between the degree of generality (abstraction) and empirical specificity (allowing 
for validation of such abstraction) to achieve a maximum degree of verifiable generality, both 
in empirical-statistical- and process-based modeling.
1.1.2.2.1. Empirical-statistical modeling
For empirical-statistical models, the higher the level of aggregation and thus the level of 
abstraction, the more open to interpretation found relationships would be (due to lower 
empirical specificity). That is, the higher the level of abstraction, the more difficult it becomes 
to link statistical relationships to real-world processes, as the number and complexity of 
spatiotemporal processes that could explain them grow beyond our ability to disentangle 
and comprehend. Such processes may also occur across different levels of spatiotemporal 
scales, further complicating meaningful analysis. Conversely, the higher the empirical 
specificity, the more geographically restricted the validity of inferences would be. However, 
found statistical relationships would then also be more concrete and more likely to pertain 
to clearly identifiable key processes. Furthermore, an empirical-statistical governance model 
would require quantification of socially constructed perceptions of governance to make 
statistical inferences, and it would not be based on positivistic general behavioral laws (as 
would be the case for a process-based model). That is, quantitative results from an empirical-
statistical governance model would still have to be interpreted in the context of a social-
constructivist perspective of governance (Table 1). Therefore, in this thesis, the empirical-
statistical approach to the modeling of governance is thought of as semi-positivistic, which 
could possibly be used to perform empirical analyses of how agricultural land use and nature 
relate to quantified perceptions of “State-centric governance” (Table 1). 
As mentioned, to allow for statistical inferences made with an empirical-statistical model of 
governance, quantification of socially constructed perceptions of governance is required. 
Recently, the World Bank has formed a research dataset summarizing quantified perceptions 
of state-centric governance (Table 2), provided by a large number of enterprises, citizens, and 
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries (World Bank, 2014b). These 
data were gathered by the World Bank from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental- and international organizations, and private-sector firms (totaling 30 sources). 
Each dimension of governance was constructed by averaging data from the underlying 
sources corresponding to the perception of governance being measured 
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(World Bank, 2014a). The resulting estimates are weighted averages of the data from 
each source, with weights reflecting the pattern of correlation among data sources, for 
each dimension of governance. While this weighting improves the statistical precision, the 
estimates for each dimension of governance are in units of a standard normal distribution 
with mean zero and standard deviation of one, running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, higher 
values corresponding to higher scores of quality of governance.
Table 2. The World Bank dimensions of governance.
Dimension Definition
Voice and accountability Measures the public perception of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Government effectiveness Measures the public perception of the quality of public- and civil ser-
vices, the degree of independence from political pressures, the quali-
ty of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory quality Measures the public perception of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development.
Rule of law Measures the public perception of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of corruption Measures the public perception of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private in-
terests.
Political stability and the 
absence of violence
Measures the public perception of the likelihood of destabilization or 
overthrowing of a government by unconstitutional or violent means, 
leading to domestic violence and terrorism.
 
Source: World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
These World Bank dimensions of governance in Table 2 can be used as indicators in a semi-
positivistic approach to studies of how quantified perceptions of state-centric governance 
relate to agricultural expansion and/or intensification and dominant spatiotemporal processes 
of fragmentation of nature. More specifically, such a semi-positivistic approach could be used 
to study whether—and if so, how—state-centric governance directly drives expansion and/
or intensification of arable agriculture, in response to the rising global food demand (1.2.1.1. 
Research question 1). Furthermore, such a semi-positivistic approach could be used to study 
whether—and if so, how—state-centric governance directly drives dominant spatiotemporal 
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processes of fragmentation of nature (1.2.1.2. Research question 2). In turn, results might 
be used to study whether—and if so, how—such processes of fragmentation of nature are 
also indirectly driven by state-centric governance (1.2.1.3. Research question 3), through the 
processes of expansion and/or intensification of arable agriculture. Together, this could allow 
for a comprehensive overview of how these land-use change processes are—directly and 
indirectly—driven by state-centric governance at supranational level, and how they interact.
1.1.2.2.2. Process-based modeling
A process-based governance model would require general behavioral laws rather than 
quantification of socially constructed perceptions of governance (as would be the case for 
an empirical-statistical model). Therefore, in this thesis, the process-based approach to 
the modeling of governance is thought of as positivistic, which could possibly be used to 
perform empirical analyses of how patterns of agricultural land use and nature relate to 
general laws of governance. Similar to the empirical-statistical approach, the number and 
complexity of spatiotemporal processes that could explain observed land-use patterns, 
grow with the extent of the study area on which a process-based model would be applied 
(i.e., for validation). That is, even when simulated land-use patterns are similar to observed 
patterns, other key processes involved that could not be included into the model due to their 
complexity may also have been responsible for observed land-use patterns. Furthermore, the 
higher the degree of abstraction with which processes are modeled the lower their empirical 
specificity. That is, the more general and abstract relationships that are assumed to regulate 
processes are, the less easily they can be expressed in measurable quantities (which may 
ultimately result in an oversimplified model). Conversely, the more empirically specific and 
based on measurable quantities such general relationships are, the more difficult it becomes 
to describe how all these quantities interact in a consistent way (which may ultimately result 
in an overly complex model). 
Quantifying generalized verifiable relationships between individual decision-making (i.e., 
local governance) and aggregate land-use patterns is one of the major challenges for the 
next generation of land-use models (Irwin and Geoghegan, 2001; Parker et al., 2008a). It 
is believed that Pattern-Oriented Modeling (POM), which attempts to reproduce real-world 
aggregate patterns with those that emerge from individual decision-making processes 
(Grimm et al., 2005, 2006; Piou et al., 2009), holds the potential to a better understanding of 
land-use systems that are too complex to be understood by empirical analysis alone (Grimm 
et al., 2005; Evans and Manson, 2007; Liu et al., 2007; Wiegand et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
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increasingly successful attempts have been made to view land-use systems as dynamic social-
ecological systems, from the perspective of individual-based modeling (Parker et al. 2003; 
Jepsen et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2008; Lopez-Carr et al., 2011). Therefore, it may be possible 
to construct a pattern-oriented land-use model of agriculture and nature, based on individual 
decision-making processes regulated by general laws of local and aggregate governance, 
with which relationships between emergent land-use patterns and differences in local and/
or aggregate governance could be empirically investigated (2.2.1. Research question 4). 
That is, determining which combination of modeled biophysical- and governance processes 
approximates real-world patterns best, with a classical positivistic approach of iterating cycles 
of theory and observation.
1.2. Research questions
1.2.1. Empirical-statistical modeling
1.2.1.1. Research question 1
Does state-centric governance directly drive—and if so, how—expansion and/or intensification 
of arable agriculture?
1.2.1.2. Research question 2
Does state-centric governance directly drive—and if so, how—dominant spatiotemporal 
processes of fragmentation of nature?
1.2.1.3. Research question 3
If state-centric governance drives expansion and/or intensification of arable agriculture 
directly, does it also drive—and if so, how—processes of fragmentation of nature through 
these processes?
1.2.2. Process-based modeling
1.2.2.1. Research question 4
Is it possible—and if so, how—to systematically and verifiably approximate real-world 
dynamic complexity of agricultural land-use systems and their governance with a pattern-
oriented modeling approach based on individual decision-making processes?
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Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of empirical-statistical research questions (RQs). 
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1.3. Structure guide
In chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis it is investigated whether state-centric governance directly 
drives—and if so, how—expansion and/or intensification of arable agriculture (1.2.1.1. 
Research question 1), and whether state-centric governance directly d ives—and if so, 
how—dominant spatiotemporal processes of fragme tation of nature (1.2.1.2. Research 
question 2), respectively. Furthermore, i  chapter 4 it is investigated whether it is possible—
and if so, how—to systematically and verifiably approximate real-world dynamic complexity 
of agricultural land-use systems and their governance with a pattern-oriented modeling 
approach based on individual decision-making processes (1.2.2.1. Research question 4). 
While in chapter 5, an attempt is made at simulating the interplay between governance, 
agricultural land use, and nature, identified through empirical-statistical means (1.2.1. 
Empirical-statistical modeling) with a constructed process-based simulation model (1.2.2. 
Process-based modeling). In chapter 6 it is discussed whether—and if so, to what extent—
the research questions posed in this thesis could be answered by applying these empirical-
statistical- and process-based modeling approaches. In addition, the value added by viewing 
separate research findings together is discussed in this chapter, and how these different 
approaches dealt with the real-world complexity of chosen land-use change processes.

Deconstructed I have been, 
A phoenix of sadness, 
Reborn and reconstructed, 
From the ashes of madness.
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Abstract
In this research we studied empirical relationships between agricultural production 
dynamics and six quantitative World Bank governance indicators for 173 countries 
between 1975 and 2007. It is hypothesized that in countries with lower quality of 
governance, agricultural production increases are more likely to be achieved by area 
expansions than by increases in yields. We distinguished four groups of countries: those 
with both area and yield increases; those with increasing yields but decreasing area; those 
with decreasing yields but a growing area; and those with both declines in yields and 
area. We analyzed differences between these four groups, and also analyzed governance-
production relationships within these groups. On average, quality of governance is low in 
countries with both area and yield increases and high in countries with increasing yields 
but decreasing area. Countries with declining yields were too few in number to allow for 
quantitative analyses. The analysis of governance-production relationships within the four 
groups suggests that countries with a lower quality of governance are more inclined to 
achieve production increases by expanding agricultural area rather than increasing yields. 
Additional explanatory value of governance indicators to agricultural production dynamics 
is generally small, but nevertheless significant in most cases. Our results suggest that, in 
order for agricultural production to increase without excessive expansions of agricultural 
area, governance issues should be resolved. Should we assume a causal relationship, the 
tendency of expanding cultivated area in less developed countries can be stopped by 
improving the quality of governance.
Keywords: development, intensification, governance, cropland, farming, empirical.
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2.1. Introduction
Recently, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) adjusted its 
projections of future food and feed demand (FAO, 2009c). Because of population growth 
and, more importantly, a rise in economic welfare, global food and feed production should 
increase with 70 % by 2050. In order to attain such an increase in production, cultivated 
area has to expand and/or yields have to increase. Although some argue that there is a vast 
potential for yield increase to meet the required production increase (Neumann et al., 2010), 
the question remains whether or not this increase in yields is likely to happen. The potential 
for yield increase is highest in developing countries, where current productivity levels are far 
below potentially attainable levels (Marra et al., 2003; Byerlee and Fischer, 2002). However, 
many developing countries are also characterized by a lower quality of governance, which 
may hinder yield increase for a number of reasons. One is that investments in research 
and development are too low to achieve the (region-specific) technology required for yield 
increase; second is that the investment-climate at farm level is often unfavorable so that 
buying equipment and inputs required for intensification is difficult; and thirdly, natural areas 
are abundant and not well protected, making expansion of agricultural area at the expense 
of nature an attractive alternative to intensification (Kakonge, 1998).
In the past, many attempts have been made to describe and predict agricultural yields and land 
use at a global level. Most of the studies concerning yields had a biophysical character (Soltani 
et al., 1999; Harrison et al., 2000; Hafner et al., 2003; Nuemann et al., 2010), while most of the 
land use studies had an economic character (Veldkamp and Fresco, 1996; Rounsevell et al., 
2005; Eickhout et al., 2006; Mittenzwei et al., 2007). Although numerous examples of cases 
where rural conditions were affected by governance can be found in literature, quantitative, 
global analyses of governance effects on agriculture are few. Those that sketch effects of policies 
are relatively abundant (EC, 2000; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004; Biermann, 2007; 
Jansson et al., 2008), but those that relate overall governance quality to agriculture are rare. 
Only recently more attention has been paid to governance effects (IFPRI, 2006; IFPRI, 2008; 
FAO, 2009a, 2009b) on agriculture. These qualitative studies related governance regarding 
land transactions (access to market, property rights enforcement) to investments in research 
and development (yield increase). However, they did not demonstrate that governance 
characteristics are indeed significant factors for aggregate agricultural production. In general 
it can be said that governance studies were mostly characterized by qualitative studies of one 
single regime, which could hardly be used to make global quantitative inferences (Cash et al., 
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2006). Now that the World Bank made a global inventory of governance indicators, we can 
identify the role of governance in agricultural dynamics.
To examine whether or not governance characteristics are indeed significant factors 
determining production increases, and whether these are obtained from yield increase or 
from area expansion, an empirical analysis of historical tendencies of yield increase and area 
expansion was performed. These observed agricultural production dynamics (i.e., changes 
in cultivated arable area and crop yields) were related to six governance indicators that 
were recently produced by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Using linear regression 
techniques we test the hypothesis that in countries with lower quality of governance, 
agricultural production increase is more likely to be achieved by area expansion than by 
increase in yield.
Table 1. Production-, governance- and control indicators.
Indicators Source
Production indicators
Aggregate change in total agricultural production (-) F.A.O. †
Aggregate change in total cultivated area (-) F.A.O. †
Aggregate change in yield (-) F.A.O. †
Governance indicators
Voice and accountability (index between -2.5 and 2.5) World Bank‡
Government effectiveness (index between -2.5 and 2.5) World Bank‡
Regulatory quality (index between -2.5 and 2.5) World Bank‡
Rule of law (index between -2.5 and 2.5) World Bank‡
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (index between -2.5 and 2.5) World Bank‡
Control of corruption (index between -2.5 and 2.5) World Bank‡
Control indicators
Change in agricultural export value index (-) F.A.O. §
Initial agricultural export value index (share of total export value) (-) F.A.O. §
Change in agricultural import value index (-) F.A.O. §
Initial agricultural import value index (share of total import value) (-) F.A.O. §
Change in net trade flow value (export minus import) (-) F.A.O. §
Initial net trade flow value (export minus import) (share of total value) (-) F.A.O. §
Change in GDP (PPP) (-) World Bank|
Initial GDP (PPP) (International $/capita/yr) World Bank|
Change in economically active agricultural population (-) F.A.O. ¶
Initial economically active agricultural population (share of total) (-) F.A.O. ¶
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Change in total population (-) F.A.O. ¶
Initial total population density (persons/Km2) F.A.O. ¶
Change in total economically active population (-) F.A.O. ¶
Initial economically active population (share of total) (-) F.A.O. ¶
Change in urban population (-) F.A.O. ¶
Initial urban population (share of total) (-) F.A.O. ¶
Change in rural population (-) F.A.O. ¶
Initial rural population (share of total) (-) F.A.O. ¶
Annual mean temperature (°C) Worldclim#
Annual precipitation (mm) Worldclim#
Fraction of area constrained by aluminum toxicity (-) F.A.O. ††
Fraction of area constrained by salinity (-) F.A.O. ††
Fraction of area constrained by high phosphorus fixation (-) F.A.O. ††
†F.A.O., faostat, 01-09-09 (http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/default.aspx#ancor); §F.A.O., tradestat, 01-
09-09 (http://faostat.fao.org/site/406/default.aspx); ¶F.A.O., popstat, 01-09-09 (http://faostat.fao.
org/site/452/default.aspx); ††F.A.O., terrastat, 01-09-09 (http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/agll/terrastat); 
‡World Bank, 01-05-09 (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi); |World Bank; World Development 
Indicators, 01-05-09 (http://www.worldbank.org/data); The international dollar is a hypothetical unit of 
currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given 
point in time; in this case the year 2000; #Worldclim, 01-05-09 (http://www.worldclim.org/methods).
2.2. Data and methods
When studying real-world phenomena that are the result of complex processes by means of 
regression analysis, it is hardly ever possible to isolate the role of the explanatory variable of 
interest from a wide range of other explanatory variables. In our case, we are interested in 
how well governance indicators can explain agricultural production indicators, but we cannot 
escape from the fact that governance is correlated to many other variables that also explain 
production indicators (e.g., climate, soils, economy and demography). For this reason, we try 
to include these other variables as much as possible, to account for their potential impact. 
We will refer to these variables as control indicators. Because of statistical confounding we 
will not be able to distinguish exactly which part of the explanatory power of the regression 
can be attributed to each of the two categories (the governance indicators and the control 
indicators). We can nevertheless measure a range of the explanatory power of governance. 
The upper limit of this range is provided by the explanatory power of the governance 
indicators only, and the lower limit is provided by the explanatory power of the governance 
indicators in addition to the explanatory power of the control indicators. The upper limit is 
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likely to overestimate explanatory power of governance, as this estimate assumes that all 
common explanatory power of the two categories of indicators should be attributed to the 
governance indicators only. Conversely, the latter one is likely to underestimate explanatory 
power of governance, as this estimate assumes that all common explanatory power of the 
two categories of indicators should be attributed to the control indicators. Therefore, true 
explanatory power of governance is likely to be within this range (Bakker et al., 2005).
2.2.1. Data
Because all indicators had to be measured in a similar manner for all countries in the analysis, 
we were limited to use global databases such as those of the FAO and the World Bank. 
Countries for which no (consistent) data existed because they either merged or split up into 
separate states during the study period (1975–2007), e.g., former USSR, former SFRY, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Ethiopia, were not included. In total, 173 countries were included in 
the analysis. As we are interested in dynamics, most indicators were computed as relative 
changes between (approximately) 1975 and 2007. Only for those indicators that were 
considered static in time (e.g., soil variables) or for which sufficiently long time series were 
not available (governance), a state variable was used. For most of the control indicators, both 
a change and a (initial) state value were used. Changes were computed as the ratio between 
initial states and final states. In order to correct for inter-annual variability, initial states were 
computed as the average over the period 1975–1980 and final states were computed as the 
average over 2002–2007. All dependence on country size and population size was eliminated 
by working with relative values (e.g., changes relative to the initial value or densities or 
fractions).
2.2.1.1. Production indicators
Production dynamics between 1975 and 2007 were expressed in terms of change in 
production, change in yield, and change in cultivated area, all between 1975 and 2007 (Table 
1). Clearly, one of these three indicators is superfluous, i.e., given any two of these, the third 
can be calculated. For this reason, we only use changes in yield and cultivated area. However, 
the mathematical relationship that describes how these latter two indicators contribute to 
production change provides insight that is important for interpretation. Therefore, production 
change is also described in the derivation below, although it is not used in the analyses.
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Yield changes were calculated for all different crop types recorded in the FAO database1, after 
which a weighted average was calculated on the basis of the average cultivated area per crop 
type: 
between these different aspects of his identity. To him, art and science are different sides of the same 
coin. Artistic qualities may facilitate scientific research, when the intellectual aspect of the identity is 
present more strongly. Conversely, scientific qualities may facilitate artistic expression, when the 
artistic aspect of the identity is present more strongly. The author’s artistic interests reflect the 
“feeling” part of his personality, while the scientific interests reflect the “thinking” part. The author 
feels it is his life’s challenge to make these two parts coexist in harmony, so that sufficient self-love 
may flow through this union. When one part is overly dominant, the other is subdued, which is still 
sometimes experienced as difficult by the author. This can also lead to being cut-off from the flow of 
self-love that we all need so much. 
 
Long before any of this, the author was born on the 11th of May, 1979, in the small city of Schagen in 
the province of North-Holland, the Netherlands. 
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In order to account for inter-annual yield variability, Y
1,i 
is the average yield over 2002–2007, 
for crop i, and Y
0,i 
is the average yield over 1975–1980, for crop i. Ai is the average cultivated 
area for crop i over 1975–2007. By computing yield changes separately for all individual 
crops before averaging, effects of shifts from heavy crops (e.g., potatoes) to light crops 
(e.g., fibers), or from crops undergoing strong yield increase to crops undergoing small yield 
increase, are not mistaken for yield changes. All changes were expressed as the log of the 
ratios of these averaged initial and final values, in order to rescale the skewed distribution 
and non-equidistant data, resulting from working with positive ratios and strongly varying 
growths/declines. This expression (Eq. 1) is defined as dY and approximates the yield change 
at national level (Y
1 divided by Y0).
Similarly, changes in cultivated area were also calculated for all of the recorded crop types:
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in which A
1,i 
is the average cultivated area over 2002–2007, for crop i, and A
0,i is the average 
cultivated area over 1975–1980, for crop i. This expression is defined as dA and approximates 
the change in total cultivated area at national level (A
1 divided by A0).
By calculating change in this way, one creates dimensionless quantities providing information 
on change between the first and last five years, standardized for country-dependent 
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properties such as size. Adding the left and right hand sides of Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, we obtain an 
approximation of the change in total production at national level, defined as dP:
between these different aspects of his identity. To him, art and science are different sides of the same 
coin. Artistic qualities may facilitate scientific research, when the intellectual aspect of the identity is 
present more strongly. Conversely, scientific qualities may facilitate artistic expression, when the 
artistic aspect of the identity is present more strongly. The author’s artistic interests reflect the 
“feeling” part of his personality, while the scientific interests reflect the “thinking” part. The author 
feels it is his life’s challenge to make these two parts coexist in harmony, so that sufficient self-love 
may flow through this union. When one part is overly dominant, the other is subdued, which is still 
sometimes experienced as difficult by the author. This can also lead to being cut-off from the flow of 
self-love that we all need so much. 
 
Long before any of this, the author was born on the 11th of May, 1979, in the small city of Schagen in 
the province of North-Holland, the Netherlands. 
 
Changes Layout Equations Chapter 2 
 
 ≡  ∑  ∑   ≈   
 
 ≡  ∑ ∑   =   
 
  +  =   +   ≈   ≡  
 
 
Changes Layout Equations Chapter 4 
 
)0()()0()0()2()1()(
1
VknVnnnV
n
k
nn 


 −=−−= ∏
=
MMMM ωω ⋯ ,      (9)  
                                equal to )()( nUnV nω= , as )0()0( UV = .                   (10) 
 
 (3)
Therefore, dY can be interpreted as the relative contribution of a change in yield to dP, thus 
reflecting a trend towards more intensive (dY > 0) or towards less intensive (dY < 0) agriculture. 
Similarly, dA can be interpreted as the relative contribution of a change in cultivated area to 
dP, thus reflecting a trend towards more extensive (dA > 0) or towards less extensive (dA < 
0) agriculture.
2.2.1.2. Governance indicators
The World Bank identified six indicators for governance (Kaufmann et al., 2009):
Voice and Accountability represents the extent to which citizens have political rights and 
civil liberties, and are able to participate in selecting their government. Yields were found 
to be significantly higher in countries with more political rights and civil liberties (Fulginiti et 
al., 2004), indicating that agricultural development is related to “voice and accountability”. 
Agricultural development requires interactions between the rural population (e.g., labor 
unions and agricultural associations) and government agencies (e.g., extension service and 
ministry of agriculture). Such interactions are believed to benefit from political rights and 
civil liberties. Furthermore, governance influences agricultural policies, tax levels, and the 
conditions under which subsidies are granted. The extent to which the (rural) population can 
influence governance (by political votes) is therefore supposed to express itself in improved 
conditions for the rural population (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997).
Government Effectiveness refers to the provision, by government agencies, of public goods 
and services (and quality thereof), such as infrastructure and governmental agricultural 
research programs. Infrastructure plays a key role for the agricultural potential of remote 
rural areas to be used; agricultural research & development play a key role for yield increases 
(Thirtle et al., 2003). Therefore, whether or not these public goods and services can be 
delivered effectively by the government, is crucial to agricultural development. Moreover, 
“government effectiveness” is known to provide an adequate measure with respect to the 
quality of these public goods and services, and in particular for agricultural research and 
development (Thirtle and Piesse, 2007).
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Regulatory Quality expresses how well private sector development is promoted by the 
government. A poor promotion of private sector development may negatively affect the 
performance of free-market mechanisms and investment climate (e.g., making it difficult for 
investors to get loans). In many countries, poor regulatory quality is caused by industrial 
protectionism: domestic trade policies disturbing the balance between domestic and world 
prices and preventing access to international markets, thereby obstructing private sector 
development (Lio and Liu, 2008). Furthermore, countries with poor regulatory quality tend to 
implement policies that result in high taxation of agriculture, which also has negative effects 
on private sector development and investment (Krueger et al., 1991).
Rule of Law represents quality of contract- and law enforcement in general. Poor contract- and 
law enforcement hinders the protection of property, and rights of landowners and tenants. 
In that case, advances in agricultural development (yield increase) are unlikely, as these 
advances strongly depend on private investments in agricultural research and development 
(Thirtle et al., 2003). Such investments are not likely to be made when investors cannot be 
assured of future revenues.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures the public perception of the likelihood 
of destabilization or overthrowing of a government by unconstitutional or violent means, 
leading to domestic violence and terrorism. It is well known that when violent political 
conflicts arise in a country, food security is compromised by failure of economic and social 
networks (Hussain and Herens, 1997). In countries facing higher levels of political conflict 
and war, yields were reported to be significantly lower during these periods (Fulginiti et al., 
2004). Therefore, violent political destabilization or overthrowing of government would have 
negative effects on agriculture.
Control of Corruption refers to the extent to which public power is abused for private goals 
and gain. In countries where corruption is controlled, impartial authorities are often provided 
to check for corruption of conventional authorities and to hold them accountable if necessary. 
This increases the likelihood that power and funds are used for what they were intended. In 
countries that fail to control corruption, powerful individuals have the opportunity to abuse 
their influence to their advantage, at the expense of other less powerful individuals (e.g., 
farmers). For example, it has been suggested that large fertilizer producers persuaded African 
governments to impose particular fertilization programs upon farmers through bribery and 
other forms of corruption (World Bank, 2010), despite the fact that farmers often knew more 
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about the particular deficits of their soils. Imposing these programs resulted in a loss of this 
knowledge, while crop yields hardly benefited from the traditional N, P and K fertilizers that 
were, after all, developed in and for temperate zones. 
Annual governance indicator data were available for all six indicators and all 173 countries, 
during 1996–2008. This period is too short to compute a meaningful relative change, and 
does not correspond to the period for which other indicators were available (1975–2007). 
Therefore, averages were calculated over 1996–2008 for all governance indicators, which 
were included in the regression.
2.2.1.3. Control indicators
Control indicators include biophysical, demographic, and economic indicators (Table 1). 
These control indicators were chosen because they are known to be important determinants 
of agriculture in general. Most control variables are correlated with governance for a variety 
of reasons. As mentioned earlier, because of this correlation we can only identify a range of 
likely governance impact. Because we also include control indicators that are quite closely 
connected to governance (particularly the economic indicators), we limit our assessment of 
governance importance to that aspect of governance that is independent from economic 
performance. As economic indicators are generally associated with overall quality of 
governance, the marginal explanatory values of governance are likely to be underestimations.
2.2.2. Methods
2.2.2.1. Between-groups analysis
Groups of countries were classified according to their production dynamics, derived from 
dY and dA. Fig. 1 presents a diagram of the different groups of countries according to this 
classification. In this diagram, countries can be in quadrant 1: area and yield increase, 
quadrant 2: area decrease and yield increase, quadrant 3: area and yield decrease, or in 
quadrant 4: area increase and yield decrease. We refer to these four groups as follows: 
“growth” countries with expansion of cultivated area and increasing yield (Q1); “intensifying” 
countries with contraction of cultivated area but increasing yield (Q2); “decline” countries 
with contraction of cultivated area and decreasing yield (Q3); and “expansion” countries with 
expansion of cultivated area but decreasing yield (Q4). 
In order to explore differences between these groups in terms of control- and governance 
indicators, we performed an ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA). Specifically, separate T-tests 
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were performed for all possible pairs of different quadrants and indicators, provided that 
the number of observations was sufficient. This analysis is referred to as the between-groups 
analysis.
2.2.2.2. Within-groups analysis
Next, in order to test the maximal and marginal explanatory value of governance indicators 
we performed linear regressions, for all countries together and for the groups individually. 
While the between-groups analysis distinguished countries based on the sign of dY and dA, 
the within-groups analysis investigates the spatial variability in dY and dA values within groups, 
taking into account their correlation with governance and control indicators. Multivariate 
regression analysis was applied to examine relationships between governance indicators and 
dY and dA. As the number of observations was not high enough to allow for the use of all 
indicators, a pre-selection of indicators was made (per group and dependents dY and dA). 
This was done using the following criteria: only one out of two correlated indicators (i.e., 
with a Pearson correlation coefficient > 0.65) was kept in the selection. Furthermore, only 
indicators that were significant (p ≤ 0.05) in univariate regressions (with dY and dA) were 
selected for further analysis. For the governance indicators, a significance level of p ≤ 0.1 was 
used, because we assume that the explanatory power of governance variables is often only 
revealed in combination with other control indicators, i.e., statistical interaction between 
governance and control indicators. The maximal and marginal explanatory power of the 
governance indicators were identified. The maximal explanatory power was obtained by using 
only the governance indicators. The marginal explanatory power was obtained by comparing 
the model containing all governance and control indicators to a model containing only the 
control indicators. Furthermore, the signs of the relationships between quality of governance 
and area- and yield change were determined. This was done by examining whether area- or 
yield change decreased or increased when all governance indicators increase by a value of 1, 
i.e., those that were significant.
2.3. Results
2.3.1. Between-groups analysis
All 173 countries were classified based on changes in yield dY and cultivated area dA as shown 
in Fig. 1. For any country in the diagram, the position relative to the origin reflects a change in 
production during 1975–2007, as dP is approximated by the sum of dY and dA. In all countries 
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below the diagonal with negative slope production decreased, while in countries above it 
production increased. On the diagonal, changes in area and yield offset one another; dP ≈ 0. 
On the diagonal with positive slope, changes in production are not dominantly attributable 
to either changes in area or changes in yield; dA = dY. Below it, dA > dY, and above it, dA < dY.
Fig. 1. Log of relative change in yield (dY) and log of relative change in cultivated area (dA) on the 
y- and x-axis respectively (both at national level), for 173 countries (dP ≈ dY + dA). Q1 holds “growth” 
countries, Q2 “intensifying” countries, Q3 “decline” countries and Q4 “expansion” countries (see 
methods: between-groups analysis).
From Fig. 1 it becomes clear that countries with a yield decline are a minority. Fig. 2 shows 
that total areas of “decline” and “expansion” countries are negligible compared to that of 
“growth” and/or “intensifying” countries, and that “growth” and “intensifying” countries 
roughly divide the area in two. Furthermore, most “growth” countries are developing or 
industrializing countries. Mexico, most of South America, most of Africa, most of the Middle 
East and South East Asia, but also Canada, Australia, France and Norway are in the “growth” 
quadrant. Canada and Australia are developed and wealthy countries in which land is 
abundant, and therefore a cheap resource. France and Norway negligibly increased their 
cultivated area and are bordering between “growth” and “intensifying” behavior. Conversely, 
the bulk of “intensifying” countries is made up by industrializing to developed countries. 
Most of Europe, New Zealand, the United States of America, small parts of South America: 
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Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Uruguay; China, Japan, Turkey, some of the wealthier 
African countries: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Botswana and South Africa; but also Afghanistan, 
Yemen and the African countries of Senegal, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, and Somalia 
are in the “intensifying” quadrant. These last few countries clearly deviate from the bulk of 
“intensifying” countries in terms of wealth and development.
Fig. 2. Geographical representation of the four groups of countries, depending on the signs of dY (log 
of relative change in yield at national level) and dA (log of relative change in cultivated area at national 
level).
Table 2 shows means and significant differences in means of the different indicators, between 
the groups of countries. For those indicators that were not significantly different with respect 
to other quadrants, only the means are given.
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Table 2. Between-groups analysis of means.
Growth  
(Q1), N = 80 
Intensifying  
(Q2), N = 65 
Decline 
(Q3),N = 10 
Expansion  
(Q4), N = 18 
All, N 
= 173
Governance indicators
Voice and accountability -0.25  
(Q2***)
0.32  
(Q1***, Q4*)
-0.02 -0.14  
(Q2*)
-0.01
Government effectiveness -0.25  
(Q2***)
0.43  
(Q1***, Q4***)
-0.22 -0.38  
(Q2***)
-0.001
Regulatory quality -0.26  
(Q2***)
0.41  
(Q1***, Q4***)
-0.11 -0.45  
(Q2***)
-0.01
Rule of law -0.23  
(Q2***)
0.34  
(Q1***, Q4*)
-0.26 -0.18  
(Q2*)
-0.01
Political stability -0.19  
(Q2*, Q3**)
0.08  
(Q1*)
0.27  
(Q1**)
0.00 -0.04
Control of corruption -0.25  
(Q2***)
0.4  
(Q1***, Q4**)
-0.27 -0.18  
(Q2**)
0.01
Control indicators
Economic
Change in agricultural export value 
index
0.53 0.51 0.04 0.07 0.44
Initial agricultural export value index 
(share of total export value)
237.46 113.47  
(Q4*)
175.50 286.39  
(Q2*)
187.89
Change in agricultural import value 
index 
0.77  
(Q3*)
0.73 0.61  
(Q1*)
0.70 0.74
Initial agricultural import value index 
(share of total import value)
44.50 44.08 63.48 51.41 46.38
Change in net trade flow value 
(export minus import) 
-0.08  
(Q4**)
-0.14  
(Q4*)
-0.28 -0.51  
(Q1**, Q2*)
-0.16
Initial net trade flow value (export 
minus import) (share of total value)
182.20 69.39  
(Q4*)
112.02 234.97  
(Q2*)
137.92
Change in GDP (PPP) 0.57  
(Q2***)
0.7  
(Q1***)
0.72 0.46 0.62
Initial GDP (PPP) (International $/
capita/yr)
2880.80  
(Q4***)
4006.30  
(Q4***)
2678.10 907  
(Q1***, Q2***)
3275.40
Change in economically active 
agricultural population
0.11  
(Q2***)
-0.15  
(Q1***, Q4***)
-0.10 0.16  
(Q2***)
0.01
Initial economically active agricultur-
al population (share of total)
0.51  
(Q2***, Q3**)
0.32  
(Q1***, Q4***)
0.36  
(Q1**, Q4**)
0.55  
(Q2***, Q3**)
0.43
Demographic
Change in total population 0.32  
(Q2***)
0.18  
(Q1***) 
0.17 0.26 0.25
Initial total population density 
(persons/Km2)
79  
(Q2*)
176  
(Q1*, Q3*, Q4*)
80  
(Q2*)
82  
(Q2*)
116
Change in total economically active 
population
0.33  
(Q2***)
0.21  
(Q1***, Q4*)
0.22 0.28  
(Q2*)
0.27
Initial economically active population 
(share of total) 
0.39  
(Q4**)
0.40  
(Q4**)
0.38 0.36  
(Q1**, Q2**)
0.39
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Change in urban population 0.19  
(Q2***, Q3***)
0.11  
(Q1***)
0.07  
(Q1***, Q4***)
0.23  
(Q3***)
0.16
Initial urban population (share of 
total)
0.39  
(Q2***)
0.54  
(Q1***, Q4***)
0.47  
(Q4*)
0.32  
(Q2***, Q3*)
0.44
Change in rural population -0.17  
(Q3*)
-0.16 -0.10  
(Q1*)
-0.14 -0.16
Initial rural population (share of 
total)
0.61  
(Q2***)
0.46  
(Q1***, Q4***)
0.53  
(Q4*)
0.68  
(Q2***, Q3*)
0.56
Biophysical
Annual mean temperature (°C) 22.80  
(Q2***)
17.60  
(Q1***, Q4***)
20.40 24.10  
(Q2***)
20.80
Annual precipitation (mm) 1361.60 1140.00 1475.70 1273.50 1274.20
Fraction of area constrained by 
aluminum toxicity
22.30  
(Q2**)
14.60  
(Q1**)
25.50 19.90 19.20
Fraction of area constrained by 
salinity 
4.20  
(Q2**)
1.70  
(Q1**)
3 1.30 3
Fraction of area constrained by high 
phosphorus fixation
6  
(Q2***)
2  
(Q1***)
9.20 6.40 4.50
Mean values of indicators per quadrant, and in parentheses from which other quadrants means 
significantly differ, according to T-tests. On the right, total means of these variables. p ≤ 0.1*, p ≤ 0.05**, 
p ≤ 0.01*** Statistical software: R for statistical computing version 2.8.0 (2008). 
With respect to governance, Table 2 shows that differences between “growth” countries 
and “intensifying” countries are most significant, and also that numbers of observations 
for these two groups are highest. Furthermore, “expansion” countries differ strongly from 
“intensifying” countries, as all but one governance indicators differ significantly. On average, 
high quality of governance is mostly seen in “intensifying” countries, far above global 
average in general. The average quality of governance is significantly lower in the other 
groups. Remarkable is that “decline” countries distinguish themselves from other groups 
by their relatively high “political stability”. “Growth” and “intensifying” countries differ in 
terms of biophysical control indicators as well. “Growth” countries are warmer and have 
more severe biophysical constraints than “intensifying” countries. The present welfare 
level in “intensifying” countries is at ca. $ 20,100 per capita per year, compared to ca. 
$ 14,050 per capita per year for “decline” countries. The present welfare levels in “growth” 
and “expansion” countries are at ca. $ 10,700 per capita per year and ca. $ 2,600 per capita 
per year, respectively. Contrary to “intensifying” and “decline” countries, agricultural labor 
force strongly increased for “expansion” and “growth” countries. Finally, initial population 
density was almost twice as large for “intensifying” countries, compared to the other groups.
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2.3.2. Within-groups analysis
The within-groups analysis could only be performed for the total number of countries, and 
for the “growth” and “intensifying” countries, as there were not sufficient observations for 
“decline” and “expansion” countries for reliable regressions; n = 10 and n = 18 respectively. 
Table 3 presents how well the variance of production indicators is explained by the biophysical, 
demographic and economic control classes (separately and together), and how well it is 
explained by governance (maximally and marginally).
Table 3. Variance explained (R2) by classes and combinations of classes, per quadrant and dependent. 
dY is the log of relative change in yield at national level, and dA the log of relative change in cultivated 
area at national level.
Growth (Q1), N = 80 Intensifying (Q2), N 
= 65
All, N = 173
Control classes dA dY dA dY dA dY
Economic (E) 0.65 0.35 0.39 0.07 0.20 0.25
Demographic (D) 0.56 N.S. 0.20 N.S. 0.34 N.S.
Biophysical (B) 0.33 0.13 N.S. N.S. 0.31 0.04
(E) + (D) + (B) 0.75 0.36 0.56 0.07 0.48 0.27
Governance classes
Maximal governance (G) 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09
Marginal governance    
(E+D+B+G)-(E+D+B)
0.03 0.02 0.00 0.22 0.04 0.02
Sign of relationship - + - + - +
N.S. = Not Significant. Sign of relationship refers to whether dA or dY decreases (negative) or increases 
(positive), upon increasing the quality of governance in the maximal governance class regression 
equations. Statistical software: R for statistical computing version 2.8.0 (2008).
Area increases are strongly controlled by economic and demographic indicators for “growth” 
countries (Table 3). Yield increase could be less well described, but also seems to be controlled 
mostly by economic indicators. Governance explains between 3 and 19 % of variance of 
change in cultivated area and between 2 and 9 % of variance of change in yield. The sign of 
the relationship between governance and area change is negative, meaning that the higher 
the quality of governance, the lower the area increase. The relationship between governance 
and yield change is positive, meaning that the higher the quality of governance, the higher 
the yield increase. For “intensifying” countries, economic indicators appear to be important 
determinants as well. It is striking that biophysical constraints do not seem to play a role for 
these countries. Governance explains between 0 and 8 % of variance of area decrease and 
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between 7 and 22 % of variance of yield increase. For yield increase, the maximal governance 
class gives a lower value of explained variance than the marginal governance class, which 
points to interactions between the governance- and control indicators. The sign of the 
relationship between governance and area decrease is again negative, indicating that better 
governance is associated to stronger area decreases. The sign of the relationship between 
governance and yield increase is again positive. Clearly, the bandwidth of variance explained 
by governance is higher for area increase for “growth” countries, and higher for yield increase 
for “intensifying” countries, roughly in opposite magnitudes.
For all groups combined, economic factors explain a significant part of the global variance in 
changes in area and yield. Area changes are also determined by demographic and biophysical 
constraints. Governance explains between 4 and 7 % of variance of change in cultivated area 
and between 2 and 9 % of variance of change in yield, similar to results found by others (Kok 
and Veldkamp 2001). The bandwidths of variance explained by governance are now in the 
same range of magnitude. The signs of the relationships are again negative for area change, 
and positive for yield change.
2.4. Discussion
The results from the two analyses presented here confirm the hypothesis that in countries 
with lower quality of governance, agricultural production increase is more likely to be 
achieved by area expansion than by increase in yield. Although governance indicators do not 
explain vast shares of spatial variability in cultivated area- and yield change within groups, a 
nonzero marginal explanatory value considerably increases the likelihood that governance 
does matter. In reality, the strengths of relationships are likely to be somewhere in between 
the most strictly (marginal R2) and loosely held criteria (maximal R2). Overall, the chosen set 
of control indicators seems adequate in explaining spatial variability in production indicators 
other than governance indicators, because of the overall consistency of results. Evidently, 
control and governance indicators can never be entirely separated, and interaction is likely 
to be present in the real world (e.g., countries with poor governance suffering more from a 
harsh climate than countries with a similar climate but good governance). In the case of yield 
change in “intensifying” countries interaction is even such that marginal explanatory power 
exceeds maximal explanatory power.
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From Table 2 we could tell that quality of governance in “growth” countries differs most 
from that in “intensifying” countries, and that “expansion” countries also differ strongly 
from “intensifying” countries in this respect. Furthermore, quality of governance is high in 
“intensifying” countries and low in other groups. In between groups, significantly higher quality 
of governance does not necessarily lead to a significantly higher yield increase, as average 
yield increases were nearly identical for “growth” and “intensifying” countries, which is not 
shown. However, the between-groups analysis does indicate a relationship between lower 
quality of governance and stronger area increase, for “growth” and “intensifying” countries. 
This means that the lower the quality of governance, the more area increase will occur. The 
signs of relationships found in the within-groups analysis confirm this by suggesting that 
lower quality of governance is more associated with area increase than with yield increase, 
while higher quality of governance is now also more associated with yield increase than with 
area increase (Table 3). We also know that quality of governance seems more important 
to the explanation of spatial variability in area increase in “growth” countries, and more 
important to the explanation of spatial variability in yield increase in “intensifying” countries 
(Table 3). Therefore, in general, higher quality of governance seems to lead to substitution 
behavior of land for inputs, rather than increases in yield only. This expands on previous 
studies that only showed yields to be positively related to higher quality of governance (Lio 
and Liu, 2008; Thirtle and Piesse, 2007; Fulginiti et al., 2004). As for the individual governance 
indicators, it could be seen that the scores on political stability differ from those of the other 
governance indicators (i.e., relatively low likelihood of destabilization in “growth” countries, 
when compared to “intensifying” countries; Table 2). This indicator is more independent from 
the others anyway: one may have poor governance but without much violence (Table 2). On 
the other hand, political instability is unlikely to occur in combination with good governance.
These results suggest that countries with lower quality of governance are more oriented 
towards expansion, and that rising levels of production are achieved more by area increase 
than by yield increase. Moreover, as quality of governance becomes higher, this orientation 
of countries towards production tends to flip from expansion towards intensification. This 
indicates that it is not possible to prevent further expansion in “growth” countries, unless 
quality of governance can be improved. On the contrary, rising levels of production would 
likely be accompanied by approximately equally as much expansion as yield growth, in line 
with other global studies (Bindraban et al., 2009; OECD/FAO, 2008; IAASTD, 2009). If quality 
of governance could be increased, results suggest that less cultivated area could be used than 
at present by “growth” countries. Furthermore, in “growth” countries, quality of governance 
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could still rise radically, compared to “intensifying” countries. Therefore, “growth” countries 
appear to have a large potential for further substitution of agricultural production. The 
“intensifying” countries, which are generally wealthier and more developed (Fig 2, Table 
2) than “growth” countries, seem to have realized this potential to a large extent already. 
Moreover, yield increases could be realized more cost-effectively in “growth” countries than 
in “intensifying” countries (Marra et al., 2003), as “growth” countries are generally less 
developed than “intensifying” countries (Fig 2, Table 2). That economic- and governance 
indicators appear to interact for yield change in “intensifying” countries (Table 3), could 
reflect that “intensifying” countries are generally higher up on their technological learning 
curve (Marra et al., 2003). Finally, “intensifying” countries are less biophysically constrained, 
which could also be related to a higher level of technology, knowledge and more effective 
management.
2.5. Conclusions
It was demonstrated that governance in countries where the agricultural area expands, 
differs significantly from that in countries where the agricultural area contracts. Governance 
is more important to the explanation of spatial variability in area increase in less well-
developed countries, and more important to the explanation of spatial variability in yield 
increase in more highly developed countries. This indicates that in the first case governance 
is more related to expansion, and in the latter more to intensification. Furthermore, our 
analysis suggests that countries with poor governance are more likely to achieve a production 
increase by means of area expansion rather than by means of yield increase. Moreover, as 
the quality of governance increases, this orientation towards production tends to flip from 
expansion towards intensification. Should we assume a causal relationship, the tendency 
of expanding cultivated area in less developed countries can be stopped by improving the 
quality of governance.
I stand on your horizon,
True love is on the run,
Chasing ever after your shadow,
Dancing on the dark side of my sun.
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Abstract
In this study, quantitative relationships between overall quality of governance and 
processes of fragmentation and expansion of nature were studied through cross-national 
comparison for 20 European countries for the period 1990–2006. Land-cover change trends 
were detected by comparing CORINE land-cover maps from the years 1990 and 2006. Four 
dominant spatiotemporal processes of change in nature were revealed by characterizing 
past developments with two indicators: overall change in nature area and change in 
average patch size of nature. These processes were “Formation of larger-than-average 
patches of nature and/or Expansion of nature and/or Connection of nature”; “Formation 
of smaller-than-average patches of nature”; “Removal of smaller-than-average patches 
of nature”; and “Removal of larger-than-average patches of nature and/or Shrinkage of 
nature and/or Dissection of nature”. The majority of countries expanded their total nature, 
although this is likely not to have been the result of deliberate nature restoration alone 
but also of land abandonment or afforestation for production purposes, which do not 
necessarily lead to positive development in terms of biodiversity. For the period 1990–
2006, overall quality of governance was found to be positively related to expansion of 
nature, and negatively to increasing patch size of nature. Lower scores of overall quality 
of governance are more likely to drive the processes of removal, shrinkage, and dissection 
of nature through changes in nature area. Higher scores of overall quality of governance 
are more likely to drive the processes of formation, expansion, and connection of nature 
through changes in both nature area and patch size. Overall, quality of governance could 
indeed drive the deliberate development of nature for the purposes of restoration and 
conservation, halting fragmentation and the ongoing decline of biodiversity in Europe.
Keywords: biodiversity; structural connectivity; governance; policy; land-cover pattern; 
ecological network.
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3.1. Introduction
Current rates of fragmentation of European nature areas pose a major threat to the survival 
of species that depend on their ability to disperse or migrate into other habitats (EEA, 2011; 
Van der Sluis et al., 2012). Throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, 
there have been many actions to combat this threat at EU level, at national levels, and at 
sub-national levels. Proposed solutions have been primarily scientific and technical, focusing 
on the development of ecological networks in one form or another (Jongman et al., 2004, 
2011). Although designs of these networks were often embedded in a policy context, actual 
implementation is challenged by how governance is organized in reality, e.g., decentralized 
or centralized (Von Haaren and Reich, 2006; Čivić et al., 2009; Simeonova et al., 2009). Policy 
studies on the implementation and evaluation of fragmentation-combating measures often 
suggest that a lack of quality in governance is responsible for the failure to halt further nature 
fragmentation (Leibenath et al., 2010). However, these studies are often performed at local 
level, and although they give detailed accounts of institutional and legislative organization, 
the sheer complexity as well as the qualitative nature of such accounts prevents cross-national 
comparisons. Nevertheless, in 2009, the World Bank has defined quantitative dimensions of 
quality of governance, which have been assessed for nearly all countries in the world (215) 
in the same manner (Kaufmann et al., 2009, 2010). These dimensions of governance provide 
quantitative national estimates of the quality of governance during the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 21st century (Table 1, World Bank, 2014a). Although these are crude estimates 
of the quality of governance they have been successfully used for quantitative analysis before 
(Mandemaker et al., 2011), and their international comparability allows for a quantitative 
analysis of statistical relationships between governance quality and the success in combating 
nature fragmentation. Results of the proposed analysis may be eligible for meaningful 
interpretation, because it is plausible that the World Bank dimensions of governance could 
be related to nature protection- and development, in the following ways.
Nature and ecological richness are often seen as common goods, which need to be 
protected from overexploitation by private parties, to avoid or resolve classical ‘tragedies 
of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). This is generally done by means of effective 
formulation and implementation of policies and regulations by a central government, of 
which the effectiveness is measured by the indicator “Government effectiveness” (Table 1). 
Furthermore, these policies and regulations should be diligently enforced by law-enforcement 
agencies, the capacity of which to do so being measured by “Rule of law” (Table 1). Moreover, 
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when enforced policies and regulations are of insufficient quality, measured by “Regulatory 
quality” (Table 1), private parties may still overexploit the natural areas, which may result 
in their partial removal or fragmentation. To prevent unsustainable overexploitation, nature 
areas are often owned by the government (national, provincial, or municipal), but also 
private owners and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) own or manage the land, 
often financially supported by the government (Čivić et al., 2009). Those officials charged 
with the protection of nature areas should not be prone to the temptations of bribery and 
abusing their position and role by privileging specific private interests that will erode existing 
nature and harm the functioning of ecosystems, such as clearance for property development 
or illegal harvesting of wood. The extent to which officials are prone to such temptations 
is measured by “Control of corruption” (Table 1). This in turn depends on the amount of 
institutional transparency and the extent to which officials may be held accountable by the 
public, measured by “Voice and accountability” (Table 1).
The preceding refers to the protection of existing nature areas, but other processes are 
at play when it comes to actively developing ecological networks. Governments that are 
involved in such actions have often committed themselves to international agreements, 
follow national legislation, or are otherwise responding to a call for more nature from 
citizens (Jones-Walters et al., 2009). The greater the degree to which these stakeholders are 
allowed to voice environmental concerns and affect decision making through democratic 
voting processes, also measured by “Voice and accountability” (Table 1), the more likely the 
realization of nature development. Furthermore, the spatial design of ecological networks is 
important for effective realization of nature development: the more its design is integrated 
with ecological knowledge the higher the quality and sustainability of the network (Čivić et 
al., 2009; Simeonova et al., 2009). However, the actual realization of new nature-conservation 
targets is another matter. Land that is designated to become nature is often owned by 
individual stakeholders (e.g., estate owners, farmers), and management agreements have to 
be made with these landowners or land can be purchased (Čivić et al., 2009), compulsorily 
in extreme cases (“Rule of law”). It may be clear that this process is fragile and decisions 
that are considered as good governance from the point of conservation considerations 
are not always considered as such by the stakeholders involved and vice versa (Čivić et al., 
2009; Jones-Walters et al., 2009). This especially applies to cases where regional planning 
is practiced through multi-stakeholder participative processes where the governance is 
highly democratic (“Voice and accountability”), but ecological quality depends on how local, 
regional, and national authorities take their responsibility and on how resulting plans are 
elaborated (Lawton et al., 2010).
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
47
Quantifying effects of governance on nature dynamics in Europe
A cross-national comparison for 1990-2006 
3
In this study, we test the hypothesis that quality of governance is related to fragmentation 
and expansion of nature, through cross-national analysis performed over 20 European 
countries and characterization of dominant spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation and 
expansion of nature. This characterization enables the identification of different processes 
of fragmentation and expansion in the field, which might help spatial planners to better 
understand geographical differences between ecological networks (Čivić et al., 2009). This 
characterization is based on relative changes in average patch size and total area of nature for 
each country, analyzed by combining the CORINE 1990 and 2006 land-cover maps (EEA, 2009, 
2010). Confirmation of the hypothesis might form an incentive for further, more targeted 
evaluation of quality of governance.
3.2. Data and methods
3.2.1. Data
3.2.1.1. Indicator of overall quality of governance
The presented World Bank dimensions of governance (Table 1) are quantified perceptions 
of state-centric governance, provided by a large number of enterprises, citizens, and expert 
survey respondents in industrial and developing countries (World Bank, 2014b). These 
dimensions of governance can be used as indicators in a semi-positivistic approach to studies 
of how quantified perceptions of state-centric governance relate to spatiotemporal processes 
of fragmentation of nature (1.1.2.2.1. Empirical-statistical modeling). Each dimension of 
governance was constructed per country by averaging data from the underlying sources 
that corresponded to the concept of governance being measured (World Bank, 2014a). All 
indicators have a mean of zero, a standard deviation of one, and a range of -2.5 to 2.5. Higher 
values correspond to higher quality of governance. For the purpose of this research we 
computed averages of the World Bank dimensions of governance presented in Table 1, over 
1996–2011 for 20 European countries (Table 2).
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Table 1. Five World Bank dimensions of governance.
Indicator name World Bank definition
Voice and 
accountability
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media.
Government 
effectiveness
Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formula-
tion and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies.
Regulatory quality Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of law Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of 
corruption
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests.
Source: World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
 
Clearly, any results of statistical analyzes involving the World Bank dimensions of governance 
cannot be interpreted in the sense of their exact definitions (Table 1), as these are far 
too subtle and complex to be incorporated in crude statistical analyzes. Furthermore, the 
separate World Bank dimensions are highly correlated between themselves (not shown), 
further preventing meaningful interpretation in this sense. Moreover, the low number of 
observations (20) does not allow for reliable multivariate analysis but only for bivariate 
analysis. For these reasons, we aimed to capture the five WB indicators into one summary 
indicator. This indicator was obtained by doing a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the 
15-year averages of the presented dimensions of governance (Tables 1–2). This way, one new 
summary indicator was obtained that is a linear combination of all five original indicators, but 
which contains maximal variance for our subset of 20 European countries.
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Table 2. Averages of World Bank dimensions of governance over 1996–2011.
Country code VA (-) GE (-) RQ (-) RL (-) CC (-)
AU 1.39 1.85 1.55 1.85 1.93
BU 0.51 0.01 0.49 -0.18 -0.19
BX 1.46 1.78 1.50 1.55 1.55
CZ 0.95 0.89 1.10 0.85 0.36
DK 1.60 2.16 1.82 1.91 2.44
ES 1.04 0.96 1.36 0.91 0.77
FR 1.25 1.58 1.13 1.41 1.38
GE 1.36 1.65 1.49 1.64 1.85
HU 1.04 0.84 1.11 0.84 0.53
IL 1.39 1.57 1.72 1.64 1.59
IT 1.04 0.60 0.90 0.55 0.30
LA 0.76 0.52 0.95 0.53 0.04
LI 0.87 0.58 1.01 0.55 0.15
NL 1.57 1.90 1.81 1.75 2.15
PL 0.97 0.57 0.79 0.57 0.38
PO 1.32 1.06 1.08 1.13 1.13
RO 0.41 -0.30 0.32 -0.10 -0.28
SK 0.87 0.76 0.94 0.42 0.28
SL 1.09 0.97 0.83 0.99 0.97
SP 1.20 1.33 1.23 1.20 1.18
VA = “Voice and accountability”, GE = “Government effectiveness”, RQ = “Regulatory quality”, RL = “Rule 
of law”, and CC = “Control of corruption”. AU = Austria, BU = Bulgaria, BX = Belgium-Luxembourg, CZ 
= Czech Republic, DK = Denmark, ES = Estonia, FR = France, GE = Germany, HU = Hungary, IL = Ireland, 
IT = Italy, LA = Latvia, LI = Lithuania, NL = the Netherlands, PL = Poland, PO = Portugal, RO = Romania, 
SK = Slovakia, SL = Slovenia, and SP = Spain. Belgium and Luxembourg were merged into Belgium-
Luxembourg (BX) for technical reasons. Source: World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/index.aspx#home.
Table 3. Coefficients of linear contribution to the first principal component of governance, and Pearson 
correlations between separate dimensions of governance, and the predicted score of overall quality of 
governance based on the first principal component.
VA GE RQ RL CC
Coeff. of contribution to PC 1 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.45
Pearson corr. coeff. 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.98
PC 1 = Principal Component 1, VA = “Voice and accountability”, GE = “Government effectiveness”, RQ = 
“Regulatory quality”, RL = “Rule of law”, and CC = “Control of corruption”.
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The first principal component explained ca. 96 % of cumulative variance, i.e., contributions of 
higher-order principal components were negligible and therefore not shown. This component 
was used as a summary indicator, i.e., as an indicator of overall quality of governance.
3.2.1.2. CORINE Land Cover (CLC)
The first CORINE land-cover map based on an inventory of 44 land-cover classes (see 
Appendix) was presented in 1990 (EEA, 2010). To produce the CORINE 2000 land-cover map, 
the existing CORINE 1990 land-cover map was first assessed and corrected for geometric- and 
thematic content (EEA, 2009). Land-cover changes were mapped by using satellite images- 
and ancillary data from the year 2000 (Feranec et al., 2010). That is, the two land-cover maps 
were made comparable to produce a dataset of land-cover change for 1990 – 2000 (EEA, 
2012a). In turn, the CORINE 2006 land-cover map resulted from updating the CORINE 2000 
land-cover map in a comparable way, to produce a dataset of land-cover change for 2000–
2006 (EEA, 2009, 2012b). For the purposes of this research, both the CORINE 1990- and 2006 
land-cover maps have been used at a pixel size of 250 m (EEA, 2009, 2010). A shape file of the 
20 European countries (Fig. 1) was overlaid on these land-cover maps in ArcGIS 10.1 to obtain 
separate maps for each country, so that reclassifications could be made to include specific 
land-cover classes in specific categories. To analyze change in natural- and semi-natural 
land cover, we included the non-urban and non-agricultural land-cover classes ranging from 
‘3.1.1. – Broad-leaved forest’ through ‘3.2.4. – Transitional wood-land shrub’, and ‘3.3.3. 
Sparsely vegetated areas’ (see Appendix). These analyzed land-cover classes together form 
the terrestrial vegetated non-agricultural and non-urban land cover. As these vegetated land-
cover classes can all play a role as habitat and in structural connectivity, we defined this set 
of land-cover classes as nature within this study, precluding other forms of nature such as 
water bodies, urban parks, etc. Here it is emphasized that although this definition of nature 
is clearly far from complete, it also does not claim to be. Here it should also be emphasized 
that only structural landscape changes and possible effects on structural connectivity were 
analyzed (Tischendorf and Fahrig, 2000).
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Fig. 1. Geographical representation of analyzed countries (white indicates no data). See Table 2 for 
country codes.
3.2.2. Methods
3.2.2.1. Change in average patch size and total area of nature
In order to obtain information on patch size of nature areas (PSN), we converted the nature 
grids into polygon shape files. When two (clusters of) nature pixels only met at one corner, 
they were converted to two separate polygons. We assessed the average PSN in each country 
for both 1990 and 2006 and computed the relative change in PSN during that period:
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representing the relative change in average patch size (on the y-axis). 
 
In Fig. 2,  is depicted on the x-axis and  on the y-axis. In the quadrants right of the origin 
there is increase in nature. In the upper-right quadrant this increase is accompanied by an increase in 
average patch size. Here are three possible dominant processes: formation of predominantly larger-
than-average patches (upper); a net expansion of existing patches of nature (middle); or a net increase 
in connectedness of existing patches of nature (lower). The formation of larger-than-average patches 
may not be very likely in real-world cases, given the field-by-field process of nature establishment on 
previously agricultural areas. In the lower-right quadrant there is increase in total nature, but a 
decrease in patch size. The only possible process is the formation of more predominantly smaller-than-
average patches. In the quadrants left of the origin there is decrease in nature. In the upper-left 
quadrant there is one dominant process, decrease in total nature, but increase in patch size by removal 
of predominantly smaller-than-average patches. In the lower-left quadrant there are three possible 
processes. In general there is a decrease in total nature area as well as a decrease in patch size. This 
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Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in real-world 
cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance.
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other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overa l quality of governance 
 
Relationships bet een   and   on the one hand and overa l quality of governance on the 
other, ere investigated using Spear an co relation coe ficients. Spear an co relation coe ficients are 
defined as Pearson co relation coe ficients bet een ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spear an co relation coe ficients ere co puted bet een overa l quality of governance and 
the indicators of overa l change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators as done in such a ay that the higher the governance 
re, t  t  lso   and   ere ranked, hereby the ore positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the ore positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries ere included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range fro  1 through 20. Co relations ere investigated for the set of a l countries, as e l as for 
specific subsets of countries. s the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent di ferent processes, these quadrants 
ere used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a ay that the response variables (  and  ) aintained a axi al spread, eaning that 
the relationship bet een   and governance as explored for the entire range of  , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships bet een   and governance ere explored 
for the entire range of	 , i.e., for the upper- and lo er quadrants together. 
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included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables range from 1 through 20. Correlations 
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can be removal predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher th  rank. Al o  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be removal of predominant y larger-than-average patches (u per); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (mi dle); or a net decrease in co nectedne s of existing patches of nature by 
di section (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships betw en  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman co relation coe ficients. Spearman co relation coe ficients are 
defined as Pearson co relation coe ficients betw en ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman co relation coe ficients were computed betw en overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score,  higher the r nk. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
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were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship betw en  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships betw en  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the u per- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectednes of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in comb na ion ith the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the o e h nd nd ov r ll quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficie ts. Spearman rrelation co ffi ients are
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients betwee  ranked contin ous data (Si gel, 1957). In thi  
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of govern ce and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of natur . The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher th  governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the hange 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more posit ve the ch ge in av rage pa ch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be r moval of p edominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patch s of ature (mid le); or a et decr ase in connectedness of existing patch s f nature by 
d ss ction (low r). Her  as well, th  r moval o  larger-than-average patches may not be ve y likely in 
real-w rld cases, given the pro ect d sta us of most of the larger nature areas, in comb nation with the 
logistics of such larg -s al  clearan e. 
 
3.2.2.2. Rel ionships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between   on the on and d over ll quality of gov rnance on the 
other, w re investigat d u i g Spearman correlation coeffici nts. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked contin ous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
s udy, Spearman correlation coeffi ients were compute  between ov rall quality of governance and 
he ndicat rs of ov rall change in nat re area and chang n average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued i dicators was done in such a way that th  higher the overnance 
score, the higher the k. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more p sitive the change 
n otal nature are , the higher the r nk, and the mor  positive the change i  averag  patch size, the 
higher the rank. B cause 20 co ntries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Corre ations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
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were us d to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such  way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the rela ionship between  and g vernance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants tog ther; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
c re, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be r moval of redomi antly larger-than-averag patc es (upper); a net shrinkage of existi g 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decr se i nn c ed ess o  existing atches of nature by
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than- verage patches m y not be very likely in 
real-worl  cases, give the pro ected status of most of the larger natur  areas, in combination with th
logistics of su h la ge-scal  c ear c .
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other, were investigated sing Spea m n correlatio  coeffici nts. Spearman correlation coeffici nts are 
defined as Pear on correlatio  co fficients betwee  ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman c rrelation coefficie s were computed w en v rall quality of gov rnance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature ar a and ch ge in average p tch size of nature. The ranki g 
of these continu u -data valu d indicators was done in such a way that the higher the overnance 
score, the higher t e rank. Al o  and  were ranked, wher by the more positive th  chang  
in total na ur  area, the higher the rank, and t e mor  positive the ch nge in av rag  patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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Table 4. Subsets for which relationships between governance quality and relative change in average 
patch size (
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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c n be r moval of predominan ly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
pat hes of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as w ll, the removal of larg r-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given th p otected status of most of larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
R lationships betwe n  and  on th  e hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spea man correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defin d as P ars  correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indic tors of o r ll change n nature a a and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of thes continuous-data valu d ndicators was do e in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature ar a, the higher the rank, and t e more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 co ntries wer  included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlation  were inve tigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subs ts of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
w re u d to divide countri s i to subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variable  ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the rel tionship between  and g vernance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
fo  the entire ange of	, i. ., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LR + LL Change in total nature area in countries characterized by an overall decrease 
in the average pat h size
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larg r-tha -average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Rel tionships wi h overall quality of governance 
 
Relat onships between  a d  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
o r, were investig ted using Spearman c rrelation coefficients. Spe rman cor elation coeffi ie t  are 
defined as Pea son correlation coefficients between ranked co tinuous d ta (Si gel, 1957). In this 
s udy, Spearman correlation co fficients wer computed betwe n overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change i  average patch siz  of ature. Th  ra king 
of these con inuous-data valued ndicators was done in such  way that the h gher the governanc  
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the h gher the rank, and th  more pos tiv  the change in average patch siz , h  
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the a aly is, th  lues of anked v riables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were inv stigated for the s t of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the qu d ants f Fig. 2 repr sent different processes, these quadrants 
wer  used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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in the average patch size
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-aver ge patche  (upper); a net shrink g  of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease i  connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, giv n he protected status of most of the larger ature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of gover ance 
 
Relationships betwe n  and  n the one hand and overall quality f governance n the 
other, were invest g ed using Spearma  correl ion coefficients. Spearman correlation coef icients are 
defined as Pearson rrelation coefficients betwe n ranked cont uous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed betwe n overall quality of governance and 
the indicators f overall change in nature ar a d change in av rage patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valu d indicators was don  in such a way that the hi her he governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  ranked, whereby the m re positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and t e more po itive the change i  average patch siz , the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were includ d in the analy is, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 t rough 20. Correlations were inv tigated for the set of all cou tries, as well a  for 
specific subs ts of c untries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into ubs s. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chose  in 
such a way tha  th  response variables ( and ) maintain d a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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in to al nature re
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-aver ge patche  (upper); a net shrink g  of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease i  connectedness of existing patches of ature by 
dissection (lower). Here a  well, the removal of large -t n-av rage patches may ot be very likely in 
real-world cases, giv n he protected status o  most of the larger ature areas, in c mbination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of gove ance 
 
Relationships betwe n  and  n the one ha d and overall quality f overnance n the 
other, were invest g ed using Sp arma  co r l ion coefficients. Spearman corr latio  c ef icients e 
defined as Pearson rrelation coefficients between ranked cont u us data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlati n efficients were computed betwe n overall q ality of governance d 
the indicators f overall change in nature ar a d change in av rage patch size of nature. Th  r king 
of these continuous-dat  valu d indicators was don  in such a way that the higher the gov rnance 
score, the igher he rank. Also  and  ranked, whereby th  m re positive the ch g
in total nature rea, the higher the rank, and t e more po itive the chang  i  average patch siz , th  
higher the rank. Because 20 c untries were includ d in the analy is, the value  f ranked variables 
range from 1 t rough 20. Correlations were inv tigated for the set of all cou tries, as well a  for 
specific subs ts of c untries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into ubs s. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chose  in 
such a way tha  th  response variables ( and ) maintain d a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UR + LR Change in av rage patch siz  in countrie  characterized by an overall i cr ase 
n total nature are
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n be removal of pr domin ntly larger-than-ave age patches (upper); a net shrinkage of xisting 
pat es of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relati nships wit  overall quality f governance 
 
Rel tionships betw n  and  on the one hand and overall quality of gov rnance on t e 
other, w e investigat d using Spearman corr lati n coeffici nts. Spearma  correlation oefficients are 
defined as Pearson orr lati n coefficients between r ked continuous data (Si gel, 1957). In this 
study, Spe rman correlation coefficients we e comput  between over ll quality of governance and 
th  indicators of overall change in nat re area and c ang  in aver g  patch size of natur . The ranking 
of thes  continuous-data valued i dicators was done in uch a way th t the highe  the governance 
score, the higher th  rank. Also  and  w re ranked, whe eby the ore ositive the change 
in total nature area, th  higher the rank, and the more positiv  the change in av rage p tch size, the 
higher the ra k. Bec use 20 countries were included in th  analysis, th  values of r k d variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlati ns were invest gated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
pecific subsets of countries. As the qu drants of Fig. 2 r present diff rent processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the resp nse variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LR + UL Change in total nature area in countries characterized by removal/formation 
of pr dominantly smaller-than-average patches
Chapter 3 
50 
 
n be removal of pr domin ntly larger-than-ave age patches (upper); a net shrinkage of xisting 
pat es of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relati nships wit  overall quality f governance 
 
Rel tionships betw n  and  on the one hand and overall quality of gov rnance on t e 
other, w e investigat d using Spearman corr lati n coefficients. Spearma  correlation oefficients are 
defined as Pearson orr lati n coefficients between r ked co tinuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spe rman correlation coefficients we  comput  between over ll quality of governance and 
th  i icators of overall change in nat re ar a a d c ang  in aver g  p tch siz  of atur . The ranking 
of thes  continuous-data valu d i dicators was done n uch a way that the highe  the governance 
score, the higher th  rank. Also  and  w re ranked, whe eby the ore ositive the change 
in total nature area, th  higher the rank, and the more positiv  the change in av rage p tch size, the 
higher the ra k. Bec use 20 countries were included in th  analysis, th  values of r k d variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlati ns were invest gated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
pecific subsets of countries. As the qu drants of Fig. 2 r present diff rent processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the resp nse variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LL + UR Change in total nature area in countries characterized by removal/formation 
of predominantly larger-than- verage patch s; a net shrinkage/expansion of 
existing patches of nature; or a net decrease/increase in connectedness of 
existing patches of nature 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LR + UL Change in average patch size in countries characterized by removal/formation 
of predominantly smaller-than-average patches
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches m y not be v ry likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the govern ce 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LL + UR Change in average patch size in countries characterized by removal/formation 
of pr dominantly larg r-than-av rage patches; a net shrinkage/expansion of 
existing patches of nature; or a net decrease/increase in connectedness of 
existing p tches of nature
LL = Lower-left quadrant, LR = Lower-right quadrant, UL = Upper-left quadrant, and UR = Upper-right 
quadrant (of Fig. 3a).
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Characteriz tio  of dominant spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation and 
expansion of nature
Fig. 3 shows the characterization of dominant spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation 
and expansion of nature applied on national data for the period 1990–2006. In Poland, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovakia both the total nature area and the 
patch size increased (
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can be removal f predominantl larger-t an-avera e patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in c nnectedness of xisting patches of nature by 
dissectio  (lower). Here as well, t e removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status f most of the larger natur  areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-sc le cle rance. 
 
3.2.2.2. R lations ips wi h overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined s Pe rson correlation coefficie ts betwee  ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be emoval of predominantly l rger-than-aver ge patches (u per); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (mi dle); or a net decrease in co nectedne s of existing patches of nature by 
di section (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world c ses, given the protected status of most of th  larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships betw en  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Sp arman co r lation coe ficients. Spearman co relation coe ficients are 
defined as Pearson co r latio coe ficients betw en rank d continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearma  co relation coe ficien s were computed betw en overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Co relations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent di ferent proce ses, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship betw en  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships betw en  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the u per- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 a both positiv ). In Austria, Denmark, Germany,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia an increase in total nature area can be 
observed with a decrease in average patch size (
Chapter 3 
50 
 
can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dis ction (l wer). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
r al-world cases, given the protected tatus of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is positive and 
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can be rem val of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper);  net shrinka e of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decreas  i  connectedness of exi ting patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Her as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches ma not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected tatus of most of the larger nature areas, n combination with the 
logistics of such large-s ale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Rela ionships with overall quality of governance 
 
Rela ionships between   and  o  the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
oth r, were investigat d usi g Sp arman correlation coefficients. Sp arman correlation co fficients are 
defined as Pe rson correlation coefficients b twee  ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Sp arman correlation co ffi ients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and ch nge in average patch size of n ture. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way tha  the higher th  governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also   and  were anked, whe by the mor  positive the change 
in total nature ar a, the higher the rank, and the mor  positive the ch nge in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Becaus  20 cou tries were included in the an ysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Cor lations were investigated or the se  of all countries, as well as for 
pecifi  s bsets of countries. As he quadrants of Fig. 2 represent differen  processes, these quadrants 
were used to d vide countri s into subsets. The subsets explored are listed i  Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the esponse variables (  and ) maintained a m xi al spread, meaning that 
t e relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range o  , so for the 
left- nd right quadrants together; and t at rela ionships between  and gov rnance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- an  lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is n g tiv ).
The decrease in average patch size suggests the formation of new, small nature patches, 
which may serve as stepping stones for species. In Romania there is a decrease in total 
nature area combined with an increase in average patch size (
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
scor , the higher the r nk. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is negative and 
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c n be rem val of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shr nka e of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decr as  i  connectedness of exi ting patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Her  as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches ma  not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected atus of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-s ale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Rela ionships with overall quality of governance 
 
Rela ionships between   and  o  the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
oth r, were investigated usi g Sp arman correlation coefficients. Sp arman correlation co fficients are 
defined as Pe rson correlation coefficients b tween ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Sp arman correlation coeffi ients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and ch nge in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way tha  the higher th governance 
sco e, the higher the rank. Also   an  were anked, whe by the mor positive the change 
in tot l nature area, the higher the rank, and the mor positive the ch nge in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Becaus  20 cou tries were included in the an lysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Cor lations were investigated for the se  of all countries, as well as for 
peci i  s bsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent differen  processes, these quadrants 
were used to d vide countrie  into subsets. The subsets explored are listed i  Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables (  and ) maintained a maxi al spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for th  entire range of , so for the 
left- nd right quadrants together; and t at rela ionships between  and gov rnance were explored 
for th  entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- an  lower quadrants together. 
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is positive), suggesting that small nature areas have been cleared, possibly by agricultural 
expansion. In Belgium-Luxembourg, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Lithuania, and Spain the total 
nature area decreased and so did average patch size (
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the r nk. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedne s of existing patches of nature by 
di section (lower). Here as we l, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overa l quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overa l quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman co relation coe ficients. Spearman co relation coe ficients are 
defined as Pearson co relation coe ficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman co relation coe ficients were computed between overa l quality of governance and 
the indicators of overa l change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Co relations were investigated for the set of a l countries, as we l as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent di ferent proce ses, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 are both negativ ). 
These countries show a net shrinkage of existing patches, possibly by urban or agricultural 
expansion along the edges or by dissection of nature areas by large infrastructure. 
Fig. 3a. Characterization of dominant spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation and expansion of 
nature applied on real-world data, with 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrea e in connecte ness of existi g patch s of ature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the r moval of larger-than-averag  p tches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 representing th elative chang  in otal nature area (on 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also    were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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Fig. 3b. Close-up of the area contained in the boldly depicted box, with 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the high r the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
scor , the higher the ank. Also   were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 represe ting the relative change in average pat  
size (on the y axis). See Table 2 for country codes.
3.3.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance
Table 5 shows the subsets for which the str ngths of h  relationship be ween quality of 
governance and 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  a   on the one hand and ov r ll quality of overnance on he 
other, were investigated using Sp arma  c rrel ion co fficients. Spe rma  correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive t e change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countrie , as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in conne tedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-tha -average patches may not be very likely in 
real-w rld cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relatio ships between   on the one d and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigat  usi g Spearman correlati efficients. Spearman correlation coeffi ients are 
defined as Pearson correlation c fficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
s udy, Spearman cor lation coefficients wer  co puted between overall quality of governance and 
the i dicators of over ll change in natur  rea and change i  average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continu us-d ta valued indic tors was done n such a way th t the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  wer  ranked, whereby the more positiv  the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in aver ge patch size, the 
higher the ank. Because 20 countries w re ncluded in the alysis, the values of rank d va iables 
range from 1 through 20. Corr lati ns were investig ted for th  s t of all countries, as well as for 
sp cific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fi . 2 represent different processes, thes  q r t  
wer  used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are list d i  Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( nd ) maintain d a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and gove nance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right qu d ants together; and that relatio ships between  and governance were explored 
for the ntire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hav  been analyz d. For all countries togeth r ap lies 
that the relationship between governance quality and 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were inve tigated using Spearman corr la ion coeffi ients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between rank d continuous data (Sieg l, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coeffici nts w re computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlatio s were investigated for the set of a l countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is fairly strong and significant, 
while for 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net hr nkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ra ked continuo s data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed bet en o rall quality of governan e and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and chang in verage patch size of na ure. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it is less strong and less significant. The direction of rel tionship between 
gove n nce quality and 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decreas  in connectedness of existing patches of natur  by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-av rage patches y not be very likely i  
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients bet een ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicato s of overall change in nature area and change in averag  p tch ize of n ture. The ranki g 
of these continuous-data valued i dicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  wer  ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, t e higher the rank, and the more p sitive the cha ge in avera e patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is as exp cted: the higher the quality of governanc , the m re 
th  n ture area has grown in the period under study. The r lationship betw en governance 
quality and 
Chapter 3 
50 
 
can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches ay n t be very likely i  
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combinatio  w th the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  a   were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 is opposit  of what we expected: the higher t e quality of governance, the 
more average patch size shrunk. The subset analysis reveals that this is probably due to the 
countries right of the origin of Fig. 3, so those countries where total nature area increased. The 
subset analysis (T ble 5, Fig. 4) furthe more shows significant relationships b tween quality 
of governance and a) 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a et decrease in conn ctednes  of existing pat s of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the emoval of larger-than-averag  patches may n t be very likely in 
real- orld cases, given the protect d st tus of most of th  larger nature areas, in combination with th
logistics of such large-scale cl a ce. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality f governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on th one hand and overall quality of gove nance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation o fficients. Spearma  correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked c ntinuous data (Siegel, 1957). In t is 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was don  in uch a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the mor  po itive th  change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and t e more po itive  change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were ncluded in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 for th  lower- and upp -right qu drants; and b) 
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can be removal of predom antly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of natur (mi dle); r a net decrease in con ect dness of existing patches of nature by 
dissecti  (low r). Her  as well, the emoval of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-w rld cases, given the pro ected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such larg -scal  clearance.
 
3.2.2.2. Relati ship  with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships b tween  a d  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investiga ed us ng Spearman correlation coeff cients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
d fined as Pe rson correla ion coe ficients between ranked c ntinuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correl ti n coef icients wer  computed betwee  overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these conti uous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the igher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, w ereby the more positive the change 
i  total natu e area, t e high r the rank, and the mor  positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher th  ra k. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range f om 1 through 20. C rrelations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
wer  used to divide countries i to subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the respo se variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
th  relatio ship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fo  the 
lower-right- and upper-l ft quadrants; and c) 
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can be removal of predominantly larg r-tha -average patches (upper); a net shrinkag  of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in con ectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the rem val of larger-than-averag  patches may not be v ry likely in 
real-world cases, giv n the protect  status of o t of the larger n ture areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall qual ty of governance 
 
Rel tionships between  and  on th one an  and overall quality of governance on the 
oth , were investigated using Sp arman c rrelation coefficie ts. Spearman corr lation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson c rrelation coeffi ients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
stu y, Spearman correlation coefficients w re computed betwe n overall quality of governa ce and 
th  indicators of overall change n nature rea and change i average patch size of ature. T e ranking 
of these co tinuous-dat  valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  a d  were ranked, whereby the more positive the c ange 
in to al n ture area, the higher the r k, and the more positive the change in averag  patc  size, the 
higher the r k. Because 20 countri s were included in the analysis, the values of rank  variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As th  q adrants of Fig. 2 repr sent differ nt processes, th se qua r nts 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen i  
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for the lower-l ft- an  rig t quadrants. 
F r t e lower- a d upper-right quadrants, 
Chapter 3 
50 
 
can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decreas  in connectedness of existing patches of natur by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the emoval of larger-than-ave age patches may not be very likely in 
real-wo ld cases, give  the prot cted status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scal  clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall qu lity of governance 
 
Relationships bet een  and  on the e hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Sp arman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson c  coefficient  between anked c ntinuous data (Sieg , 1957). In this 
study, Spearma  correlation coefficients were com uted between ove all quality of govern ce and 
the indicators f overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of natur . The ranking 
of these continuous-dat  v lu d indicators was done in such a way that the higher th  governance 
sc e, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and t e more positive the change in verage patch siz , the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 as sig ificantly n gatively related to overall 
quality of governance. Furthermore, for the lower-right- and upper-left quadrants, 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships be ween  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
was 
significantly positively related to overall quality of governance. For the lower-left- and right 
quadrants, 
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
57
Quantifying effects of governance on nature dynamics in Europe
A cross-national comparison for 1990-2006 
3
Table 5. Spearman correlation coefficients and R-squared values, for relative change in average patch 
size ()- and total nature area (), and overall quality of governance. 
Response variable Subset n Spearman r R2
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can be removal of predominantly larger-than-average patches (upper); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decrease in connectedness of existing patches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the removal of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlation coefficients. Spearman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearman correlation coefficients were computed between overall quality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change i  nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indic tors was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
higher the rank. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the values of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. Correlations were investigated for the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 represent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 0.36* 0.13
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can be removal of predominantly larger-tha -av rage patches (upp r); a net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decr ase in connectedness of existing p tches of nature by 
dissection (lower). Here as well, the rem val of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships bet en  and  on the one hand and overall quality of gover ance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlat o  coeffici ts. Spearman correlation co fficients are 
defined as Pearson cor el tion coeff cients between ranked continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearma  correlati n coefficients were computed between overall qu lity of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the high r the gove nance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the ch nge 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and he more positive the c ange in average patch size, th  
higher the ra k. Because 20 countries were included in the analysis, the valu s of ranked variables 
range from 1 through 20. C rrelations were investigated f r the set of all countri s, as well a  for 
specific subs ts of countries. As the quadrants of Fig 2 r present different proce s s, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subs ts. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationshi s between  and governanc  were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 -0.48** 0.23
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c n be removal of pr dominantly larg r-than-av ra patches (upp r); a n t shrinkage of xisting 
patches of n ture (middle); or a net ecrease in c nnect dness of existi g patches f nature by 
di section (lower). H r  s well, the rem val of larger-than-av rage patches may not be v ry likely in 
real-wo ld cases, given th  protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of gover ance on the 
other, were investigat d us ng Sp arma  corr lati  coefficients. p arman correlation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlation coefficients between r k d continuous data (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spe rman correl tion coefficients were computed between overall q ality of governa ce and 
the indicators of overall change in natur area and ch nge in avera e patc  size of ature. T e ranking 
of these continuous-data value  indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total n t r  area, the higher the ra k, and more positive the change in average patch size, the 
hig er the rank. Be a se 20 countries were included in the nalysis, the values of ranked variables 
range rom 1 through 20. Correla ions were investiga e  or the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subse s of countries. As t q adrants of Fig. 2 repr sent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
uch a way that the response variables ( an  ) maintained a maximal pread, meaning that 
t e relatio ship between  and governanc  as explored for the e tire range of , so for the 
l ft- and right quadrants together; and that relationships betw en  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LR + LL 13 0.75*** 0.56
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c n b  remov l of predominantly larger-than- verag  patches (upper); a net shrinkag  of existing 
p tches of ature (middle); or a net decrease in conn c ed ss of existing patches of natur  by 
dissection (low r). H re as well, the removal of larger-t an-av age patch s may not e very likely in 
real-world cases, giv n the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand an  overall quality f governanc  on the 
other, wer  investigated us ng Sp arma  correlation coefficients. Spearman correlatio  coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correl tion coefficients between rank d continuous d ta (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spe man cor e ation coefficients were omputed betwe n over ll quality of gov rnance and 
the indicators of over ll change  nature are  and change in verage pa ch s ze of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-d ta valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the highe  the rank. Also  and  w re ranked, whereby the mo e positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in aver ge patch size, the 
high r the rank. Becaus  20 cou tries ere included in the analysis, the valu s of r nked variables 
range from 1 thr ugh 20. Correlations w re investigated fo  th  set o  all countrie , as well as fo  
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 re resent differ nt processes these quadra ts 
were used to divid  countri s into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in T ble 4, and chosen in 
such a way t at the r sponse variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning t at 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire rang  of , so for th  
left- and right quadrants togeth r; and that relatio ships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
UR + UL 7 0.46 0.22
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can be removal of pred minantly larger-tha -av rage patches (upp r);  net shrinkag  of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net decr ase in connectedness f existin  p tches of n ture by 
dissection (l wer). Here as well, the r m val of larger-than-average patches may not be very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such larg -scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governa ce 
 
Relationships bet en  and  on the one hand and overall quality of gover ance on the 
other, were investigated using Spearman correlat o  coeffici ts. Spearman c rrelation co fficients are 
defined as Pearson correl ti n coeff cients between r nked continuous data (Si gel, 1957). In this 
study, Spearma  correlati n coefficients were computed betw en overall qu lity of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data valued indicators was done in such a way that the high r the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  ere ranked, whereby the more positive the ch nge 
in total nature area, the higher t e rank, and he mor  positive the c ange in average patch size, th  
higher the ra k. Becaus  20 countries were include  in the analysis, the valu s of ra ked variables 
range from 1 through 20. C rrelations were investigated f r the set of all countri s, as well a  for 
specific subs ts of countries. As the quadrants of Fig 2 r present different proce s s, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subs ts. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in
such a way that the response variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning that 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire range of , so for the 
left- and right quadrants together; and that relationshi s between  and governanc  were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
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c n b  removal of pred minantly larger-than-averag  patches (upper);  net shrinkage of existing 
patches of nature (middle); or a net d crease in conn c ed ess f existin  patches of n tur  by 
dissection (l wer). H re as well, the r moval of larger-t an-av age patch s may not e very likely in 
real-world cases, given the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such larg -scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governa ce 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand and overall quality of governance on the 
other, were investigated us ng Sp rma  correlation coefficients. Spearman c rrelation coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correlati n coefficients between r nked continuous data (Si gel, 1957). I  this 
study, Spea man cor e ation coefficients were computed betw n over ll quality of gov rnance and 
the indicators of over ll change  nature are  and change in verage pa ch s ze of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-d ta valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the highe  the rank. Also  and  ere ranked, whereby the mo e positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher t e rank, and the more positive the change in average patch size, the 
high r the rank. Becaus  20 coun ries ere include  in the analysis, the values of ra ked variables 
range from 1 thr ugh 20. Correlations were investigated fo  th  set o  all countrie , as well as fo  
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 re resent differ nt processes these quadra ts 
were used to divid  countri s into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in T ble 4, and chosen in 
such a way t at the r sponse variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning t at 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire rang  of , so for th  
left- and right quadrants togeth r; and that relatio ships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
UR + LR 13 -0.71*** 0.51
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c n be remov l of predominantly larger-than- v rage patches (upper); a net shrinkag  of existing 
p tches of ature (middle); or a net decrease in connect dn ss of existi g patches of natur  by 
di section (low r). Her  as well, the rem val of larger-than-av rage patches may not be v ry likely in 
real-wo ld cases, given th  protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand an  overall quality of gover ance on the 
other, wer  investigated us ng Sp arma  corr lati  coefficients. pearman correlatio  coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correl tion coefficients between rank d continuous d ta (Siegel, 1957). In this 
study, Spe rman correlation coefficients were omputed between overall q ality of governance and 
the indicators of overall change in natur area and ch nge in avera e patch size of ature. The ranking 
of these continuous-data value  indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the higher the rank. Also  and  were ranked, whereby the more positive the change 
in total n t re area, the higher the rank, and more positive the change in aver ge patch size, the 
hig er the rank. Becaus  20 cou tries were included in the nalysis, the valu s of r nked variables 
range rom 1 through 20. Correla ions w re investiga e  or the set of all countries, as well as for 
specific subse s of countries. As t q adrants of Fig. 2 repr sent different processes, these quadrants 
were used to divide countries into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in Table 4, and chosen in 
uch a way that the response variables ( an  ) maintained a maximal pread, meaning that 
t e relatio ship between  and governanc  as explored for the e tire range of , so for the 
l ft- and right quadrants together; and that relationships betw en  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LR + UL 8 0.93*** 0.86
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can b  remov l of predominantly larger-than- verag  patches (upper); a net shrinkag  of existing 
p tches of ature (middle); or a net decrease in conn c ed ss of existing patches of natur  by 
dissection (low r). H re as well, the removal of larger-t an-av age patch s may not e very likely in 
real-world cases, giv n the protected status of most of the larger nature areas, in combination with the 
logistics of such large-scale clearance. 
 
3.2.2.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
 
Relationships between  and  on the one hand an  overall quality f governanc  on the 
other, wer  investigated us ng Sp arma  correlation coefficients. Spearman correlatio  coefficients are 
defined as Pearson correl tion coefficients between rank d continuous d ta (Siegel, 1957). I  this 
study, Spea man cor e ation coefficients were omputed betwe n ov r ll quality of gov rnance and 
the indicators of over ll change  nature are  and change in verage pa ch s ze of nature. The ranking 
of these continuous-d ta valued indicators was done in such a way that the higher the governance 
score, the highe  the rank. Also  and  w re ranked, whereby the mo e positive the change 
in total nature area, the higher the rank, and the more positive the change in aver ge patch size, the 
high r the rank. Becaus  20 cou tries ere included in the analysis, the valu s of r nked variables 
range from 1 thr ugh 20. Correlations w re investigated fo  th  set o  all countrie , as well as fo  
specific subsets of countries. As the quadrants of Fig. 2 re resent differ nt processes these quadra ts 
were used to divid  countri s into subsets. The subsets explored are listed in T ble 4, and chosen in 
such a way t at the r sponse variables ( and ) maintained a maximal spread, meaning t at 
the relationship between  and governance was explored for the entire rang  of , so for th  
left- and right quadrants togeth r; and that relatio ships between  and governance were explored 
for the entire range of	, i.e., for the upper- and lower quadrants together. 
 
LL + UR 12 -0.1 0.01
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can be removal of pred minantly larger-tha -av rage patches (upp r);  net shrinkag  of existing 
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3.4. Discussion
The here-presented analysis assesses dynamics in nature areas in Europe and links this 
to governance aspects. In the period under study considerable changes in land use took 
place. Most analyzes of the impact of policy (change) on the area and configuration of 
nature concern case studies or country studies (Mander et al., 1996) and do not provide a 
comprehensive overview. Conversely, our approach does not provide in-depth detail but the 
birds’ eye view on changes that took place throughout Europe. It is clear from the analysis 
that (re)development of nature is an important process in many countries. Yet, fragmentation 
of nature also continues to be increasingly harmful, particularly in countries where this 
coincides with a decrease in total nature area. The observed trends are in agreement with 
the trends seen in case studies and expert reports (Petit et al., 2001; Jongman, 2002). 
3.4.1. Characterization of dominant spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation and 
expansion of nature 
The majority of countries expanded their total nature area during the studied period. Observed 
trends of nature expansion may have been driven by agricultural land abandonment, by 
afforestation for commercial purposes, or by ecosystem restoration projects. Although the 
outcomes can be very different in terms of biodiversity targets, these processes are difficult 
to disentangle. After all, land abandonment is likely to occur at the fringes of agricultural 
areas (MacDonald et al., 2000; Hatna and Bakker, 2011), and sometimes deliberate nature 
development or tree planting for production purposes take place in response to land 
abandonment. Abandoned farmland and production forests are known to have a relatively 
low biodiversity in terms of plants and insects, but when they contribute to the enlargement 
of semi-natural areas they may have led to improved living conditions for larger species. 
The development of wolves and several large-bird species indeed show that structural 
connectivity is developing positively for these species (Van der Sluis et al., 2012). Countries 
that implemented a so-called National Ecological Network , such as in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia (in the upper-right quadrant of Fig. 3), Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia (in the lower-right quadrant) (Jongman et al., 2004) all 
show an increase in nature area. Whenever nature expansion is the result of such deliberate 
planning processes, one may expect nature developed at such locations to have a higher 
biodiversity than the land use it replaced.
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Abandonment as the dominant process can be excluded in some countries, where land 
prices are very high (e.g., Denmark and the Netherlands). Conversely, land abandonment is 
a serious issue in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (mostly in the upper-
right quadrant of Fig. 3) (Hobbs and Cramer, 2007), due to major land reforms designed to 
privatize agricultural land after the fall of the iron curtain (Kuemmerle et al., 2006; Hobbs and 
Cramer, 2007; Bakker et al., 2011).
The remaining minority of countries showed a decline in their total nature area during the 
studied period. While it was difficult to tell to what extent the developments have been 
negative for biodiversity in these countries, it will most certainly not have been a positive 
development either. Spain and Romania are the outliers of those countries that saw their 
nature area shrink. Romania is the only country where this resulted in an increase in the 
average patch size, which has probably been the result of deforestation for the sake of large-
scale agriculture in response to Romania’s accession to the EU and consequent access to 
agricultural subsidies. As for Spain, this is also one of the few European countries (together 
with Bulgaria, France, Italy, and Romania) that showed a net expansion of agricultural land 
(Bakker and Veldkamp, 2012). Moreover, the strong urbanization/infrastructure development 
that occurred in Spain may have contributed to its fragmentation of nature as well. However, 
which of these processes (agricultural expansion or urbanization/infrastructure development) 
has been dominant in the process of fragmentation could not be determined 
3.4.2. Relationships with overall quality of governance 
Linking the position of the countries within the scheme of Fig. 3 to the indicator of overall 
quality of governance, reveals how the different underlying processes of fragmentation 
and/or expansion were related to overall quality of governance. This tends to be lower for 
countries in the upper-right quadrant, compared to those in the lower-right quadrant (Table 
5, Fig. 4), which agrees with the negative relationship found between patch size and overall 
quality of governance. There is more than one possible explanation for lower (higher) overall 
quality of governance being associated with an increase (decrease) in the average patch size 
of nature in the upper-right (lower-right) quadrant of Fig. 3. One is the earlier mentioned 
abandonment of grasslands in the CEECs, particularly at the boundaries of nature areas 
(Kuemmerle et al., 2006; Hobbs and Cramer, 2007; Bakker et al., 2011). Another explanation 
is that nature development in CEES may be realized more efficiently by deliberate planning 
practices in these countries because property rights of farmers are less well protected there. 
These explanations together provide an image consistent with what may have occurred in the 
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upper-right quadrant of Fig. 3: a mixture of nature expansion through land abandonment and 
deliberate development of nature, in which land abandonment has likely been the dominant 
process (Hobbs and Cramer, 2007). Conversely, when a government plans a nature area, 
expropriation of its owners is not easy, particularly in the (mostly western European) countries 
where property rights of farmers are well established and protected. Compulsory purchase 
for purposes of nature development hardly ever happens (Roodbol-Mekkes et al., 2012), and 
for that reason deliberate nature development tends to occur according to a more scattered 
pattern (Bakker et al., Forthcoming). That is, the good protection of land-property rights of 
farmers in (mostly western European) countries, likely reflected by the higher overall quality 
of governance in the lower-right quadrant may have hampered deliberate development of 
nature, which in turn may have had a negative effect on structural connectivity, and ultimately, 
on biodiversity. On the one hand, nature expansion due to land abandonment may have led 
to the destruction of high-value agri-ecosystems, but this is more likely to be observed in the 
upper-right quadrant than in the lower-right quadrant of Fig. 3 (Hobbs and Cramer, 2007). 
On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that new agricultural areas could have provided a 
habitat for endangered species in countries where the opposite occurred, i.e., where the 
dominant land-cover change has been the clearing of nature for agricultural expansion. That 
latter process is more likely to be observed in the upper-left (and possibly also in the lower-
left) quadrant than in the lower-right quadrant of Fig. 3. 
3.4.3. Limitations of this study and suggestions for further research
Although our analysis provides several interesting results, it is also subject to several 
handicaps. As mentioned earlier, the lumped-nature category obtained from the CORINE 
land-cover maps does not allow for distinguishing between deliberately planned nature and 
that which arose from land abandonment or the establishment of production forest. Although 
these land-cover types also provide habitats or at least facilitate migration of species to some 
degree, the establishment of these land-cover types is not the result of deliberate planning 
and should therefore not be associated with high overall quality of governance. Furthermore, 
the CORINE land-cover maps do not allow for identification of high-nature value farmland 
or farmland comprising agri-environment schemes, nor does their resolution allow the 
evaluation of finer patterns of stepping stones (smaller patches of nature meant to facilitate 
dispersal). 
Moreover, quality of governance is known to be entangled with practically all policy-based 
drivers of land use, such as rates of agricultural intensification, economic performance, 
urbanization rates and patterns, etc., making comparative study of correlation coefficients 
meaningless (Mandemaker et al., 2011). Disentangling the role of governance requires 
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specific statistical techniques to establish both a lower- and upper limit of explanatory power 
through multivariate analysis, and therefore requires a number of observations that is in 
the order of ten times larger than was available for this study (Mandemaker et al., 2011). 
Therefore, and because of the crude nature of the overall quality of governance indicator, it 
is not possible to confirm the hypothesis that governance is causally related to fragmentation 
and/or expansion of nature. On the other hand, the results of the here-presented analysis do 
provide empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis, and the analysis allows for generic 
interpretation of found relationships between quality of governance and fragmentation 
and/or expansion at the European level, which would otherwise not have been possible. 
Further research based on more detailed governance indicators with respect to nature 
conservation and fragmentation could provide better information on how to halt the ongoing 
decline of biodiversity in Europe, through knowledge generated by quantitative analyzes of 
relationships between such new, more targeted environmental-governance indicators and 
identified processes of fragmentation and expansion of nature. 
3.5. Conclusions
The here-presented analysis reveals how countries have been performing with respect to 
development of nature areas by a) characterizing dominant processes of fragmentation and 
expansion of nature with indicators of overall change in nature area and change in average 
patch size, and b) by relating these two indicators to overall quality of governance. The majority 
of studied European countries expanded their nature area, although this is likely not to have 
been the result of deliberate nature restoration alone but also of land abandonment and 
establishment of production forest, which do not necessarily lead to positive developments 
in terms of biodiversity. The remaining minority of studied European countries contracted 
their total nature area. For the period 1990–2006, overall quality of governance was found 
to be positively related to expansion of nature, and negatively to increasing patch size of 
nature. Deliberate development of nature appears to result in formation of smaller-than-
average patches of nature, while land abandonment appears to result in the formation of 
larger-than-average patches of nature. Lower scores of overall quality of governance are 
more likely to drive the processes of removal, shrinkage, and dissection of nature through 
changes in nature area. Higher scores of overall quality of governance are more likely to drive 
the processes of formation, expansion, and connection of nature through changes in both 
nature area and patch size. Overall, it appears that quality of governance indeed drives the 
deliberate development of nature for the purposes of restoration and conservation, halting 
fragmentation and the ongoing decline of biodiversity in Europe.
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Appendix
Table 1. CORINE land-cover classes.
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
1. Artificial surfaces 1.1. Urban fabric 1.1.1. Continuous urban fabric
1.1.2. Discontinuous urban fabric
1.2. Industrial, 
commercial, and 
transport units
1.2.1. Industrial or commercial units
1.2.2. Road and rail networks, and associated land
1.2.3. Port areas
1.2.4. Airports
1.3. Mine, dump, and 
construction sites
1.3.1. Mineral extraction sites
1.3.2. Dump sites
1.3.3.Construction sites
1.4. Artificial, non-
agricultural vegetated 
areas 
1.4.1. Green urban areas
1.4.2. Sport and leisure facilities
2. Agricultural areas 2.1. Arable land 2.1.1. Non-irrigated arable land
2.1.2. Permanently irrigated land
2.1.3. Rice fields
2.2. Permanent crops 2.2.1. Vineyards
2.2.2. Fruit trees and berry plantations
2.2.3. Olive groves
2.3. Pastures 2.3.1. Pastures
2.4. Heterogeneous 
agricultural areas
2.4.1. Animal crops associated with permanent 
crops
2.4.2. Complex cultivation patterns
2.4.3. Land principally occupied by agriculture 
with significant areas of natural vegetation
2.4.4. Agro-forestry areas
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3. Forests and semi-
natural areas
3.1. Forests 3.1.1. Broad-leaved forest
3.1.2. Coniferous forest
3.1.3. Mixed forest
3.2. Shrub and/or 
herbaceous vegetation 
associations
3.2.1. Natural grassland
3.2.2. Moors and heathland
3.2.3. Sclerophyllous vegetation 
3.2.4. Transitional woodland shrub
3.3. Open spaces with 
little or no vegetation
3.3.1. Beaches, dunes, and sand plains
3.3.2. Bare rock
3.3.3. Sparsely vegetated areas
3.3.4. Burnt areas
3.3.5. Glaciers and perpetual snow
4. Wetlands 4.1. Inland wetlands 4.1.1. Inland marshes
4.1.2. Peat bogs
4.2. Coastal wetlands 4.2.1. Salt marshes
4.2.2. Salines
4.2.3. Intertidal flats
5. Water bodies 5.1. Continental 
waters
5.1.1. Water courses
5.1.2. Water bodies
5.2. Marine waters 5.2.1. Coastal lagoons
5.2.2. Estuaries
5.2.3. Sea and ocean
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/landscape/about.htm).
Alone, in the ruins of my mind, 
On an island of reflection, 
Deserted by all, 
Except for rejection.
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Abstract
In this research we investigate whether real-world agricultural land-use systems can be 
meaningfully approximated by emergent—complex systems—behavior. We do so by 
constructing an innovative pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model. 
The model can exhibit complex systems behavior by combining simple yet plausible 
temporal and spatial mechanisms. These can operate on cellular automata—abstractions 
of farmers—and allow automata to maximize utility at varying levels of complexity, 
rationality, and foresight. By calibrating agricultural benefits and costs to real-world relative 
perceptions, we analyze spectrums of landscapes in states of statistical equilibrium. 
Because—input—complexity is systematic, aggregate output is truly emergent. In 
particular, intensification of agriculture emerges. By systematically combining mechanisms 
we can construct different process-based filters generating different emergent behavior- 
and land-use patterns. Results suggest that real-world agricultural land-use systems can 
be meaningfully approximated by emergent—complex systems—behavior.
Keywords: land use; utility/preference; entropy/uncertainty; individual-based; complexity/
emergence; self-organization; pattern formation.
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4
A Pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model:
Utility maximization at varying levels of complexity and rotionality (CORA)
4.1. Nomenclature
All non-variable matter is depicted upright. Scalar variables are italicized, vectors are italicized 
and barred while matrices are depicted bold upright. The temporal average of scalar variable 
x  is defined as >< x . The term transition always refers to conversion of a particular land-
use state into another, by an individual decision maker. The term entropy always refers to 
transition entropy, and the term equilibrium state(s) always refers to statistical-equilibrium 
state(s). Furthermore, the term iteration(s)—when used separately—always refers to (a) full 
model step(s), while the term step(s) always refers to iteration(s) of anticipation. The asterisk 
always indicates multiplication.
4.2. Introduction
A better understanding of land use is of major importance as it represents a vital link between 
human decision making and the natural environment (Young et al., 2006). Although the past 
few decades have allowed for successful attempts at modeling land use, e.g., CLUE (Veldkamp 
and Fresco, 1996), GLM (Aspinall, 2004), LUS (Loonen and Koomen, 2009), CGE models 
(Adams, 2005; Psaltopoulos et al., 2011), these models do not explicitly take into account 
decision-making processes at the individual level. This is due to input complexity of aggregate 
concepts, data and drivers typical for larger spatial scales (e.g., national, continental or global 
scale). Quantifying generalized verifiable relationships between—complex—individual 
decision making and aggregate land-use patterns is one of the major challenges for the next 
generation of land-use models (Parker et al., 2008a). Recently, more and more attempts 
have been made to view land-use systems as complex systems (Parker et al, 2003; Brown 
et al., 2008; Washington-Ottombre et al., 2010; Lopez-Carr et al., 2011), usually from the 
perspective of individual-based modeling (Jepsen et al., 2006; Parker et al, 2008b; Bao Le et 
al., 2010; Moreno et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2011; Lauf et al., 2011).
In this paper we investigate whether we can systematically approximate real-world 
complexity of agricultural land-use systems with emergent—complex systems— behavior 
(Strogatz, 2001; Liu et al., 2007). We do so by constructing a pattern-oriented (Grimm et 
al., 2005, 2006) individual-based land-use-transition model, written in NetLogo2 (Centre for 
Connected Learning, 2011; Wilensky and Rand, 2011). The model generates emergent land-
use patterns- and behavior resulting from the decisions of many individuals. It can exhibit 
2 NetLogo can be downloaded for free (Centre for Connected Learning 2011). The model may be ob-
tained from corresponding author on request.
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complex systems behavior (Strogatz, 2001; Liu et al., 2007) by combining simple yet plausible 
temporal and spatial mechanisms.
The model allows for maximization of individual utility at varying levels of complexity, 
rationality, and foresight. Because the model is individual-based it is unaffected by input 
complexity of aggregates, allowing us to systematically and reproducibly approximate real-
world complexity. 
Input complexity of real-world spatial distributions of land use would likely introduce 
disorganized complexity, i.e., input complexity beyond our ability to disentangle into 
reproducible systematic processes. We would then no longer be able to distinguish 
reproducible systematic emergent properties from emergent effects due to disorganized 
input complexity. Therefore, we do not introduce any real-world input complexity in this 
paper, although the model can work with real-world maps of land use.
4.3. Model
In this section we present an overview of land-use states, land-use-state transitions, and 
model structure- and mechanisms. Furthermore, we present a measure of aggregate 
uncertainty. Finally, we present initial land-use configuration and general form of model 
output. Thereafter, we will demonstrate and explain the effects of—combining—model 
mechanisms in detail in section 4.4.
4.3.1. Land-use states
Land can be in two states of agricultural land use, i.e., in a state of high-input- and in a state 
of low-input agriculture. High-input agricultural land is used more intensively than low-input 
land. Low-input agriculture causes soil-nutrient depletion while high-input agriculture results 
in increased sensitivity to diseases due to e.g., mono cultivation and sterilization of the soil. 
Conversely, high-input agriculture does not cause soil-nutrient depletion, while low-input 
agriculture does not cause increased sensitivity to diseases. Therefore, negative effects of 
low- and high-input land use may be assumed to be independent. Furthermore, land can be 
in a state of fallow land use by abandonment or by clearing of natural land, and it can be in a 
state of natural land use.
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4.3.2. Land-use-state transitions
Individual decision makers are allowed to convert land to the fallow state by clearing of natural 
land or by abandonment of high- or low-input agricultural states. Individual decision makers 
are allowed to convert land to agriculture by taking fallow or natural land into production, 
associated with investment costs. Finally, decision makers can convert from high-input- to 
low-input agriculture and vice versa, associated with opportunity costs. That is, these costs 
are determined by what is lost by not remaining in a particular agricultural state. Regrowth 
of nature after clearing or abandonment is a gradual and natural process and not the result 
of a single iteration of decision making. Therefore, land can only be in a state of natural land 
because it remained in that state, or land remained in the fallow state sufficiently long for 
nature to regrow (fallowing).
4.3.3. Structure
In total, 10,000 cellular automata are placed in a fixed two-dimensional grid. Individual 
choices of automata are codetermined by economic preferences. Economic preferences are 
determined by perceived benefits—land-use-state utilities—and transition costs (Table 1). The 
costs of converting land from natural- or fallow states to high- or low-input states are made to 
weigh five and three times as much as perceived benefits, respectively. This models the usually 
high investment costs, compared to benefits from agriculture. Investment costs are even 
higher for high-input agriculture, compared to low-input agriculture. Based on utilities and 
transition costs, a stochastic utility-maximization mechanism (Fig. 1) determines individual 
choices. How stochastic this mechanism operates is determined by individual rationality. 
Rationality can be regulated in between extremes of—purely stochastic—irrational decision 
making and—purely deterministic—rational decision making. The more rational automata 
become, the more utility-maximizing decisions will occur. That is, rationality determines the 
strength of the effect of economic preferences on decision making. The occurrence of non-
utility-maximizing decisions reflects that individuals also have non-economic preferences. 
An anticipation mechanism (Fig. 1) allows automata to project and compare utility gained 
from the possible different decision chains, departing from their present land-use state up 
to an arbitrary number of steps into the future. They then base present decisions on these 
future projections. Furthermore, effects of high- and low-input agriculture are modeled by 
independent utility-feedback mechanisms (Fig. 1) that operate on automata in high- and low-
input states, respectively. Finally, more efficient sharing of costs by larger groups of automata 
is modeled by a co-operation mechanism (Fig. 1). This mechanism causes transition costs 
into agricultural states to decrease, proportional to the count of neighboring agricultural 
states. Note that only the utility-maximization mechanism allows for actual decision making; 
all other mechanisms only affect decision making indirectly by manipulating its inputs (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Flowchart of CORA.
Note: Mechanisms are specified by their order of introduction in the next section. This also specifies the 
order of level of complexity. The utility-maximization mechanism (1) is the core of the model and will 
be introduced first. The model is named CORA, because we attempt to model real-world complexity of 
agricultural land-use systems at varying levels of—CO—complexity and—RA—rationality.
4.3.4. Aggregate uncertainty
The stochastic nature of individual decision making together with the large number of 
decision makers, make it meaningful to compute the entropy over land-use transitions. We 
know land-use states, possible transitions, and transition probabilities for each automaton 
at any time. Therefore, the real-time entropy over land-use transitions or transition entropy 
)(tTΩ  may be defined as follows:
 (1).)(ln()()(
1
∑∑
=
−≡Ω
N
i T
TTT tptpt
Equation (1) summates individual expectation values of transition uncertainty, over all N  
individual automata. Individual expectation values are computed over possible transitions T  
and their transition probabilities )(tpT  for each individual automaton at time t . The base 
of logarithm used is mathematically arbitrary, as we can convert to any other base larger than 
zero and unequal to one by multiplication of a constant. Transition entropy )(tTΩ  provides 
us with a quantitative measure of aggregate uncertainty. This will prove very useful when 
comparing and interpreting results, because model output depends strongly on systematic 
manipulation of aggregate uncertainty.
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4.3.5. Model output
Model output strongly depends on initial land use. Therefore, we assign equal values of 33 
%—of total land use—to initial high-input-, low-input- and fallow land use throughout this 
paper for reasons of comparison. Initial natural land use is always set to zero. Furthermore, 
the model produces spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states. These statistical-equilibrium 
states are approximated by computation of temporal averages over finite iterations. Although 
statistical-equilibrium states are approximated by only 500 iterations, this approximation 
is sufficiently close as temporal averages no longer noticeably change when number of 
iterations is increased further (not shown). Hence, time does not play a role in our analysis of 
produced spectrums of equilibrium states.
4.4. Temporal and spatial mechanisms
The model is built up out of mechanisms that can affect each automaton independently 
and simultaneously, thereby affecting the aggregate system. Any mechanism operating 
on N  automata of which the outcome is determined by precisely these N  automata, is 
defined as a temporal mechanism. This simply quantifies that a temporal mechanism does 
not introduce any spatial dependency, i.e., an automaton operated upon is not affected 
by any other automata. Any mechanism operating on N  automata of which the outcome 
is affected by a number of automata greater than N , is defined as a spatial mechanism. 
This simply quantifies that such a mechanism does introduce spatial dependency, i.e., an 
automaton operated upon is affected by at least one other automaton. Finally, note that for 
reasons of clarity—which will become apparent later—model results are not shown until 
after subsection 4.4.1.1.
4.4.1. Temporal mechanisms
4.4.1.1. Utility maximization
Although we may accurately describe decision making for some fraction of the population, 
human behavior can never be entirely captured by a set of rational rules. There are always 
those who take irrational decisions, i.e., for other reasons than maximizing personal gain. 
The utility-maximization mechanism attempts to take this into account by introducing 
individual uncertainty in a systematic way. That is, the probability that automata will make 
rational decisions can be regulated by systematic manipulation of individual uncertainty. This 
systematic manipulation can be measured by using transition entropy TΩ  (4.3.4. Aggregate 
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uncertainty). Because individual uncertainty is directly related to entropy, there is a direct 
relationship between entropy and occurrence of utility maximization. The utility-maximization 
mechanism—and it alone—allows for actual decision making. All other mechanisms simply 
manipulate the input of the utility-maximization mechanism (Fig. 1). 
Automata individually determine which decision would maximize their utility by comparing 
the net utility that would be gained by remaining in their present land-use state, to the net 
utility that would be gained by making the transition into any of the other possible land-use 
states. The likelihood of a transition into a different state is determined by the difference 
between land-use-state utilities and by the costs of that transition. The more positive the 
land-use-state utility difference between states, the greater the likelihood of that transition. 
Similarly, the smaller the associated transition costs, the greater the likelihood of that 
transition. If the present land-use state already yields maximum net gain in utility, the option 
with the greatest likelihood is to remain in that state. In that case transition costs are zero. 
Below, the utility-maximization mechanism is demonstrated in detail. First, we describe the 
possible transitions by defining a transition-probability matrix:
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From the first two columns of equation (2), we see that automata can go to high-input state I or low-
input state A by making the transition from fallow land F, by making the transition directly from 
natural land N, or by making the transition from I to A (or vice versa). From the fourth column of 
equation (2), we see that automata can go to the fallow state F, either by clearing natural land N or by 
making the transition from one of the agricultural states I or A. The transitions in the first, second and 
fourth column of equation (2) are realistic. Transitions in the third column of equation (2), from A, I 
and F to N are considered unrealistic. That is, these transitions cannot occur because regrowth of 
nature is a gradual and natural process and not the result of a single decision. Therefore, the 
mechanism of regrowth of nature is treated externally to decision-making (4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and 
regrowth of nature). 
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directly from natural land N, or by making the transition from I to A (or vice versa). From the 
fourth column of equation (2), we see that automata can go to the fallow state F, either by 
clearing natural land N or by making the transition from one of the agricultural states I or A. 
The transitions in the first, second and fourth column of equation (2) are realistic. Transitions 
in the third column of equation (2), from A, I and F to N are considered unrealistic. That is, 
these transitions cannot occur because regrowth of nature is a gradual and natural process 
and not the result of a single decision. Therefore, the mechanism of regrowth of nature is 
treated externally to decision-making (4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature).
All land-use states are assigned a land-use-state utility value and all transitions are assigned 
a transition cost (Table 1). In equation (2), the transition-probability element 
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In equation (3), 4=m  as P  is a four by four matrix, jU  is land-use-state utility of future state j , 
and iU  is land-use-state utility of present state i . Transition costs associated with a transition from 
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(3.3. Structure). For 0=β , utility maximization cannot occur because automata then behave purely 
stochastic, i.e., irrational. The entropy is then maximal, which corresponds to minimal occurrence of 
utility maximization. For ∞→β , automata will behave purely deterministic. Automata are then 
maximally rational and only make utility-maximizing decisions (with probability one). The entropy is 
then minimal (zero), which corresponds to maximal occurrence of utility maximization. 
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All l nd-u  t t  r  ign d  l nd-u - t t  utility v lu  nd ll tr n ition  r  ign d  
tr n ition o t (T bl  1). In qu tion (2), th  tr n ition-prob bility l m nt P∈ijp num ri  
indi for  tr n ition from pr nt t t  i row to futur  t t   j olumn i  d fin d : 
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m xim lly r tion l nd only m k  utility i i ing d i ion  (with prob bility on ). Th  ntropy i  
th n minim l ( ro), whi h orr pond  t  m xim l urr n  of tility m ximi ti . 
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Note: The first row contains land-use-state utilities. Transition costs should be read from row to column. 
Empty table entries correspond to non-occurring transitions. I is high-input land use, A is low-input land 
use, N is natural land use and F is fallow land use.
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agriculture is always the dominant source of economic benefit. Because transition costs weigh 
exponentially in equation (3), )5ln()( +−= NINI UUC  and )5ln()( +−= FIFI UUC , to make 
costs of converting land from natural- or fallow states to high-input state weigh five times as much as 
perceived benefits, in decision making (3.3. Structure). Furthermore, )3ln()( +−= NANA UUC  and 
)3ln()( +−= FAFA UUC , to make costs of converting land from natural- or fallow states to low-
input state weigh three times as much as perceived benefits, in decision making. Finally, it is always 
true that FINFNI CCC +=  and FANFNA CCC += . 
 
4.4.1.2. Anticipation 
 
To enable automata to make decisions informed by their expectations of future consequences of 
present decisions, automata can compute net total expectation values of utility over an arbitrary 
number of steps into the future, given their present land-use state. This mechanism is explained in 
detail below. First, we show how automata compute expectation values of utility gained from land use 
after the first step ( 1=n ):  
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4.4.1.2. Anticipation
To enable automata to make decisions informed by their expectations of future consequences 
of present dec sions, automata can compute net total expectation values of utility over an 
arbitrary number of steps into the future, given their present l nd-use state. This mechanism 
is explained in detail below. First, we show how automata compute expectation values of 
utility gained from land use after the first step ( 1=n ): 
)0()0()1( UU M= , in which )0(M  is                (4)
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 and ( )TFNAI UUUUU )0()0()0()0()0( =  is the column-vector of land-use-state utilities of 
high-input land use I, low-input land use A, natural land use N and fallow land use F (Table 1). 
In equation (5) we see transition probabilities, transition costs, and land-use-state utilities as 
defined in equation (3). However, expectation values of utility must be used to re-compute 
transition probabilities after each step. This is to ensure that automata use all information 
available to them in the present while anticipating on future consequences of decisions. 
This explains why transition probabilities are no longer constant in equation (5). Note that 
rationality parameter β  is also present in equation (5), in the transition probabilities. 
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4
A Pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model:
Utility maximization at varying levels of complexity and rotionality (CORA)
Furthermore, that if transition costs are zero, )0(M  reduces to the transition-probability 
matrix )0(P , equal to matrix P  in equation (2). In general, )(nM  reduces to )(nP  for 
zero transition costs. The matrix )(nM  cannot be interpreted as a transition-probability 
matrix itself. Hence, it is a more general transition matrix. Gains in utility after n  steps, 
resulting from the different states after 1−n  steps, are computed by a linear recursive 
transformation through the more general transition matrix )(nM :
)1()1()( −−= nUnnU M   (6)
Therefore, the utility expected to be gained in going from state 1−n  to state n  will be:
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Economics of temporal discounting state that the expected utility from a decision in the 
present should be higher than the expected utility from the same decision but projected 
to be made in the (near) future (Ebert 2010). Therefore, stationary discounting is applied 
by defining anticipation parameter 
r+
≡
1
1ω  with discount rate ),0[ ∞∈r . This ensures 
that expected utility from decisions decreases monotonously compared to when the same 
decisions would be made earlier. The parameter has a range of ]1,0[∈ω  and is applied 
to equation (4) by multiplication with ω , yielding discounted expected utility. Discounted 
expected utility is assigned the symbol V , resulting in the following matrix notation:
)0()0()1( UV Mω= , )0()0( UV =  (8)
We can now compute the discounted expected utility at n  steps into the future, using 
equation (6):
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artistic aspect of the identity is present more strongly. The author’s artistic interests reflect the 
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At this point, automata—farmers—would want to know which land-use state will allow them 
to gain a maximum of discounted expected utility, in total after n  steps. To this purpose, 
automata must compute total discounted expected utility gains:
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To compute )(nV  in equation (11), automata compute new transition probabilities after 
each step. For the first step, transition probabilities 
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To compute )(nV  in equation (11), automata compute new transition probabilities after each step. For 
the first step, transition probabil ties )0(ijp  simply follow from )0(V  using equation (11) and then 
equation (3). These probabilities are then used to compute )1(U . It is then possible to compute )1(V  
from equation (11): 
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The transition probabilities )1(ijp  for the second step then follow from  applying equation (3) to the 
entries of )1(V  in equation (12). From these probabilities we may compute )2(U , which may be used 
to compute )2(V , thus allowing us to compute transition probabilities )2(ijp  for the third step etc., 
recursively calculating )(nV  in equation (11). Once )(nV  is known, automata make an actual 
decision based on the updated transition probabilities )(npij , by applying the entries of )(nV  to their 
present situation by using equation (3) again. Transition costs remain constant during this process. 
 
As can be seen from equation (6) any future state after step n  depends on the previous state at after 
step 1−n  only. Therefore, the sequence of discounted expected utility vectors { })(iUiω  resulting 
from equation (11) constitutes a Markov chain counting 1+n  elements. Thus n  in equation (11) 
determines the length of the decision chain, i.e., how many steps automata can see into the future, 
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The transition probabilities 
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To compute )(nV  in equation (11), automata compute new transition probabilities after each step. For 
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The transition probabil ties )1(ijp  for the second step then follow from  applying equation (3) to the 
entries of )1(V  in equation (12). From these probabilities we may compute )2(U , which may be used 
to compute )2(V , thus allowing us to compute transition probabilities )2(ijp  for the third step etc., 
recursively calculating )(nV  in equation (11). Once )(nV  is known, automata make an actual 
decision based on the updated transition probabilities )(npij , by applying the entries of )(nV  to their 
present situation by using equation (3) again. Transition costs remain constant during this process. 
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 r s lti from equation (11) constitutes a Markov chain counting 1+n  
elements. Thus n  in equation (11) determines the length of the decision chain, i.e., how 
many steps automata can see into the future, while anticipation parameter ω  regulates 
the effect of discounting. If 0→ω , i.e., discount rate ∞→r , expectation values from 
future decisions will be negligible. In this case, decisions are effectively a result of comparing 
present utility v lues only, i.e., all other values i  eq ation (11) re zero. If 1→ω , i.e., 
discount rate 0→r , expectation values from future decisions will not be negligible and will 
affect decision making. In this case, decisions are a result of comparing non-zero discounted 
expected total utility value entries of equation (14). 
Below, the utility-maximization mechanism and effects of rationality parameter β  and 
anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 2). Note that agricultural marginal 
utility is the total rate of change of utility from high- and low-input states. That is, it is the sum 
of all individual utility increments/decrements due to agriculture, per iteration. To arrive at 
agricultural marginal utility per automaton 
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A Pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model:
Utility maximization at varying levels of complexity and rotionality (CORA)
(4.4.1.1. Utility maximization). This explains our choice of presenting results of this- and the 
previous subsection together.
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Note: Length of Markov chai 10=n . Red is high-input fraction I of total land use, brown is low-
input fraction A of total land use, green is natural fraction N of total land use, black is fallow fraction F 
of total land use. Total land use is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
 
Table 2. Statistical-equilibrium states—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilities MaU  and land-use fractions I, A, N and F. 
),( ωβ  >Ω< T  >< MaU  >< I  >< A  >< N  >< F  
),0( x  11,755.2 3.7 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
)0,1(  245 9.9 0.99 0 0 0.01 
(2.5,0) 4.4 9.4 0.68 0.32 0 0 
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anticipation (Fig. 2, Table 2). Furthermore, without anticipation land use becomes stable around 
2=β  (Fig. 2c). With anticipation, land use already becomes stable around 5.1=β  (Fig. 2d). 
Furthermore, we observe spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states for which agricultural marginal 
utility is stable, for 86.0>β  (Fig. 2c) and 47.0>β  (Fig. 2d) without and with anticipation, 
respectively. Finally, natural land use N is always zero because regrowth of nature does not yet occur 
(Fig. 2c–2d, Table 2). 
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A Pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model:
Utility maximization at varying levels of complexity and rotionality (CORA)
Fig. 3a. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 0=ω
Fig. 3b. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 5.2=β  with anticipation 0=ω
Fig. 3c. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 
Chapter 4  
73 
 
 
 
Fig. 3a. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 0=ω . 
 
Fig. 3b. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
ratio ality 5.2=β  with anticipation 0=ω . 
 
Fig. 3c. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 25.0=ω . 
        
Fig. 3d. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 5.2=β  with anticipation 
25.0=ω .
Note: Red is high-input fraction I of total land use, yellow is low-input fraction A of total land use, 
green is natural fraction N of total land use, black is fallow fraction F of total land use. Total land use 
is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
 
Because the utility-maximization mechanism is temporal and not spatial (4.4. Temporal and spatial 
mechanisms), automata behave spatially independent. Furthermore, landscapes are quite similar, 
comparing with (Figs. 3c–3d) and without (Figs. 3a–3b) anticipation. Moreover, differences between 
landscapes become even smaller for increasing β  with fixed ω  (Table 2). Comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 
3, the need for studying statistical-equilibrium states is evident. 
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4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature
Utility-feedback mechanisms affect decision making indirectly by manipulation of inputs of the 
utility-maximization mechanism (Fig. 1), and are modeled according to (4.3.1. Land-use states). 
A negative effect of low-input agriculture is that soil nutrients will become depleted over time. 
This is modeled by decreasing the low-input agriculture utility as long as land use remains low 
input agriculture. This causes low-input agricultural land to become fallow with increasing 
probability over time, as the utility associated with the low-input state gradually declines and 
drops below that associated with the fallow state. Furthermore, fallow land that has been in a 
low-input state for a number of iterations before becoming fallow is allowed to recover. This is 
accomplished by increasing the low-input agriculture utility again after each iteration as long as 
land use remains fallow, increasing the probability of becoming low input again. Furthermore, 
negative effects of high-input agriculture and recovery therefrom, are also modeled by two 
such mechanisms. That is, independent from the soil-nutrient depletion- and recovery 
mechanisms. Consequently, when high-input land use has been practiced too long at the same 
location automata are forced to switch back to low-input- or fallow land use. Land that remains 
in fallow state sufficiently long, will turn into nature. Because regrowth of nature is considered 
an independent process external to decision making, it can only occur by an independent 
stochastic mechanism. This mechanism causes the transition from fallow land to natural land 
to occur once in every five iterations on average. The rate of decrease of land-use-state utility 
is assumed to be 25 % lower for high-input agriculture compared to low-input agriculture, to 
model that high-input agriculture is usually more productive for a longer time. Rates of increase 
of land-use-state utility, i.e., recovery rates, are assumed to be equal. All rates are illustrative, 
i.e., they are not calibrated to concrete data. Rates are regulated by one parameter ε, which 
is then internally manipulated. Low-input agriculture utility decreases by units of ε, high-input 
agriculture utility decreases by units of.
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Below, the effects of adding utility feedbacks and the regrowth of nature mechanism in addition to 
effects of rationality parameter β  and anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated (Fig. 4). 
Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of 
transition entropy TΩ , agricultural marginal utility per automaton MaU  and land use were then 
approximated by 500 iterations for each sample-point, both with )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  
anticipation (Fig. 4). Note that if we set parameter 0=ε , the model reduces to its previous form 
(4.4.1.2. Anticipation). Furthermore, that agricultural land-use-state utilities (Table 1) are no longer 
constant. 
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nu ber of iterations before becoming fallow is allowed to recover. This is accomplished by increasing 
the low-input agriculture utility again after each iteration as long as land use remains fallow, 
increasing the probability of becoming low input again. Furthermore, negative effects of high-input 
agriculture and recover therefrom, are also modeled by two such mechanisms. That is, independent 
from the soil-nutrient depletion- and recovery mechanisms. Consequently, when high-input land use 
has been practiced too long at the same location automata are forced to switch back to low-input- or 
fallow land use. Land that remains in fallow state sufficiently long, will turn into nature. Because 
regrowth of nature is considered an independent process external to decision making, it can only occur 
by an independent stochastic mechanism. This mechanism causes the transition from fallow land to 
natural land to occur once in every five iterations on average. The rate of decrease of land-use-state 
utility is assumed to be 25 % lower for high-input agriculture compared to low-input agriculture, to 
mod l that high-input griculture is usually more productive for a long r time. Rates of increase of 
land-use-state utility, i.e., recovery rates, are assumed to be equal. All rates are illustrative, i.e., they 
are not calibrated to concrete data. Rates are regulated by one parameter ε, which is then internally 
manipulated. Low-input agriculture utility decreases by units of ε, high-input agriculture utility 
decreases by units of ε*75.0 . Both utilities are increased by units of ε in case of recovery. The 
parameter ε has been chosen to create noticeable yet comprehensible effects, allowing to compare with 
earlier model forms. 
 
Below, the effects of adding utility feedbacks and the regrowth of nature mechanism in addition to 
effects of rationality parameter β  and anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated (Fig. 4). 
Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was sampled usi g increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of 
transition entropy TΩ , agricultural marginal utility per automaton MaU  and land use were then 
approximated by 500 iterations for each sample-point, both with )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  
anticipation (Fig. 4). Note that if we set parameter 0=ε , the model reduces to its previous form 
(4.4.1.2. Anticip tion). Furthermore, that agricultural land-use-state utilities (Table 1) are no longer 
constant. 
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A Pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model:
Utility maximization at varying levels of complexity and rotionality (CORA)
Fig. 4a. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of transition 
entropy TΩ  plotted against rationality β  
without and with anticipation, i.e., for 0=ω  
(black) and 
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Fig. 3a. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 0=ω . 
 
Fig. 3b. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 5.2=β  with anticipation 0=ω . 
 
Fig. 3c. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 25.0=ω . 
        
Fig. 3d. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 5.2=β  with anticipation 
25.0=ω .
Note: Red is high-input fraction I of total land use, yellow is low-input fraction A of total land use, 
green is natural fraction N of total land use, black is fallow fraction F of total land use. Total land use 
is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
 
Because the utility-maximization mechanism is temporal and not spatial (4.4. Temporal and spatial 
mechanisms), automata behave spatially independent. Furthermore, landscapes are quite similar, 
comparing with (Figs. 3c–3d) and without (Figs. 3a–3b) anticipation. Moreover, differences between 
landscapes become even smaller for increasing β  with fixed ω  (Table 2). Comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 
3, the need for studying statistical-equilibrium states is evident. 
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Fig. 4b. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of agricultural 
marginal utility 
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Fig. 4a. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of transition 
entropy TΩ  plotted against rationality β  
without and with anticipation, i.e., for 0=ω  
(black) and 25.0=ω  (bl e), resp ctively. 
 
Fig. 4b. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of 
agricultural marginal utility MaU  plotted 
against rationality β  without and with 
anticipation, i.e., for 0=ω  (black) and 
25.0=ω  (blue), respectively. 
 
Fig. 4c. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against 
rationality β  without anticipation, i.e., for 
0=ω . 
 
Fig. 4d. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against 
rationality β  with anticipation, i.e., for 
25.0=ω . 
 
Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n  and feedback parameter 1.0=ε . Red is high-input fraction I 
of total land use, brown is low-input fraction A of total land use, green is natural fraction N of total 
land use, black is fallow fraction F of total land use. Total land use is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
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Table 3. Statistical-equilibrium states—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilit es MaU  and land-use fractions I, A, N and F. 
),( ωβ  >Ω< T  >< MaU  >< I  >< A  >< N  >< F  
),0( x  12,151.3 3.4 0.31 0.31 0.06 0.32 
)0,1(  3915.4 4.9 0.52 0.09 0.07 0.32 
)0,5.2(  1804.8 4.7 0.57 0 0.07 0.36 
)25.0,1(  2681.8 4.8 0.46 0.28 0.01 0.25 
)25.0,5.2(  903.2 4.6 0.59 0.05 0 0.36 
Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n  and feedback parameter 1.0=ε . I is high-input fraction of 
total land use, A is low-input fraction of total land use, N is natural fraction of total land use and F is 
fallow fraction of total land use. Total land use is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . The ),0( xx∈  indicates that 
ω  has no effect for 0=β . 
 
Results for the 0=β  model (Table 2) are slightly offset compared to Table 3, as entropy is higher 
after introduction of the regrowth of nature mechanism, although not because of utility maximization. 
This mechanism simply causes a more uniform distribution of land uses, explaining the increase in 
entropy (Tables 2–3). The decrease in agricultural marginal utility (Tables 2–3) can be explained by 
the specification of NU  (Table 1). That is, it might just as well have been an increase for a higher 
specific value of NU . For the utility-maximization mechanism affected by feedback mechanisms 
without anticipation (Fig. 4c, Table 3), we see increasing high-input- and fallow land use at the 
expense of low-input agriculture for increasing rationality, while natural land use does not change 
much. For the utility-maximization mechanism affected by feedback mechanisms with anticipation 
(Fig. 4d), we see stable high- and low-input agriculture until around 25.1=β . For 25.1>β , high-
input agriculture suddenly strongly increases at the expense of low-input agriculture. Fallow land 
shows an overall increase at the expense of natural land use (for 25.1<β ) and low-input land use 
(for 25.1>β ). The entropy with anticipation (Fig. 4a, blue) is still lower than the one without 
anticipation (Fig. 4a, black). Apparently there is a higher occurrence of individual utility maximization 
with anticipation. Remarkably, the agricultural marginal utility with anticipation (Fig. 4b, blue) 
remains lower than the one without anticipation (Fig. 4b, black) until around 1=β . The agricultural 
marginal utility without anticipation (Fig. 4b, black) stabilizes almost immediately, around 3.0=β , 
while the one with anticipation (Fig. 4b, blue) stabilizes around 25.1=β . Just as for the previous 
model form (4.4.1.2. Anticipation), we observe  spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states for which 
agricultural marginal utility is stable, for 3.0>β  (Fig. 4c) and 25.1>β  (Fig. 4d) without and with 
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Results for the 0=β  model (Table 2) are slightly offset compared to Table 3, as entropy 
is higher after introduction of the regrowth of nature mechanism, although not because of 
utility maximization. This mechanism simply causes  more unif rm distributi n of land us s, 
explaining the increase in entropy (Tables 2–3). The decrease in agricultural marginal utility 
(Tables 2–3) can be explained by the sp cification of NU  (Table 1). That is, it might just as 
well have been an increase for  high r specific value of NU . For the utility-maxim zation 
mechanism affected by f edback mech nisms without anticipation (Fig. 4c, Table 3), we 
see increasing high-input- and fallow land use at the expense of low-input agriculture 
for increasing rationality, while natural land use does not change much. For the utility-
maximization mechanis  affected by feedback mechanisms with anticipation (Fig. 4d), we 
see stable high- and low-input agriculture until around
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Because the added utility-feedback mechanisms ar  temporal and not spatial (4.4. Temporal 
and spatial mechanisms), automata still behave independently. Furthermore, after 
introducing utility-feedback mechanisms each aut maton in the landscapes in Fig. 5 makes 
independent land-use transition cycles. Whereas before automata could remain in the same 
state indefinitely (Fig. 3, Table 2). Upon increasing rationality from 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c) to 
5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), high-input agriculture increases and low-input agriculture strongly 
decreases (Table 3), both with (Figs. 5c–5d) and without (Figs. 5a–5b) anticipation. Upon 
enabling automata to anticipate for 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c), natural- and high-input land 
use decrease and low-input agriculture strongly increases (Table 3), compared to without 
anticip tion (Fig. 5a). Finally, upon enabling automata to anticipate for 5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, 
Fig. 5d), natural land use decreases and low-input agriculture increases (Table 3), compared 
to without anticipation (Fig. 5b).
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4.4.2. Spatial mechanisms
4.4.2.1. Co-operation
Larger groups of farmers often share costs more efficiently, e.g., by forming agricultural 
co-operatives. To simulate this, automata use a near neighbor mechanism (Hofbauer and 
Sigmund 2003). They scan the land-use state of their eight nearest neighbors for each 
iteration. For every neighboring automaton in a low- or high-input agricultural state, the costs 
of making the transition from fallow land to that agricultural state decrease proportionally. 
Thus, the more neighboring automata in a high- or low-input agriculture state, the higher 
the probability that near automata in non-agricultural states will start practicing agriculture 
as well. Note that this is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and spatial mechanisms) that 
manipulates the inputs of the utility-maximization mechanism. The more rational automata 
become, the more the effects of co-operation become apparent. The economic advantage 
for automata gained from co-operation can be regulated with parameter δ . That is, 
transition costs into high- and low-input states decrease by a factor of δ  multiplied with 
the count of neighboring automata in high- and low-input agriculture states, respectively. 
Co-operation parameter δ  has been chosen such to create noticeable yet comprehensible 
effects, allowing to compare with earlier model forms.
Below, the effect of adding the co-operation mechanism and effects of rationality parameter 
β  and anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 6). Rationality 
]5.2,0[∈β  was again sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of 
transition entropy TΩ , agricultural marginal utility per automaton 
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Table 3. Statistic l-equilibrium st tes—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilities MaU  and land-use fractions I, A, N and F. 
),( ωβ  >Ω< T >< MaU  >< I  >< A  >< N  >< F  
),0( x  12,151.3 3.4 0.31 0.31 0.06 0.32 
)0,1(  3915.4 4.9 0.52 0.09 0.07 0.32 
)0,5.2(  1804.8 4.7 0.57 0 0.07 0.36 
)25.0,1(  2681.8 4.8 0.46 0.28 0.01 0.25 
)25.0,5.2(  903.2 4.6 0.59 0.05 0 0.36 
Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n  and feedback parameter 1.0=ε . I is high-input fraction of 
total land use, A is low-input fraction of total land use, N is natural fraction of total land use and F is 
fallow fraction of total land use. Total land use is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . The ),0( xx∈  indicates that 
ω  has no effect for 0=β . 
 
Results for the 0=β  model (Table 2) are slightly offset compared to Table 3, as entropy is higher 
after introduction of the regrowth of nature mechanism, although not because of utility maximization. 
This mechanism simply causes a more uniform distribution of land uses, explaining the increase in 
entropy (Tables 2–3). The decrease in agricultural marginal utility (Tables 2–3) can be explained by 
the specification of NU  (Table 1). That is, it might just as well have been an increase for a higher 
specific value of NU . For the utility-maximization mechanism affected by feedback mechanisms 
without anticipation (Fig. 4c, Table 3), we see increasing high-input- and fallow land use at the 
expense of low-input agriculture for increasing rationality, while natural land use does not change 
much. For the utility-maximization mechanism affected by feedback mechanisms with anticipation 
(Fig. 4d), we see stable high- and low-input agriculture until around 25.1=β . For 25.1>β , high-
input agriculture suddenly strongly increases at the expense of low-input agriculture. Fallow land 
shows an overall increase at the expense of natural land use (for 25.1<β ) and low-input land use 
(for 25.1>β ). The entropy with anticipation (Fig. 4a, blue) is still lower than the one without 
anticipation (Fig. 4a, black). Apparently there is a higher occurrence of individual utility maximization 
with anticipation. Remarkably, the agricultural marginal utility with anticipation (Fig. 4b, blue) 
remains lower than the one without anticipation (Fig. 4b, black) until around 1=β . The agricultural 
marginal utility without anticipation (Fig. 4b, black) stabilizes almost immediately, around 3.0=β , 
while the one with anticipation (Fig. 4b, blue) stabilizes around 25.1=β . Just as for the previous 
model form (4.4.1.2. Anticipation), we observe  spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states for which 
agricultural marginal utility is stable, for 3.0>β  (Fig. 4c) and 25.1>β  (Fig. 4d) without and with 
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2). Upon increasing rationality from 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c) to 5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), high-input 
agriculture increases and low-input agriculture strongly decreases (Table 3), both with (Figs. 5c–5d) 
and without (Figs. 5a–5b) anticipation. Upon enabling automata to anticipate for 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 
5c), natural- and high-input land use decrease and low-input agriculture strongly increases (Table 3), 
compared to without anticipation (Fig. 5a). Finally, upon enabling automata to anticipate for 5.2=β  
(Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), natural land use decreases and low-input agriculture increases (Table 3), compared 
to without anticipation (Fig. 5b). 
 
4.4.2. Spatial mechanisms 
 
4.4.2.1. Co-operation 
 
Larger groups of farmers often share costs more efficiently, e.g., by forming agricultural co-
operatives. To simulate this, automata use a near neighbor mechanism (Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003). 
They scan the land-use state of their eight nearest neighbors for each iteration. For every neighboring 
automaton in a low- or high-input agricultural state, the costs of making the transition from fallow 
land to that agricultural state decrease proportionally. Thus, the more neighboring automata in a high- 
or low-input agriculture state, the higher the probability that near automata in non-agricultural states 
will start practicing agriculture as well. Note that this is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and 
spatial mechanisms) that manipulates the inputs of the utility-maximization mechanism. The more 
rational autom ta become, the more t  effects of co-operation become apparent. The economic 
advantage for automata gained from co-operation can be regulated with parameter δ . That is, 
transition costs into high- and low-input states decrease by a factor of δ  multiplied with the count of 
neighboring automata in high- and low-input agriculture states, respectively. Co-operation parameter 
δ  has been chosen such to create noticeable yet comprehensible effects, allowing to compare with 
earlier model forms. 
 
Below, the effect of adding the co-operation mechanism and effects of rationality parameter β  and 
anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 6). Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was again 
sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of transition entropy TΩ , agricultural 
marginal utility per automaton MaU  and land use were then approximated by 500 iterations for each 
sample-poi i )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  anticipation (Fig. 6). Note that if we set 
parameter 0=δ , the model reduces to its previous form (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of 
nature). Furthermore, that both agricultural land-use-state utilities and transition costs (Table 1) are no 
longer constant. 
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Fig. 6a. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of transition 
entropy TΩ  plotted against rationality β  
without and with anticipation, i.e., for 0=ω  
(black) and 
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2). Upon increasing rationality from 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c) to 5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), high-input 
agriculture increases and low-input agriculture strongly decreases (Table 3), both with (Figs. 5c–5d) 
and without (Figs. 5a–5b) anticipation. Upon enabling automata to anticipate for 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 
5c), natural- and high-input land use decrease and low-input agriculture strongly increases (Table 3), 
compared to without anticipation (Fig. 5a). Finally, upon enabling automata to anticipate for 5.2=β  
(Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), natural land use decreases and low-input agriculture increases (Table 3), compared 
to without anticipation (Fig. 5b). 
 
4.4.2. Spatial mechanisms 
 
4.4.2.1. Co-operation 
 
Larger groups of farmers often share costs more efficiently, e.g., by forming agricultural co-
operatives. To simulate this, automata use a near neighbor mechanism (Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003). 
They scan the land-use state of their eight nearest neighbors for each iteration. For every neighboring 
automaton in a low- or high-input agricultural state, the costs of making the transition from fallow 
land to that agricultural state decrease proportionally. Thus, the more neighboring automata in a high- 
or low-input agriculture state, the higher the probability that near automata in non-agricultural states 
will start practicing agriculture as well. Note that this is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and 
spatial mechanisms) that manipulates the inputs of the utility-maximization mechanism. The more 
rational automata become, the more the effects of co-operation become apparent. The economic 
advantage for automata gained from co-operation can be regulated with parameter δ . That is, 
transition costs into high- and low-input states decrease by a factor of δ  multiplied with the count of 
neighboring automata in high- and low-input agriculture states, respectively. Co-operation parameter 
δ  has been chosen such to create noticeable yet comprehensible effects, allowing to compare with 
earlier model forms. 
 
Below, the effect of adding the co-operation mechanism and effects of rationality parameter β  and 
anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 6). Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was again 
sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of transition entropy TΩ , agricultural 
marginal utility per automaton MaU  and land use were then approximated by 500 iterations for each 
sample-point, both with )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  anticipation (Fig. 6). Note that if we set 
parameter 0=δ , the model reduces to its previous form (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of 
nature). Furthermore, that both agricultural land-use-state utilities and transition costs (Table 1) are no 
longer constant. 
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Fig. 6b. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of 
gricultural marginal utilit MaU  plotted 
against rationality β  without and with 
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Fig. 6c. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against 
rationality β  without anticipation, i.e., for 
0=ω . 
 
Fig. 6d. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against 
rationality β  with anticipation, i.e., for 
25.0=ω . 
 
Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n , feedback parameter 1.0=ε  and co-operation parameter 
5.0=δ . Red is high-input fraction I of total land use, brown is low-input fraction A of total land use, 
green is natural fraction N of total land use, black is fallow fraction F of total land use. Total land use 
is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
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2). Upon increasing rationality from 1=β (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c) to 5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), high-input 
agriculture increases and low-input agriculture trongly decreases (Table 3), both with (Figs. 5c–5d) 
and without (Figs. 5a–5b) anticipation. Upon enabling automata to anticipate for 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 
5c), natural- and high-input land use de  and low-input agriculture strongly increases (Table 3), 
compared t  without anticipation (Fig. 5a). Finally, upon enabling automata to anticipate for 5.2=β  
(Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), natural la d use decreas s and low-input agriculture increases (Table 3), compared 
to without anticipation (Fig. 5b). 
 
4.4.2. Spatial mechanisms 
 
4.4.2.1. Co-operation 
 
La g r groups of farmers ften share osts more efficiently, e.g., by forming agricultural co-
operatives. To simul te this, automata use a near neighbor mechanism (Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003). 
Th y scan the land-use sta  of their eight near st neighbors for each iteration. For every neighboring 
automaton in a low- or high-input gr cultu al state, the costs of making the transition from fallow 
land to that agricultural stat  decrease proportionally. Thus, the more neighboring automata in a high- 
or l w-input agriculture state, the higher the probabili y that near automata in non-agricultural states 
will start practicing agriculture as well. Note that this is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and 
spatial mechanisms) that manipulates the inputs of the utility-maximization mechanism. The more 
rational autom ta become, the more the effects f co-operation become apparent. The economic 
adva tage for automata gained from co-operation can be regulated with parameter δ . That is, 
ransition costs into high- and low-input states de rease by a factor of δ  multiplied with the count of 
nei hboring automata in high- and low-input agricultur  states, respectively. Co-operation parameter 
δ  has been chosen such to create noticeable yet comprehensible effects, allowing to compare with 
earlier model forms. 
 
Below, the effect of adding the co-oper tion mechanism and effects of rationality parameter β  and 
anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 6). Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was again 
sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibri m states of transition entropy TΩ , agricultural 
marginal utility per auto on MaU  and l nd use w re then approximated by 500 iterations for each 
sample-point, both with )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  anticipation (Fig. 6). Note that if we set 
parameter 0=δ , the model reduces to its previous form (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of 
n ture). Furthermor , that both agricultural land-use-state utilities and transition costs (Table 1) are no 
longer constant. 
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Fig. 6c. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against rationality 
β  without anticipation, i.e., for 0=ω
Fig. 6d. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against rationality 
β  with anticipation, i.e., for 
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2). Upon increasing rationality from 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c) to 5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), high-input 
agricultu e increases and low-input agricultur  strongly decreases (Table 3), both with (Figs. 5c–5d) 
and without Figs. 5a–5b) anticipation. Upon enabling automata to ticipate for 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 
5c), natural- and high-input land use decrease and low-input agriculture strongly increases (Table 3), 
compared to without anticipation (Fig. 5a). Finally, upon enabling automata to anticipate for 5.2=β  
(Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), natural land use decreases and low-input agriculture increases (Table 3), compared 
to without anticipation (Fig. 5b). 
 
4.4.2. Spatial mechanisms 
 
4.4.2.1. Co-operation 
 
Larger groups of farmers often share costs more efficiently, e.g., by forming agricultural co-
operatives. To simulate this, automata use a near neighbor mechanism (Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003). 
They scan the land-use state of their eight nearest neighbors for each iteration. For every neighboring 
automaton in a low- or high-input agricultural state, the costs of making the transition from fallow 
land to that agricultural state decrease proportionally. Thus, the more neighboring automata in a high- 
or low-input agriculture state, the higher the probability hat near automat  in no -agricultural states 
will start practicing agriculture as well. Note that this is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and 
spatial echanisms) h t manipulates he inputs of the utility-maximization mechanism. The more 
rational a omata become, the m e the effects of co-operation become apparent. The economic 
advantage for automata gained from co-operation can be regulated with parameter δ . That is, 
transition costs into high- and low-input states decrease by a factor of δ  multiplied with the count of 
neighboring automata in high- and low-input agriculture states, respectively. Co-operation parameter 
δ  has been chosen such to create noticeable yet comprehensible effects, allowing to compare with 
earlier model forms. 
 
Below, the effect of adding the co-operation mechanism and effects of rationality parameter β  and 
anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 6). Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was again 
sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of transition entropy TΩ , agricultural 
marginal utility per automaton MaU  and land use were then approximated by 500 iterations for each 
sample-point, both with )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  anticipation (Fig. 6). Note that if we set 
parameter 0=δ , the model reduces to its previous form (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of 
nature). Furthermore, that both agricultural land-use-state utilities and transition costs (Table 1) are no 
longer constant. 
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approximated by 500 iterations—of transition 
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Fig. 6b. Statistical-equilibrium states—
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agricultural marginal utility MaU  plotted 
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Fig. 6c. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against 
rationality β  without anticipation, i.e., for 
0=ω . 
 
Fig. 6d. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A, N and F plotted against 
rationality β  with anticipation, i.e., for 
25.0=ω . 
 
Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n , feedback parameter 1.0=ε  and co-operation parameter 
5.0=δ . Red is high-input fraction I of total land use, brown is low-input fraction A of total land use, 
green is natural fraction N of total land use, black is fallow fraction F of total land use. Total land use 
is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
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A Pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model:
Utility maximization at varying levels of complexity and rotionality (CORA)
Table 4. Statistical-equilibrium states—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilities 
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Table 4. Statistical-equilibrium states—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilit es MaU  and land-use fractions I, A, N and F for 0≠β . 
),( ωβ  >Ω< T  >< MaU  >< I  >< A  >< N  >< F  
)0,1(  4761.7 4.6 0.51 0.13 0.06 0.3 
)0,5.2(  2029.1 4.4 0.58 0 0.07 0.35 
)25.0,1(  2870.2 4.4 0.47 0.28 0.01 0.24 
)25.0,5.2(  838.2 4.6 0.51 0.21 0 0.28 
Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n , feedback parameter 1.0=ε  and co-operation parameter 
5.0=δ . I is high-input fraction of total land use, A is low-input fraction of total land use, N is natural 
fraction of total land use and F is fallow fraction of total land use. Total land use is 
tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 .  
 
Entropic and economic behavior is similar to that of the previous model form without co-operation 
mechanism (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature), except that the model with anticipation 
performs better for sufficiently high β  (Fig. 2b, Fig. 4b). That is, when the co-operation mechanism 
is included. For the model with anticipation, we see that high- and low-input agriculture are more 
stable compared to the model without co-operation mechanism, i.e., they are stable until around 2=β  
(Fig. 6d) instead of until around 25.1=β  (Fig. 4d). Just as for the previous model form, we observe 
spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states for which marginal utility is stable for 3.0>β  (Fig. 6c) 
and 25.1>β  (Fig. 6d), without and with anticipation, respectively. 
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Table 4. Statistica -equilibrium states—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marg nal 
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Table 4. Statistical-equilibrium states—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilities MaU  and land-use fractions I, A, N and F for 0≠β . 
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5.0=δ . I is high-input fraction of total land use, A is low-input fraction of total land use, N is natural 
fraction of total land use and F is fallow fraction of total land use. Total land use is 
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Entropic and economic behavior is similar to that of the previous model form without co-operation 
mechanism (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature), except that the model with anticipation 
performs better for sufficiently high β  (Fig. 2b, Fig. 4b). That is, when the co-operation mechanism 
is included. For the model with anticipation, we see that high- and low-input agriculture are more 
stable compared to the model without co-operation mechanism, i.e., they are stable until around 2=β  
(Fig. 6d) instead of until around 25.1=β  (Fig. 4d). Just as for the previous model form, we observe 
spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states for which marginal utility is stable for 3.0>β  (Fig. 6c) 
and 25.1>β  (Fig. 6d), without and with anticipation, respectively. 
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Tabl tatistical-equ librium st tes—approximated by 500 itera i ns—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilities MaU  and land-use fractions I, A, N and F for 0≠β . 
),( ωβ  >Ω< T  >< MaU  >< I  >< A  >< N  >< F  
)0,1(  4761.7 4.6 0.51 0.13 0.06 0.3 
)0,5.2(  2029.1 4.4 0.58 0 0.07 0.35 
)25.0,1(  2870.2 4.4 0.47 0.28 0.01 0.24 
)25.0,5.2(  838.2 4.6 0.51 0.21 0 0.28 
Note: Le  of Mar  in 10=n , feedback parameter 1.0=ε  and co-operation parameter 
5.0=δ . I is high-input fraction of total land use, A is low-input fraction of total land use, N is natural 
fraction of total land use and F is fallow fraction of total land use. Total land use is 
tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 .  
 
Entropic and economic behavior is similar to that of the previous model form without co-operation 
mechanism (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature), except that the model with anticipation 
performs better for sufficiently high β  (Fig. 2b, Fig. 4b). That is, when the co-operation mechanism 
is included. For the model with anticipation, we see that high- and low-input agriculture are more 
stable compared to the model without co-operation mechanism, i.e., they are stable until around 2=β  
(Fig. 6d) instead of until around 25.1=β  (Fig. 4d). Just as for the previous model form, we observe 
spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states for which marginal utility is stable for 3.0>β  (Fig. 6c) 
and 25.1>β  (Fig. 6d), without and with anticipation, respectively. 
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Table 4. Statistical-equilibrium states—approximated by 500 iterations—of entropies TΩ , marginal 
utilities MaU  and land-use fractions I, A, N and F for 0≠β . 
),( ωβ  >Ω< T >< MaU >< I  >< A  >< N  >< F  
)0,1(  4761.7 4.6 0.51 0.13 0.06 0.3 
)0,5.2(  2029.1 4.4 0.58 0 0.07 0.35 
)25.0,1(  2870.2 4.4 0.47 0.28 .0  .24 
)25.0,5.2(  838.2 4.6 0.51 0.21 0 0.28 
Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n , feedback parameter 1.0=ε  and co-operation parameter 
5.0=δ . I is high-input fraction of total land use, A is low-input fraction of total land use, N is natural 
fraction of total land use and F is fallow fraction of total land use. Total land use is 
tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 .  
 
Entropic and economic behavior is similar to that of the previous model form without co-operation 
mechanism (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature), except that the model with anticipation 
performs better for sufficiently high β  (Fig. 2 , Fig. 4b). That is, when the co-operation mechanis  
is included. For the model with anticipation, we see that high- and low-input agriculture are more 
stable compared to the model without co-operation mechanism, i.e., they are stable until around 2=β  
(Fig. 6d) instead of until arou  25.1=β  (Fig. 4d). Just as for the previous model form, we observe 
spectrums of statistical-equilibriu  states for which marginal utility is stable for 3.0>β  (Fig. 6c) 
and 25.1>β  (Fig. 6d), without and with anticipation, respectively. 
  
 ig. 4d). Just as for the previous model form, we observe spectrums of 
statistical-equilibrium states for which marginal utility is st ble for 3.0>β  (Fig. 6c) and 
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5.0=δ . I is high-input fraction of total land use, A is low-input fraction of total land use, N is natural 
fraction of total land use and F is fallow fraction of total land use. Total land use is 
tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 .  
 
Entropic and economic behavior is similar to that of the previous model form without co-operation 
mechanism (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature), except that the model with anticipation 
performs better for sufficiently high β  (Fig. 2b, Fig. 4b). That is, when the co-operation mechanism 
is included. For the model with anticipation, we see that high- and low-input agriculture are more 
stable compared to the model without co-operation mechanism, i.e., they are stable until around 2=β  
(Fig. 6d) instead of until around 25.1=β  (Fig. 4d). Just as for the previous model form, we observe 
spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states for which marginal utility is stable for 3.0>β  (Fig. 6c) 
and 25.1>β  (Fig. 6d), without and with anticipation, respectively. 
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Fig. 7a. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 0=ω
Fig. 7b. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 5.2=β  with anticipation 0=ω
Fig. 7c. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 1=β  with anticipation 
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2). Upon increasing rationality from 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c) to 5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), high-input 
agriculture increases and low-input agriculture strongly decreases (Table 3), both with (Figs. 5c–5d) 
and without (Figs. 5a–5b) anticipation. Upon enabling automata to anticipate for 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 
5c), natural- and high-input land use decrease and low-input agriculture strongly increases (Table 3), 
compared to without anticipation (Fig. 5a). Finally, upon enabling automata to anticipate for 5.2=β  
(Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), natural land use decreases and low-input agriculture increases (Table 3), compared 
to without anticipation (Fig. 5b). 
 
4.4.2. Spatial mechanisms 
 
4.4.2.1. Co-operation 
 
Larger groups of farmers often share costs more efficiently, e.g., by forming agricultural co-
operatives. To simulate this, automata use a near neighbor mechanism (Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003). 
They scan the land-use state of their eight nearest neighbors for each iteration. For every neighboring 
automaton in a low- or high-input agricultural state, the costs of making the transition from fallow 
land to that agricultural state decrease proportionally. Thus, the more neighboring automata in a high- 
or low-input agriculture state, the higher the probability that near automata in non-agricultural states 
will start practicing agriculture as well. Note that this is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and 
spatial mechanisms) that manipulates the inputs of the utility-maximization mechanism. The more 
rational automata become, the more the effects of co-operation become apparent. The economic 
advantage for utomata gained from co-operation can b  regulated with parameter δ . That is, 
transition costs into high- and low-input states decrease by a factor of δ  multiplied with the count of 
neighboring automata in high- and low-input agriculture states, respectively. Co-operation parameter 
δ  has been chosen such to create noticeable yet comprehensible effects, allowing to compare with 
earlier model forms. 
 
Below, the effect of adding the co-operation mechanism and effects of rationality parameter β  and 
anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 6). Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was again 
sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of transition entropy TΩ , agricultural 
marginal utility per automaton MaU  and land use were then approximated by 500 iterations for each 
s mple-point, both with )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  anticipation (Fig. 6). Note that if we set 
parameter 0=δ , the model reduces to its previous form (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of 
nature). Furthermore, that both agricultural land-use-state utilities and transition costs (Table 1) are no 
longer constant. 
Fig. 7d. Landscape after 500 iterations for 
rationality 5.2β  w th anticipation 
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2). Upon increasing rationality from 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 5c) to 5.2=β  (Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), high-input 
agriculture increases and low-input agriculture strongly decreases (Table 3), both with (Figs. 5c–5d) 
and without (Figs. 5a–5b) anticipation. Upon enabling automata to anticipate for 1=β  (Fig. 5a, Fig. 
5c), natural- and high-input land use decrease and low-input agriculture strongly increases (Table 3), 
compared to without anticipation (Fig. 5a). Finally, upon enabling automata to anticipate for 5.2=β  
(Fig. 5b, Fig. 5d), natural land use decreases and low-input agriculture increases (Table 3), compared 
to without anticipation (Fig. 5b). 
 
4.4.2. Spatial mechanisms 
 
4.4.2.1. Co-operation 
 
Larger groups of farmers often share costs more efficiently, e.g., by forming agricultural co-
operatives. To simulate this, automata use a near neighbor mechanism (Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003). 
They scan the land-use state of their eight nearest neighbors for each iteration. For every neighboring 
automaton in a low- or high-input agricultural state, the costs of making the transition from fallow 
land to that agricultural state decrease proportionally. Thus, the more neighboring automata in a high- 
or low-input agriculture state, the higher the probability that near automata in non-agricultural states 
will start practicing agriculture as well. Note that this is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and 
spatial mechanisms) that manipulates the inputs of the utility-maximization mechanism. The more 
rational automata become, the more the effects of co-operation become apparent. The economic 
advantage for automata gained from co-operation can be regulated with parameter δ . That is, 
transition costs into high- and low-input states decrease by a factor of δ  multiplied with the count of 
neighboring automata in high- and low-input agriculture states, respectively. Co-operation parameter 
δ  has been chosen such to create noticeable yet comprehensible effects, allowing to compare with 
earlier model forms. 
 
Below, the effect of adding the co-operation mechanism and effects of rationality parameter β  and 
anticipation parameter ω  are demonstrated together (Fig. 6). Rationality ]5.2,0[∈β  was again 
sampled using increments of 1/10. Statistical-equilibrium states of transition entropy TΩ , agricultural 
marginal utility per automaton MaU  and land use were then approximated by 500 iterations for each 
sample-point, both with )25.0( =ω  and without )0( =ω  anticipation (Fig. 6). Note that if we set 
parameter 0=δ , the model reduces to its previous form (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of 
nature). Furthermore, that both agricultural land-use-state utilities and transition costs (Table 1) are no 
longer constant. 
Note: Red is high-input fraction I of total land use, yellow is low-input fraction A of total land use, 
green is natural fraction N of total land use, black is fallow fraction F of total land use. Total land use is 
tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 .
Because the added co-operation mechanism is a spatial mechanism (4.4. Temporal and 
spatial mechanisms) automata no longer behave spatially independent. Periodically changing 
patterns of low- and high-input agriculture emerge (Fig. 7), although resulting landscapes are 
still somewhat similar to those without co-operation mechanism (Fig. 5). Upon increasing 
rationality from 1=β  (Fig. 7a, Fig. 7c) to 5.2=β  (Fig. 7b, Fig. 7d), spatial clustering 
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increases and high-input agriculture increases while low-input agriculture strongly decreases 
(Table 4), both with (Figs. 7c–7d) and without (Figs. 7a–7b) anticipation. Finally, upon enabling 
automata to anticipate (Figs. 7c–7d), natural- and high-input land use decrease and low-input 
agriculture strongly increases (Table 4), compared to without anticipation (Figs. 7a–7b). This 
is true for both 1=β  (Fig. 7a, Fig. 7c) and 5.2=β  (Fig. 7b, Fig. 7d).
4.5. Discussion
The here-presented model has shown how simple individual-based land-use systems may 
generate complex behavior at aggregate level, which is a common feature of real-world 
land-use systems. It suggests that land-use systems can exhibit system complexity that can 
be disentangled into systematic processes. That is, aggregate complexity that is not solely 
attributable to effects of disorganization, and can be shown to be derived from systematic 
input complexity (4.2. Introduction). If we are too much inclined towards aggregate real-
world drivers, empirical data, and statistics, it is more likely that we cannot disentangle input 
complexity. This obstacle prevents successful dynamic modeling of real-world complexity 
(Claessens et al., 2009). Conversely, if we are too much inclined towards abstraction, we 
are likely to lose the ability to validate results. Our model minimizes disorganized input 
complexity by its individual-based design, while retaining the possibility of validation. 
Input complexity is then most easily disentangled into reproducible systematic processes. 
Moreover, non-systematic temporal effects of input complexity will be filtered out by using 
statistical-equilibrium states. Therefore, we may expect it to perform better than either of 
these extremes. In the following subsections we discuss emergence and self-organization, 
how the different mechanisms give rise to observed complexity, and added value of the 
model.
4.5.1. Emergence and self-organization 
Particular statistical-equilibrium states are emergent, because they are a result of individual 
behavior of many automata that could not have been predicted a priori (Strogatz, 2001; Liu et 
al., 2007). Therefore, also observed spectrums of statistical-equilibrium states (Fig. 2, Fig. 4, 
Fig. 6) are emergent, because they are a result of individual behavior of many automata that 
could not have been predicted a priori. However, there can be no self-organization between 
particular statistical-equilibrium states. That is, each particular state is obtained by one 
model run while there is no information exchange between model runs. Furthermore, until 
the addition of the co-operation mechanism automata do not interact (Fig. 2, Fig. 4). After 
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adding the spatial co-operation mechanism to the temporal mechanisms already in effect, 
the model allows for spatio-temporal self-organization (Bao Le et al., 2011). Moreover, it can 
then exhibit complex systems behavior through non-linear interaction between automata.
4.5.2. Temporal mechanisms
Although both the choice model of utility maximization (4.4.1.1. Utility maximization) and 
Markov chains (4.4.1.2. Anticipation) have been well-known tools in the scientific land-
use modeling community for decades, dynamic—real time—feedbacks between transition 
probabilities and choice model are scarce (Satake and Iwasa, 2006; Bao Le et al., 2008). We 
were inspired by the work of Satake and Iwasa (2006) which was improved and expanded by 
us, constructing a new model in the process. They only included perceptions of utility into 
their model (Satake and Iwasa, 2006, p. 372, eq. 2) and not perceptions of costs as well, as 
we have done in equation (3). The inclusion of perceptions of costs and benefits leads to 
the more general transition matrix )(nM  given by equation (8), compared to )(nP  given 
by equation (2) which is a special case of )(nM  for zero transition costs. Furthermore, we 
differentiate between high- and low-input land use whereas they only define agricultural land 
use (Satake and Iwasa, 2006, p. 373). Regrowth of nature is treated as part of decision making 
by Satake and Iwasa (2006, p. 376, eq. 17), while we have treated it as an independent gradual 
process (4.4.1.3. Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature). Moreover, they did not add any 
other temporal or spatial mechanisms (4.4. Temporal and spatial mechanisms). 
Therefore, we have not only improved the work of Satake and Iwasa (2006) and constructed 
a new model in the process, but we have also added another temporal mechanism allowing 
for more advanced decision making. That is, utility-feedback mechanisms make it possible 
for land-use-state utilities to decrease as a consequence of utility-maximizing decisions 
that cause automata to either convert into or remain in high- or low-input states (4.4.1.3. 
Utility feedbacks and regrowth of nature). This causes entropies and agricultural marginal 
utilities (Fig. 4, Table 3) to be much higher and lower, respectively, compared to without 
feedback mechanisms (Fig. 2, Table 2). This could be interpreted as a result of facing more 
realistic conditions in general. Finally, our work follows the conceptual approaches of pattern-
oriented modeling (Grimm et al., 2005, 2006) and statistical-equilibrium states (4.3.5. Model 
output), while the work of Satake and Iwasa (2006) does not allow for landscape visualization 
or pattern formation and follows an opposite approach of investigating real-time behavior 
only, respectively. Note that combining the temporal mechanisms of utility maximization and 
utility feedbacks can already generate different emergent land use- and land-use patterns, for 
varying levels of individual rationality- and foresight (Figs. 4–5).
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4.5.3. Spatial mechanisms
The co-operation mechanism is an abstraction of how agricultural co-operatives can lead to 
more efficient sharing of costs. It allows automata to indirectly affect their nearest neighbor’s 
transition probabilities into high- and low-input agricultural states, by lowering transition 
costs proportionally to the number of neighboring automata in such states (Jepsen et al., 
2006; Moreno et al., 2009; Wickramasuriya et al., 2009). Because lowering transition costs 
exponentially affects the outcome of equation (3) and thereby of the utility-maximization 
mechanism, automata become spatially interdependent in a non-linear way. This causes 
complex systems behavior, in tandem with temporal mechanisms already in effect. Complex 
systems behavior generates different dynamical emergent land-use patterns, for varying 
levels of individual rationality- and foresight (Fig. 7). Furthermore, it causes changes in 
emergent land use- and agricultural marginal utility, compared to without complex systems 
behavior, for varying levels of individual rationality- and foresight (Fig. 4, Fig. 6).
4.5.4. Intensification
In some cases, resulting emergent behavior can be interpreted as intensification of 
agriculture. This is explained in detail in the next paragraph. Overall, when considerations of 
the future do not matter )0( =ω , we cannot say with certainty that intensification emerges. 
When considerations of the future do matter 
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probabilities into high- and low-input agricultural states, by lowering transition costs proportionally to 
the number of neighboring automata in such states (Jepsen et al., 2006; Moreno et al., 2009; 
Wickramasuriya et al., 2009). Because lowering transition costs exponentially affects the outcome of 
equation (3) and thereby of the utility-maximization mechanism, automata become spatially 
interdependent in a non-linear way. This causes complex systems behavior, in tandem with temporal 
mechanisms already in effect. Complex systems behavior generates different dynamical emergent 
land-use patterns, for varying levels of individual rationality- and foresight (Fig. 7). Furthermore, it 
causes changes in emergent land use- and agricultural marginal utility, compared to without complex 
systems behavior, for varying levels of individual rationality- and foresight (Fig. 4, Fig. 6). 
 
4.5.4. Intensification 
 
In some cases, resulting emergent behavior can be interpreted as intensification of agriculture. This is 
explained in detail in the next paragraph. Overall, when considerations of the future do not matter 
)0( =ω , we cannot say with certainty that intensification emerges. When considerations of the future 
 tt )25.0( =ω , we can say with certainty that intensification emerges for  3.0>β . 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8a. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A and T plotted against rationality 
β  with anticipation, i.e., 25.0=ω , for utility- 
maximization- and utility-feedback 
mechanisms. 
 
Fig. 8b. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A and T plotted against rationality 
β  with anticipation, i.e., 25.0=ω , for utility- 
maximization-, utility-feedback- and co-
operation mechanisms. 
 
, we can say with certainty that 
intensification emerges for 3.0>β .
For utility-maximization- and utility-feedback mechanisms with anticipation (Fig. 8a), we see 
that total agricultural land use remains nearly constant at increasing agricultural marginal 
utility for 
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Note: Length of Markov chain 10=n , feedback parameter 1.0=ε  (Fig. 8a, Fig. 8b). Co-operation 
p rameter 5.0=δ  (Fig. 8 ). Red is i tensive f action I of total land use, brown is extensive fraction A 
of total land use and black is total agricultural fraction T of total land use )( AIT += . Total land use 
is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
 
For utility-maximization- and utility-feedback mechanisms with anticipation (Fig. 8a), we see that 
total agricultural land use remains nearly constant at increasing agricultural marginal utility for 
25.13.0 << β  (Fig. 4b, Fig. 8a). That is, changes in total agricultural land use are negligible, 
compared to changes in agricultural marginal utility. Because automata are units of area, we can 
interpret agricultural marginal utilities (Fig. 2b, Fig. 4b, Fig. 6b) as abstractions of average yields per 
unit area. Therefore, this behavior could be interpreted as intensification due to  yield increase. 
However, for 5.225.1 ≤≤ β , agricultural marginal utility remains nearly constant (Fig. 4b). Total 
agricultural land use strongly decreases, while intensive land use increases (Fig. 8a). That is, now 
changes in agricultural marginal utility are negligible, compared to changes in total agricultural land 
use. This could be interpreted as intensification of agriculture due to substitution of land for inputs 
(Mandemaker et al., 2011). Complex systems behavior generated by adding the co-operation 
mechanism, causes intensification due to yield increase to emerge for 23.0 << β  (Fig. 6b, Fig. 8b), 
instead of for 25.13.0 << β  (Fig. 4b, Fig. 8a). That is, intensification due to yield increase at 
constant total agricultural land use emerges over a larger range of rationality. 
 
4.5.5. Validation and value added 
 
Pattern-Oriented Modeling (POM) (Grimm et al., 2005, 2006; Piou et al., 2009) attempts to reproduce 
real-world aggregate patterns with emergent—complex systems—behavior. It is believed that POM 
holds the potential to further increase understanding of land-use systems that are too complex to be 
understood by empirical analysis alone (Grimm et al., 2005; Evans and Manson, 2007; Liu et al., 
2007; Wiegand et al., 2008). The concept of statistical-equilibrium state enables us to better 
approximate real-world systematic properties by filtering out  non-systematic temporal variations. 
Furthermore, statistical-equilibrium states are reproducible emergent properties of  systematic 
complexity, and not of—disorganized—input complexity. In effect, we are treating the landscape as 
analogous to a thermo-dynamical system that can traverse a spectrum of equilibrium states. 
 
To quantify and compare generated land-use patterns to real-world land-use patterns, we could apply 
patch-level pattern metrics from landscape ecology, e.g., patch distribution- and density and/or patch-
shape complexity (McGarigal, 2006). Furthermore, we could investigate—partial—autocorrelation of 
patches (Overmars et al., 2003). This would allow us to investigate the relation between pattern 
ig. 4b, Fig. 8a). That is, changes in total agricultura  land use 
are negligible, compared to changes in agricultural marginal utility. Because automata are 
units of area, we can interpret agricultural marginal utilities (Fig. 2b, Fig. 4b, Fig. 6b) as 
abstractions of average yields per unit area. Therefore, this behavior could be interpreted 
as intensification due to yi ld increa e. However, for 
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of tot l land us  and black is total agricultural fraction T of total land use )( AIT += . Total land use 
is tFNAI ∀=+++ ,1 . 
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total agricultural land use remains nearly constant at increasing agricultural marginal utility for 
25.13.0 << β  (Fig. 4b, Fig. 8a). That is, changes in total agricultural land use are negligible, 
compared to changes in agricultural marginal utility. Because automata are units of area, we can 
interpret agricultural marginal utilities (Fig. 2b, Fig. 4b, Fig. 6b) as abstractions of average yields per 
unit area. Therefore, this behavior could be interpreted as intensification due to  yield increase. 
However, for 5.225.1 ≤≤ β , agricultural marginal utility ma ns ne rly c nstant (Fig. 4b). Total 
agricultural land use strongly decreases, while intensive land use increases (Fig. 8a). That is, now 
changes in agricultural marginal utility are negligible, compared to changes in total agricultural land 
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mechanism, causes intensification due to yield increase to emerge for 23.0 << β  (Fig. 6b, Fig. 8b), 
instead of for 25.13.0 << β  (Fig. 4b, Fig. 8a). That is, intensification due to yield increase at 
constant total agricultural land use emerges over a larger range of rationality. 
 
4.5.5. Validation and value added 
 
Pattern-Oriented Modeling (POM) (Grimm et al., 2005, 2006; Piou et al., 2009) attempts to reproduce 
real-world aggregate patterns with emergent—complex systems—behavior. It is believed that POM 
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Fig. 8a. Statistical-equilibrium states—
approximated by 500 iterations—of land-use 
fractions I, A and T plotted against rationality 
β  with anticipation, i.e., 
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4.5.5. Validation and value added
Pattern-Oriented Modeling (POM) (Grimm et al., 2005, 2006; Piou et al., 2009) attempts to 
reproduce real-world aggregate patterns with emergent—complex systems—behavior. It is 
believed that POM holds the potential to further increase understanding of land-use systems 
that are too complex to be understood by empirical analysis alone (Grimm et al., 2005; Evans 
and Manson, 2007; Liu et al., 2007; Wiegand et al., 2008). The concept of statistical-equilibrium 
state enables us to better approximate real-world systematic properties by filtering out non-
systematic temporal variations. Furthermore, statistical-equilibriu  states are reproducible 
emergent properties of systematic complexity, and not of—disorganized—input complexity. 
In effect, we are treating the landscape as analogous to a thermo-dynamical system that can 
traverse a spectrum of equilibrium states.
To quantify and compare generated land-use patterns to real-world land-use patterns, we 
could apply patch-level pattern metrics from landscape ecology, e.g., patch distribution- 
and density and/or patch-shape complexity (McGarigal, 2006). Furthermore, we could 
investigate—partial—autocorrelation of patches (Overmars et al., 2003). This would allow 
us to investigate the relation between pattern indices and systematic processes (Li and Wu, 
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2004). If the land-use pattern generated by a specific combination of mechanisms—and 
parameters—matches a real-world land-use pattern, there is quantitative evidence for those 
mechanisms key to that real-world landscape. Therefore, systematically generated patterns 
can be used in an attempt to filter out underlying processes.
However, as soon as real-world aggregate land-use patterns do come into play, so does 
disorganized complexity (4.2. Introduction). That is, if real-world- and generated patterns 
match, this could also be caused by processes or combinations of processes we did—or 
could—not include. Furthermore, our model could also be subject to disorganized input 
complexity introduced by real-world maps. Clearly, for any situation involving real-world 
complexity of landscapes, it is impossible to exclude input complexity entirely.
4.6. Conclusions
Combining the simple yet plausible temporal mechanisms of utility maximization, 
utility feedbacks, and anticipation can generate different emergent land-use patterns. 
Furthermore, it can generate two different types of emergent intensification of agriculture. 
That is, intensification due to yield increase at constant total agricultural land use, or due to 
substitution of agricultural land for inputs. Complex systems behavior caused by addition of 
the simple and plausible spatial mechanism of co-operation, can generate different dynamical 
emergent land-use patterns. Furthermore, it causes intensification due to yield increase to 
emerge over a larger range of rationality. Both with and without complex systems behavior, 
intensification only emerges when automata are allowed to anticipate. Our pattern-oriented 
land-use-transition model allows for meaningful approximation of real-world agricultural 
land-use systems by emergent—complex systems—behavior. Through an iterative process 
of comparing land-use patterns generated by different combinations of mechanisms with—
and tuning parameters of those mechanisms to—real-world land-use patterns. Different 
patterns generated by different combinations of mechanisms—and parameters—can be 
used in an to attempt to filter out underlying processes. Our model minimizes disorganized 
input complexity while retaining the possibility of validation. Statistical-equilibrium states 
are reproducible emergent properties of systematic complexity, and not of—disorganized—
input complexity. When applied, non-systematic temporal effects of input complexity will be 
filtered out by using statistical-equilibrium states.
Feathers touched down softly, 
Upon my mind’s face,
You were the backbone of kindness,
My cornerstone of grace.
5Patt ern-oriented individual-based modeling of spati ally 
explicit agricultural landscapes: A scenario analysis of 
eff ects of state-centric governance and top-down policy 
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Abstract
To investigate under which conditions nature could be protected from agriculture in an 
optimal way, individual farmers were subjected to different state-centric governance 
settings in a spatially explicit pattern-oriented individual-based land-use model (CORA). 
One state-centric governance setting was assumed to be determined by the quality 
of the investment climate, reflected by the quality of the state-centric governance 
dimension “Regulatory quality”. The other was assumed to be determined by the level 
of entrepreneurial awareness, reflected by the quality of the state-centric governance 
dimension “Government effectiveness”. Together, these could be combined into four 
state-centric governance settings: “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of 
Investment Climate” (I); “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment 
Climate” (II); “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate” 
(III); and “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate” (IV). 
Farmers were subjected to two different top-down policy instruments in each state-centric 
governance setting: subsidies and fines. For all state-centric governance settings, a fine 
was likely to be the most cost-effective policy instrument for protection of nature, rather 
than a subsidy. The most effective- and second-most effective protection of nature were 
generated by applying fines, under state-centric governance setting III and IV, respectively.
Keywords: co-operation; governance; agriculture; land-use pattern; utility; complexity; 
scenario.
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5.1. Introduction
It is believed that Pattern-Oriented Modeling (POM) holds the potential to further increase 
understanding of land-use systems that are too complex to be understood by empirical analysis 
alone (Grimm et al., 2005; Evans and Manson 2007; Liu et al., 2007; Wiegand et al., 2008). 
POM attempts to reproduce real-world aggregate patterns with emergent behavior (Grimm 
et al., 2005, 2006; Piou et al., 2009). Recently, more and more successful attempts have been 
made to view land-use systems as dynamic social-ecological systems, from the perspective of 
individual-based modeling (Parker et al., 2003; Jepsen et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2008; Lopez-
Carr et al., 2011; Mandemaker et al., 2014). By combining pattern-oriented and individual-
based modeling techniques, it should be possible to incorporate dynamic complexity of 
interactions between farmers and nature in a verifiable way. Furthermore, by incorporating 
economic behavior in a way that does not oversimplify it to keep complexity at a manageable 
level, an attempt could be made to help bridge the gap between landscape ecology and 
economics (Veldkamp et al., 2011). Conventionally, the field of Walrasian economics focuses 
on the behavior of agents, without explicit spatial dimensions or interactions (van der Veen 
and Otter, 2001, 2003). Core assumptions of simplification are that rational decision making 
occurs through optimization, that preferences are stable in time, and that forward looking 
individual farmers can instantaneously update their knowledge of the entire system, at any 
time (Vatn, 2005).
A pattern-oriented individual-based land-use transition model that allows for utility 
maximization at varying levels of complexity and rationality (CORA) was made for agricultural 
landscapes (Mandemaker et al., 2014). This model was designed to tackle dynamic 
complexity as well as to incorporate more realistic Walrasian economic behavior, in a 
spatially explicit way. Its aggregate land-use patterns are the product of local spatially explicit 
optimization problems that may be resolved through the economic behavior of individual 
farmers simultaneously facing local environmental and state-centric governance constraints. 
Preferences are spatially explicit and no longer required to be stable in time, individual 
farmers can interact spatially and anticipate future consequences of decisions, and individual 
farmers are rationally bounded. Moreover, individual farmers are subjected to imperfect 
information. That is, they only have access to limited spatial and temporal information to 
base their land-use decisions on. The CORA model was applied to a fictive landscape in 
which land-use preferences- and transition costs varied across space. To investigate under 
which conditions nature could be protected from agriculture in an optimal way, farmers 
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were subjected to four different state-centric governance settings: “Low Entrepreneurial 
Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate”; “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and 
High Quality of Investment Climate”; “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of 
Investment Climate”; and “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment 
Climate”. Furthermore, individual farmers were subjected to two different top-down policy 
instruments for each state-centric governance setting: subsidies and fines. This led to eight 
top-down policy scenarios for protection of nature; one subsidy scenario and one fine 
scenario for each state-centric governance setting.
5.2. Methods
5.2.1. CORA model
5.2.1.1. Land-use states
Land can be in a natural state, in a high- or low-input agricultural state, or in a fallow 
state. High-input agricultural land is used more intensively than low-input land. Low-input 
agriculture causes soil-nutrient depletion, while high-input agriculture results in increased 
sensitivity to diseases due to e.g., mono cultivation and sterilization of the soil. Conversely, 
high-input agriculture does not cause soil-nutrient depletion, while low-input agriculture 
does not cause increased sensitivity to diseases. Therefore, negative effects of low- and high-
input land use may be assumed to be independent. 
5.2.1.2. Land-use-state transitions
Individual farmers are allowed to convert land to the fallow state by clearing of natural land 
or by abandonment of high- or low-input agricultural states. Individual farmers are allowed 
to convert land to agriculture by taking fallow or natural land into production, associated 
with investment costs. Finally, decision makers can convert from high-input- to low-input 
agriculture and vice versa, associated with opportunity costs. That is, these costs are 
determined by what is lost by not remaining in a particular agricultural state. Regrowth of 
nature after clearing or abandonment is a gradual and natural process and not the result of 
a single iteration of decision making. Therefore, land can only be in a state of natural land 
because it remained in that state, or land remained in the fallow state sufficiently long for 
nature to regrow (fallowing). Whenever land remained in a state of natural land for more 
than one model iteration, nature was assumed to be protected from agriculture.
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5.2.1.3. Structure
Within the CORA model (Fig. 1), cellular automaton cells (10,000) represent abstractions of 
individual farmers operating on single patches of land in a fixed two-dimensional grid. Based 
on utilities and transition costs, a stochastic utility-maximization mechanism determines 
individual choices. How stochastic this mechanism operates is determined by individual 
rationality, regulated in between extremes of – purely stochastic – irrational decision making 
and – purely deterministic – rational decision making. An anticipation mechanism allows 
automata to project and compare utility gained from the possible different decision chains, 
departing from their present land-use state up to an arbitrary number of steps into the 
future. They then base present decisions on these future projections. Furthermore, effects 
of high- and low-input agriculture are modeled by independent utility-feedback mechanisms 
that operate on automata in high- and low-input states, respectively. More efficient sharing 
of costs by larger groups of automata is modeled by a co-operation mechanism. This 
mechanism causes transition costs into agricultural states to decrease, proportional to the 
count of neighboring agricultural states.
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the CORA model. Source: Mandemaker et al., 2014.
Note. A full explanation of these mechanisms and specific settings of their parameters may be found in 
Chapter 4 (4.4. Temporal and spatial mechanisms).
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5.2.1.4. Model output
The CORA model generated six system-state variables, of which five were land uses and one 
was utility derived from these land uses. The five land uses were low-input agriculture, high-
input agriculture, protected nature, nature by regrowth, and fallow land. Furthermore, the 
model generated the land-use patterns associated with these system-state variables. After 
500 iterations (the total runtime of one modelrun), generated landscapes could be assumed 
to be in a state of statistical equilibrium. This is because within the CORA model, temporal 
averages of system-state variables no longer noticeably change upon further increasing the 
number of iterations per modelrun (Mandemaker et al., 2014). Hence, time did not play a 
role in the analysis of generated system-state variables and land-use patterns. Because this 
study investigated how well nature could be protected from agriculture in different scenarios, 
all landscapes were assumed to be unaffected by land use, initially. That is, initial land cover 
was set to 100 % nature for all modelruns.
5.2.2. Spatial distribution of utilities and costs
All land-use states were assigned land-use-state utilities, and all transitions were assigned 
a transition cost (Table 1). To construct a fictive but realistic landscape, five ASCII-files 
were imported into the CORA model. Four of these files contained the values and spatial 
distributions of the four land-use-state utilities, over all individual patches. Distributions of 
land-use-state utilities were constructed in ArcGIS 10.1, in such a way that the average value 
calculated from their respective ASCII-files, was equal to their respective values in Table 1. 
Values deviated no more than one Standard Deviation from this average (plus or minus two). 
To preserve conceptual consistency of the land-use transition framework defined for the 
CORA model by Mandemaker et al. (2014), the original differences between land-use-state 
utilities (Table 1) needed to be preserved for all individual patches. This is because this land-
use transition framework was defined conceptually through these differences (Table 1). To 
do so, it was necessary to use identical spatial distributions for all land-use-state utilities, 
centered around their respective averages (Table 1). This also provided a means of comparing 
results for a specific state-centric governance setting, with and without a top-down policy 
instrument superposed on this constraint (a baseline). That is, only if such a policy instrument 
preserved conceptual consistency as well. Furthermore, behavior under different state-
centric governance settings could be compared in this way (all other things being equal). The 
fifth ASCII-file contained the values and spatial distribution of the transition cost associated 
with making the transition from nature to fallow land (Table 1), over all individual patches. 
To better compare the results of simulated top-down policy instruments later, this particular 
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transition cost was spatially varied in the same way as the initial land-use-state utility of 
natural land. Transition costs associated with the transitions from nature to low- or high-input 
agriculture necessarily also followed from this fifth ASCII-file (Table 1).
Table 1. Relative perceptions of benefits – land-use-state utilities – )(U  and transition costs )(C .
I )10( =IU A )8( =AU N )2( =NU F )4( =FU
)0( =IIC )10( =IAC
-
)0( =IFC
I
)8( =AIC )0( =AC
-
)0( =AFC
A
)6.9( =NIC )1.7( =NAC )0( =NC )2( =NFC
N
)6.7( =FIC )1.5( =FAC
-
)0( =FC
F
Note. The first row contains land-use-state utilities. Transition costs should be read from row to column. 
Empty table entries correspond to non-occurring transitions. I is high-input land use, A is low-input land 
use, N is natural land use, and F is fallow land use. Source: Mandemaker et al., 2014.
5.2.3. State-centric governance settings and top-down policy scenarios
5.2.3.1. State-centric governance settings
In the CORA model, the parameter ),0[ ∞∈β  regulates rationality of individual behavior 
(Mandemaker et al., 2014). For 0=β , utility maximization cannot occur because individual 
farmers then behave purely stochastic (irrational). For non-zero increasing values of β , 
individual farmers will behave more and more rational. The ability of individual farmers to 
process information on which they base land-use decisions is known to be related to general 
education and governmental educational programs designed to raise farmers’ entrepreneurial 
awareness (refs). Therefore, it is assumed that the higher farmers’ entrepreneurial awareness, 
the more rational their land-use decisions will be. That is, the rationality parameter β  is 
assumed to model farmers’ entrepreneurial awareness. Furthermore, the anticipation 
mechanism (Fig. 1) that allows individual farmers to project and compare the utility that 
would be gained from different decisions, and then base present decisions on these future 
projections, is regulated by parameter ]1,0[∈ω . For 0=ω , expectations from future 
decisions will be negligible and will not affect decision making. For non-zero increasing values 
of ω , expectations from future decisions will affect decision making more and more. This 
allows individual farmers to invest in their future, if they are able to identify and exploit 
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opportunities. The higher the quality of the investment climate the more and further farmers 
are assumed to anticipate on these projections, modeled by a higher value of the anticipation 
parameter. Therefore, anticipation parameter ω  was assumed to correspond with the 
quality of the investment climate, i.e.,, how much investment potential there is available for 
individual farmers. Following the parameter settings of Mandemaker et al. (2014), 0=ω  
was assumed to correspond with ‘Low Quality of Investment Climate’, and 25.0=ω  was 
assumed to correspond with ‘High Quality of Investment Climate’. Furthermore, 1=β  was 
assumed to correspond with ‘Low Entrepreneurial Awareness’, and 5.2=β  was assumed 
to correspond with ‘High Entrepreneurial Awareness’.
The general level and quality of education and the ability to actually take rationally preferred 
decisions depend on the quality of the state-centric governance dimension “Government 
effectiveness”, responsible for the delivery of such public services (Kaufmann, 2009, 2010). 
Therefore, the rationality parameter reflects the quality of this dimension of governance. 
Similarly, the quality of the investment climate depends on the quality of the state-centric 
governance dimension “Regulatory quality”, responsible for the promotion of private-sector 
development (Kaufmann, 2009, 2010). Therefore, the anticipation parameter reflects the 
quality of this dimension of governance. This leads to four different state-centric governance 
settings, to which farmers will need to adapt (Fig. 2).
5.2.3.2. Top-down policy scenarios
In each of the four state-centric governance settings, individual farmers were subjected to 
two different top-down policy instruments: subsidies and fines. This led to eight top-down 
policy scenarios for protection of nature; one subsidy scenario and one fine scenario for each 
state-centric governance setting. Both subsidies and fines were modeled in a way that did not 
corrupt the conceptual consistency of the land-use transition framework of the CORA model 
(5.2.2. Spatial distribution of utilities and costs). Subsidies were modeled by increments in 
land-use-state utility of natural land (Table 1), causing individual farmers to perceive nature 
as more valuable than agriculture, possibly resulting in the protection of nature. For each 
state-centric governance setting, 50 consecutive model runs occurred to simulate the effects 
of subsidies, incrementing the perceived value of nature by 0.1 each run (identically for all 
individual patches). 
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Fig. 2. The four state-centric governance settings.
Similarly, fines were modeled by increments in the cost (Table 1) associated with the transition 
from natural land to fallow land, discouraging individual farmers to clear natural land by 
causing them to perceive it as more costly, thereby encouraging the protection of nature. 
To compare the effects of fines with those of subsidies, this transition cost was incremented 
in a way that was identical to how the perceived value of nature was incremented for the 
subsidy scenarios. That is, for each state-centric governance setting, 50 consecutive model 
runs occurred to simulate the effects of fines, incrementing the cost of clearing by 0.1 each 
run (identically for all individual patches). Incrementing this transition cost also caused the 
costs associated with the transitions from nature to low- and high-input agriculture to be 
incremented in an identical way (Table 1).
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5.3. Results
5.3.1. System-state variables
5.3.1.1. Land use
Figs. 3–4 show the subsidy- and fine-scenario results for land use, belonging to state-centric 
governance settings I and II (Fig. 3), and III and IV (Fig. 4), respectively. Each scenario was 
constructed from 50 samples in total, with a sample size of 0.1. For each of these samples, 
land uses were averaged over the total runtime of one modelrun (500 iterations), after 
which generated landscapes could be assumed to be in a state of statistical equilibrium 
(Mandemaker et al., 2014).
Fig. 3. Subsidy scenario I (upper left), fine scenario I (lower left), subsidy scenario II (upper right), fine 
scenario II (lower right). A is low-input agriculture, I is high-input agriculture, P is protected nature, R is 
nature from regrowth, and F is fallow land.
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Fig. 4. Subsidy scenario III (upper left), fine scenario III (lower left), subsidy scenario IV (upper right), fine 
scenario IV (lower right). A is low-input agriculture, I is high-input agriculture, P is protected nature, R is 
nature from regrowth, and F is fallow land.
5.3.1.2. Utility
Figs. 5–6 show the subsidy- and fine-scenario results for marginal utility per automaton 
cell, belonging to state-centric governance settings I and II (Fig. 5), and III and IV (Fig. 6), 
respectively. Each scenario was constructed from 50 samples in total, with a sample size 
of 0.1. For each of these samples, marginal utility per automaton cell was computed by 
dividing the sumtotal of utility (yielded by all automaton cells together) by the total number 
of automaton cells (every iteration). This was then averaged over the total runtime of one 
modelrun (500 iterations), after which generated landscapes could be assumed to be in a 
state of statistical equilibrium (Mandemaker et al., 2014).
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Fig. 5. Subsidy scenario I (upper left), fine scenario I (lower left), subsidy scenario II (upper right), fine 
scenario II (lower right). For values of subsidy greater than 1.5, utilities of subsidy- and fine scenario I 
diverged much faster (left). For values of subsidy greater than 1.79, utilities of subsidy- and fine scenario 
II diverged much faster (right).
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Fig. 6. Subsidy scenario III (upper left), fine scenario III (lower left), subsidy scenario IV (upper right), fine 
scenario IV (lower right). For values of subsidy greater than 1.25, utilities of subsidy- and fine scenario III 
diverged much faster (left). For values of subsidy greater than 1.25, utilities of subsidy- and fine scenario 
IV diverged much faster (right).
5.3.2. Land-use patterns
Figs. 7–10 show the land-use patterns for the subsidy- and fine scenarios belonging to state-
centric governance settings I, II, III, and IV (Fig. 2), respectively. Subsidies and fines ranged from 
a minimum of zero to a maximum of five. All land-use patterns resulted from one modelrun 
(500 iterations), after which generated landscapes could be assumed to be in a state of 
statistical equilibrium (Mandemaker et al., 2014). For state-centric governance setting I, 
“Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate”, individual farmers 
generated a baseline landscape that was dominated by high-input agriculture (Fig. 7 upper- and 
lower left). With moderately clustered low-input agriculture across the middle. Furthermore, 
severely and moderately fragmented protected nature was generated in the upper-left- and 
lower-right corner, respectively. Corresponding baseline values of system-state variables could 
be observed in the left-hand sides of Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 (at zero subsidy/fine). Upon introducing 
subsidies (Fig. 7 upper middle, Fig. 7 upper right) and fines (Fig. 7 lower middle, Fig. 7 lower 
right), an expansion of protected area of nature could be observed, starting from the lower-
right corner. Furthermore, an increasing fragmentation of agriculture could be observed.
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Fig. 7. Subsidy scenario I (upper), fine scenario I (lower). Zero (baseline) subsidy and fine (upper- and 
lower left, respectively); half of maximal (2.5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower middle, respectively); 
and maximal (5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower right, respectively). Yellow is low-input agriculture, 
red is high-input agriculture, green is protected nature, blue is nature from regrowth, and black is fallow 
land.
For state-centric governance setting II, “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality 
of Investment Climate”, individual farmers generated a baseline landscape that was 
severely dominated by low- and high-input agriculture (Fig. 8 upper- and lower left). With 
moderately clustered low-input agriculture across the landscape. Furthermore, the lower-
right corner was dominated by high-input agriculture. Corresponding baseline values of 
system-state variables could be observed in the right-hand sides of Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 (at zero 
subsidy/fine). Upon introducing subsidies (Fig. 8 upper middle, Fig. 8 upper right) and fines 
(Fig. 8 lower middle, Fig. 8 lower right), an expansion of protected area of nature starting 
could be observed, particularly in the upper-left- and lower-right corners. Furthermore, an 
increasing fragmentation of agriculture could be observed, as well as differences in degrees 
of fragmentation.
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Fig. 8. Subsidy scenario II (upper), fine scenario II (lower). Zero (baseline) subsidy and fine (upper- and 
lower left, respectively); half of maximal (2.5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower middle, respectively); 
and maximal (5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower right, respectively). Yellow is low-input agriculture, 
red is high-input agriculture, green is protected nature, blue is nature from regrowth, and black is fallow 
land.
For state-centric governance setting III, “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality 
of Investment Climate”, individual farmers generated a baseline landscape that was least 
dominated by agriculture (Fig. 9 upper- and lower left). With moderately clustered high-input 
agriculture in the upper-left corner, and strongly clustered low- and high-input agriculture in 
the middle. Furthermore, moderately and strongly clustered protected nature was generated 
in the upper-left- and lower-right corner, respectively. Corresponding baseline values of 
system-state variables could be observed in the left-hand sides of Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 (at zero 
subsidy/fine). Upon introducing subsidies (Fig. 9 upper middle, Fig. 9 upper right) and fines 
(Fig. 9 lower middle, Fig. 9 lower right), an expansion of protected area of nature could be 
observed, starting from the upper-left- and lower-right corners. Furthermore, an increasing 
fragmentation of clusters of remaining (mainly high-input) agriculture could be observed.
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Fig. 9. Subsidy scenario III (upper), fine scenario III (lower). Zero (baseline) subsidy and fine (upper- and 
lower left, respectively); half of maximal (2.5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower middle, respectively); 
and maximal (5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower right, respectively). Yellow is low-input agriculture, 
red is high-input agriculture, green is protected nature, blue is nature from regrowth, and black is fallow 
land.
For state-centric governance setting IV, “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of 
Investment Climate”, individual farmers generated a baseline landscape that was dominated 
by high-input agriculture (Fig. 10 upper- and lower left). With moderately clustered low-
input agriculture in the middle, and strongly clustered high-input agriculture in the upper-left 
corner. Furthermore, strongly clustered protected nature was generated in the lower-right 
corner. Corresponding baseline values of system-state variables could be observed in the 
right-hand sides of Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 (at zero subsidy/fine). Upon introducing subsidies (Fig. 
10 upper middle, Fig. 10 upper right) and fines (Fig. 10 lower middle, Fig. 10 lower right), 
an expansion of protected area of nature could be observed, starting from the lower-right 
corner. Furthermore, an increasing fragmentation of (clusters of) remaining agriculture could 
be observed, as well as differences in degrees of fragmentation.
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Fig. 10. Subsidy scenario IV (upper), fine scenario IV (lower). Zero (baseline) subsidy and fine (upper- and 
lower left, respectively); half of maximal (2.5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower middle, respectively); 
and maximal (5) subsidy and fine (upper- and lower right, respectively). Yellow is low-input agriculture, 
red is high-input agriculture, green is protected nature, blue is nature from regrowth, and black is fallow 
land.
5.4. Discussion
5.4.1. Within state-centric governance settings
In this subsection, differences between subsidy- and fine scenarios were discussed in an 
attempt to identify effects of cross-level and cross-scale interactions, and which policy 
instrument protects nature best, given a specific state-centric governance setting. That is, 
for each state-centric governance setting (Fig. 2), differences between the subsidy- and fine 
scenario belonging to that state-centric governance setting were discussed.
5.4.1.1. Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate (I)
For “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate”, state-centric 
governance setting I, comparing the subsidy scenario to the fine scenario showed that land 
uses were affected nearly identically in both scenarios (Fig. 3 left). Furthermore, that land-
use patterns were affected nearly identically in both scenarios (Fig. 7 upper, Fig. 7 lower). 
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Overall, nature was equally well protected from agriculture in both scenarios. However, in the 
subsidy scenario, results came at an increasingly high cost (for society as a whole) compared 
to the fine scenario, for values greater than 1.5 (Fig. 6 left). Upon exceeding this value, the 
individual utility derived from land use in the subsidy- and fine scenarios diverged much 
faster. Therefore, subsidies were roughly equally cost effective up to this value, but overall 
fines are likely to have been the best option.
5.4.1.2. Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate (II)
For “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate”, state-centric 
governance setting II, comparing the subsidy scenario to the fine scenario showed that 
land uses were affected similarly in both scenarios (Fig. 3 right). However, identical levels of 
protection of nature were reached for lower values of subsidy, compared to values of fine. 
That is, the subsidy scenario achieved the same results as the fine scenario, only faster. This 
is also clearly reflected by the land-use patterns belonging to these scenarios (Fig. 8 upper, 
Fig. 8 lower). Although co-operation of farmers (Fig. 1) was equally strong in both scenarios, 
more farmers chose not to farm but to protect nature instead in the subsidy scenario. This 
led to a lower degree of fragmentation of agriculture (Fig. 8 lower). Furthermore, in the 
subsidy scenario, results came at an increasingly high cost (for society as a whole) compared 
to the fine scenario, for values greater than 1.79 (Fig. 5 right). Upon exceeding this value, 
the individual utility derived from land use in the subsidy- and fine scenarios diverged much 
faster. That is, subsidies could be acceptable up to this value in terms of cost effectiveness, 
but overall fines are likely to have been the best option.
5.4.1.3. High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate (III)
For “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate”, state-centric 
governance setting III, comparing the subsidy scenario to the fine scenario, showed that land 
uses were affected nearly identically in both scenarios (Fig. 4 left). Furthermore, that land-
use patterns were affected nearly identically in both scenarios (Fig. 9 upper, Fig. 9 lower). 
Overall, nature was equally well protected from agriculture in both scenarios. However, in the 
subsidy scenario, results came at an increasingly high cost (for society as a whole) compared 
to the fine scenario, for values greater than 1.25 (Fig. 6 left). Upon exceeding this value, 
the individual utility derived from land use in the subsidy- and fine scenarios diverged much 
faster. Therefore, subsidies were roughly equally cost effective up to this value, but overall 
fines are likely to have been the best option.
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5.4.1.4. High Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate (IV)
For “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate”, state-centric 
governance setting IV, comparing the subsidy scenario to the fine scenario showed that 
land uses were affected similarly in both scenarios (Fig. 4 right). However, identical levels of 
protection of nature were reached for lower values of subsidy, compared to values of fine. 
That is, the subsidy scenario achieved the same results as the fine scenario, only faster. This 
is also clearly reflected by the land-use patterns belonging to these scenarios (Fig. 10 upper, 
Fig. 10 lower). Although co-operation of farmers (Fig. 1) was equally strong in both scenarios, 
more farmers chose not to farm but to protect nature instead in the subsidy scenario. This 
led to a lower degree of fragmentation of agriculture (Fig. 10 lower). Furthermore, in the 
subsidy scenario, results came at an increasingly high cost (for society as a whole) compared 
to the fine scenario, for values greater than 1.25 (Fig. 6 right). Upon exceeding this value, 
the individual utility derived from land use in the subsidy- and fine scenarios diverged much 
faster. That is, subsidies could be acceptable up to this value in terms of cost effectiveness, 
but overall fines are likely to have been the best option.
5.4.2. Between state-centric governance settings
In this subsection, differences between state-centric governance settings were discussed, in 
an attempt to identify in which state-centric governance setting nature was protected best, 
given a specific policy instrument. That is, applying the same policy instrument to all state-
centric governance settings, differences between state-centric governance settings were 
discussed (for both subsidy- and fine scenarios). However, differences between baselines 
of state-centric governance settings were discussed first, to identify in which state-centric 
governance setting nature was protected best without application of a policy instrument.
5.4.2.1. Baselines
Without any further measures of protection of nature, state-centric governance setting III, 
‘High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate’, worked out best 
for nature (Fig. 9 left, Fig. 11). State-centric governance setting IV, ‘High Entrepreneurial 
Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate’, worked out second-best for nature 
(Fig. 10 left, Fig. 11). Furthermore, state-centric governance setting I, ‘Low Entrepreneurial 
Awareness and Low Quality of Investment Climate’, worked out second-worst for nature (Fig. 
7 left, Fig. 11). While state-centric governance setting II, ‘Low Entrepreneurial Awareness 
and High Quality of Investment Climate’, worked out worst for nature (Fig. 8 left, Fig. 11). 
Clearly, the higher the quality of the investment climate the more protection of nature 
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was required. Furthermore, the higher entrepreneurial awareness the less protection of 
nature was required. Consistently, the degree of co-operation (Fig. 1) and their effects on 
pattern formation were strongest in state-centric governance setting III (Fig. 9 left), and 
second-strongest in state-centric governance setting IV (Fig. 10 left). This suggests that the 
higher entrepreneurial awareness, the more farmers co-operated, and that co-operation 
is conducive to protection of nature. Moreover, that the lower the quality of investment 
climate given a high entrepreneurial awareness, the more farmers co-operated in a way 
that was even more conducive to protection of nature. In turn, this suggests that the lower 
entrepreneurial awareness, the less farmers co-operated and that this was not conducive to 
protection of nature (state-centric governance settings I and II). Moreover, that the higher 
the quality of the investment climate given a low entrepreneurial awareness (state-centric 
governance setting II), the more farmers behaved in a way that was even less conducive to 
protection of nature. Although this is not immediately clear from generated landscapes in 
state-centric governance settings I and II (Figs. 7–8), it is more than likely.
Fig. 11. The four state-centric governance settings and their required level of protection of nature, 
relative to one another.
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5.4.2.2. Top-down subsidy scenarios
From comparing subsidy scenarios belonging to state-centric governance settings I and 
II, it was clear that protection of nature in subsidy scenario II was more effective than in 
subsidy scenario I, caused by a higher quality of the investment climate (Fig. 2, Fig. 3). This 
also caused an increased low-input agriculture in subsidy scenario II, compared to subsidy 
scenario I (Fig. 3). Given the low entrepreneurial awareness in subsidy scenarios I and II, 
co-operation between farmers (Fig. 1) was likely to be weak (Figs. 7–8 upper). This is the 
only case for which a higher quality of the investment climate caused a more effective 
protection of nature (not shown). Furthermore, from comparing subsidy scenarios belonging 
to state-centric governance settings II and III, it was clear that protection of nature in subsidy 
scenario III was more effective than in subsidy scenario II, caused by higher entrepreneurial 
awareness and a lower quality of the investment climate (Fig. 2, Figs. 3–4). Given the higher 
entrepreneurial awareness in subsidy scenario III, co-operation between farmers was likely 
to be weaker in subsidy scenario II (Figs. 8–9 upper). Moreover, given the lower quality of 
the investment climate in subsidy scenario III, farmers co-operated in a way that was even 
more conducive to protection of nature, compared to subsidy scenario II. Overall, low-input 
agriculture strongly decreased in subsidy scenario III, compared to subsidy scenario II (Figs. 
3–4). That is, higher entrepreneurial awareness and a lower quality of the investment climate 
both caused low-input agriculture to decrease (Figs. 3–4). These comparisons imply that εI < 
εII < εIII, with ε merely indicating how effectively nature was protected in the different state-
centric governance settings, relative to one another. 
From comparing subsidy scenarios belonging to state-centric governance settings II and IV, it 
was clear that protection of nature in subsidy scenario IV was more effective than in subsidy 
scenario II, caused by higher entrepreneurial awareness (Fig. 2, Figs. 3–4). This also caused 
a decreased low-input agriculture in subsidy scenario IV, compared to subsidy scenario II 
(Figs. 3–4). Given the higher entrepreneurial awareness in subsidy scenario IV, co-operation 
between farmers was likely to be weaker in subsidy scenario II (Fig. 8 upper, Fig. 10 upper). 
Furthermore, from comparing subsidy scenarios belonging to state-centric governance 
settings III and IV, it was clear that protection of nature in subsidy scenario III was more 
effective than in subsidy scenario IV, caused by a lower quality of the investment climate (Fig. 
2, Fig. 4). This also caused a decreased low-input agriculture in subsidy scenario III, compared 
to subsidy scenario IV (Fig. 4). Given the high entrepreneurial awareness in subsidy scenarios 
III and IV, co-operation between farmers was likely to be strong (Figs. 9–10 upper). Moreover, 
given the lower quality of the investment climate in subsidy scenario III, farmers co-operated 
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in a way that was even more conducive to protection of nature, compared to subsidy scenario 
IV. These comparisons imply that εII < εIV < εIII. Because previous comparisons implied that εI 
< εII < εIII, these two inequalities together imply that εI < εII < εIV < εIII. That is, protection of 
nature was best in subsidy scenario III, second-best in subsidy scenario IV, second-worst in 
subsidy scenario II, and worst in subsidy scenario I, nearly consistent with baselines (Fig. 11), 
except for the switched order of subsidy scenarios I and II.
5.4.2.3. Top-down fine scenarios
From comparing fine scenarios belonging to state-centric governance settings I and II, it was 
clear that protection of nature in fine scenario I was more effective than in fine scenario 
II, caused by a lower quality of the investment climate (Fig. 2, Fig. 3). This also caused a 
decreased low-input agriculture in fine scenario II, compared to fine scenario I (Fig. 3). 
Given the low entrepreneurial awareness in fine scenarios I and II, co-operation between 
farmers (Fig. 1) was likely to be weak (Figs. 7–8 lower). Moreover, given the higher quality 
of the investment climate in subsidy scenario II, farmers behaved in a way that was even 
less conducive to protection of nature, compared to subsidy scenario I. Furthermore, from 
comparing fine scenarios belonging to state-centric governance settings I and III, it was clear 
that that protection of nature in fine scenario III was more effective than in fine scenario I, 
caused by higher entrepreneurial awareness (Fig. 2, Figs. 3–4). This also caused a decreased 
low-input agriculture in fine scenario I, compared to fine scenario III (Figs. 3–4). Given the 
higher entrepreneurial awareness in fine scenario III, co-operation between farmers was 
likely to be weaker in fine scenario I (Fig. 7 lower, Fig. 9 lower). These comparisons imply 
that εII < εI < εIII, with  merely indicating how effectively nature was protected in the different 
state-centric governance settings, relative to one another.
From comparing fine scenarios belonging to state-centric governance settings III and IV, 
it was clear that protection of nature in fine scenario III was more effective than in fine 
scenario IV, caused by a lower quality of the investment climate (Fig. 2, Fig. 4). This also 
caused a decreased low-input agriculture in fine scenario III, compared to fine scenario IV 
(Fig. 4). Given the high entrepreneurial awareness in fine scenarios III and IV, co-operation 
between farmers was likely to be strong (Figs. 9–10 lower). Moreover, given the lower quality 
of the investment climate in fine scenario III, farmers co-operated in a way that was even 
more conducive to protection of nature, compared to fine scenario IV. Furthermore, from 
comparing fine scenarios belonging to state-centric governance settings I and IV, it was clear 
that protection of nature in fine scenario IV was more effective than in fine scenario I, caused 
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by higher entrepreneurial awareness and a higher quality of the investment climate (Fig. 
2, Figs. 3–4). Given the higher entrepreneurial awareness in fine scenario IV, co-operation 
between farmers was likely to be weaker in fine scenario I (Fig. 7 lower, Fig. 10 lower). 
Conversely, a higher quality of the investment climate had a negative effect on protection 
of nature. Overall, low-input agriculture did not change noticeably, i.e.,, changes caused by 
higher entrepreneurial awareness and a higher quality of the investment climate were offset 
(Figs. 3–4). These comparisons imply that εI < εIV < εIII. Because previous comparisons implied 
that εII < εI < εIII, these two inequalities together imply that εII < εI < εIII. That is, protection 
of nature was best in fine scenario III, second-best in fine scenario IV, second worst in fine 
scenario I, and worst in fine scenario II, consistent with baselines (Fig. 11).
5.5. Conclusions
For all state-centric governance settings, a fine was likely to be the most cost-effective policy 
instrument for protection of nature, rather than a subsidy. For state-centric governance 
settings II (“Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate”) and IV 
(High Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate”), co-operation of 
farmers and its effect on pattern formation were more dominant when a fine was applied. 
Comparing state-centric governance settings subjected to neither a subsidy nor a fine (i.e.,, 
baselines), the most effective- and second-most effective protection of nature were generated 
under state-centric governance settings III (“High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low 
Quality of Investment Climate”) and IV, respectively. The higher entrepreneurial awareness, 
the less protection of nature was required because more farmers co-operated, which was 
more conducive to protection of nature. The higher the quality of the investment climate, the 
more protection of nature was required because less farmers co-operated, which was less 
conducive to protection of nature. Comparing state-centric governance settings identically 
subjected to a subsidy, the most effective- and second-most effective protection of nature 
were generated under state-centric governance settings III and IV, respectively. Comparing 
state-centric governance settings identically subjected to a fine, the most effective- and 
second-most effective protection of nature were again generated under state-centric 
governance setting III and IV, respectively. Consistently, the most (cost-)effective protection of 
nature was produced when a fine was applied in state-centric governance setting III, because 
farmers co-operated in a way that was most conducive to protection of nature.
Once more into the darkness,
Until first light hits,
Into the pitch black burning,
That cleanses our spirits.
6Synthesis
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Synthesis
In this chapter, it is discussed whether—and if so, to what extent—the research questions 
posed in the general introduction of this thesis could be answered by the applied empirical-
statistical- and process-based modeling approaches. In addition, the value added by viewing 
separate research findings together is discussed, and how these different approaches dealt 
with the real-world complexity of chosen land-use change processes.
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6.1. Ways of including governance into land-use modeling
6.1.1. Empirical-statistical modeling
Quantification of socially constructed perceptions of governance is required to allow 
for a semi-positivistic approach to the modeling of governance in the context of land use 
(1.1.2.2.1. Empirical-statistical modeling). Because the World Bank dimensions of governance 
(repeated in Table 1) represent quantifications of socially constructed perceptions of “State-
centric governance” (1.1.2.1. Governance), these dimensions can be used for precisely such 
an approach. That is, these can be incorporated into an empirical-statistical model of how 
state-centric governance relates to arable-agricultural expansion- and/or intensification, and 
dominant spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation and expansion of nature. Evidently, 
the real-world complexity of governance processes cannot be entirely captured by a mere 
number of six general dimensions designed to be comparable across countries at the national 
level, as these are far too abstract to account for details specific to (sub)national land-use 
planning processes. On the one hand, the higher the level of abstraction, the less statistical 
relationships can be linked to real-world processes in an empirically specific way, as the 
number and complexity of processes that could explain them grow beyond our ability to 
disentangle and comprehend. Clearly, any results of statistical analyses involving the World 
Bank dimensions of governance cannot be interpreted in the sense of their exact definitions 
(Table 1), as these are far too delicate and complex to be incorporated in crude statistical 
analyses. Furthermore, the separate World Bank dimensions are highly correlated between 
themselves (not shown), further preventing meaningful interpretation in this sense. On 
the other hand, their high degree of abstraction does allow for general and meaningful 
interpretation of statistical relationships between these crude estimates of quality of 
governance and those of arable-agricultural expansion- and/or intensification and dominant 
spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation and expansion of nature, at an aggregate level, 
which would otherwise not have been possible. That is, the higher the empirical specificity, 
the more geographically restricted the validity of any statistical inferences would be.
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Table 1. The World Bank dimensions of governance.
Dimension Definition
Voice and 
accountability
Measures the public perception of the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Government 
effectiveness
Measures the public perception of the quality of public- and civil services, 
the degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies.
Regulatory quality Measures the public perception of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.
Rule of law Measures the public perception of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of 
corruption
Measures the public perception of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Political stability 
and the absence of 
violence
Measures the public perception of the likelihood of destabilization or 
overthrowing of a government by unconstitutional or violent means, leading to 
domestic violence and terrorism.
Source: World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of empirical-statistical research questions (RQs).
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6.1.1.1. Research question 1
Does state-centric governance directly drive—and if so, how—expansion and/or intensification 
of arable agriculture?
The analysis in chapter 2 demonstrates that quality of state-centric governance in countries 
where agricultural area expands differs significantly from that in countries where the 
agricultural area contracts, measured over 173 countries across the globe for 1975–2007. 
On the one hand, less well-developed countries score lower on quality of state-centric 
governance (2.3.1. Between-groups analysis, Fig. 2, Table 2), while there it is more important 
to the explanation of spatial variability in area increase (2.3.2. Within-groups analysis, 
Table 3). These countries are consistently primarily associated with “growth” behavior, i.e., 
behavior characterized by expansion of arable agriculture and increasing yield per unit area 
(2.3.1. Between-groups analysis, Fig. 1). On the other hand, more-developed countries 
score higher on quality of state-centric governance (2.3.1. Between-groups analysis, Fig. 2, 
Table 2), while there it is more important to the explanation of spatial variability in yield 
increase (2.3.2. Within-groups analysis, Table 3). These countries are consistently primarily 
associated with “intensifying” behavior, i.e., behavior characterized by contraction of arable 
agriculture and increasing yield per unit area (2.3.1. Between-groups analysis, Fig. 1). This 
indicates that governance is more related to expansion in case of “growth” behavior, and 
more to intensification in case of “intensifying” behavior. The analysis performed in chapter 
2 further suggests that across the globe, countries with lower scores of quality of governance 
are more likely to achieve a production increase by means of area expansion rather than 
by means of yield increase. Moreover, as quality of governance improves, this orientation 
toward production tends to flip from expansion toward intensification. 
Yields were found to be significantly higher in countries with more political rights and civil 
liberties (Fulginiti et al., 2004), indicating that the dimension “Voice and accountability” is 
positively related to yield increase (Table 1). Infrastructure plays a key role in the realization 
of agricultural potential of remote rural areas, while governmental agricultural research & 
development programs play a key role in increasing yields (Thirtle et al., 2003). The quality 
of these public goods and services, measured by the dimension “Government effectiveness”, 
is therefore also likely to be positively related to agricultural development (yield increase). 
Countries with poor “Regulatory quality” tend to implement policies that result in high 
taxation of agriculture, which has negative effects on private-sector development- and 
investment (Krueger et al., 1991). For example, advances in agricultural development become 
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unlikely, as these advances strongly depend on private investments in agricultural research 
and development (Thirtle et al., 2003), which are not likely to be made when investors cannot 
be assured of future revenues. Furthermore, failing enforcement of property rights caused by 
poor “Rule of law” would also add to a negative perception of the investment climate through 
higher levels of instability and uncertainty, negatively affecting agricultural development. 
It has been suggested that large fertilizer producers persuaded African governments to 
impose particular fertilization programs upon farmers through bribery and other forms of 
corruption (World Bank, 2010), despite the fact that farmers often knew more about the 
particular deficits of their soils, having a negative effect on agricultural development through 
lack of “Control of corruption”. In countries facing higher levels of political conflict and war, 
yields were reported to be significantly lower (Fulginiti et al., 2004), suggesting that “Political 
stability and the absence of violence” is positively related to agricultural development (yield 
increase). Overall, higher scores of quality of state-centric governance are more likely to 
drive the intensification of arable agriculture, while lower scores of quality of state-centric 
governance are more likely to drive the practicing of cheaper forms of arable agriculture, 
requiring less financial investment to keep up with the growing demand for food. In particular, 
expansion at the expense of nature, which is common in developing countries where nature 
is often abundant yet poorly protected (Kakonge, 1998).
6.1.1.2. Research question 2
Does state-centric governance directly drive—and if so, how—dominant spatiotemporal 
processes of fragmentation of nature?
The analysis presented in chapter 3 reveals four dominant spatiotemporal processes of 
change in nature (3.2.2. Methods, Fig. 2), by capturing past developments in two indicators: 
overall change in nature area and change in average patch size of nature, measured over 
20 European countries (3.2.1. Data, Fig. 1) for 1990–2006. The analysis demonstrates 
that nature expansion was positively related to overall quality of state-centric governance 
for this period (3.3. Results, Fig. 4, Table 5). Nature area increased in a small majority of 
European countries (3.3. Results, Fig. 3), but this is not necessarily the result of deliberate 
nature restoration alone. New nature also developed on abandoned agricultural land, which 
is not necessarily a positive development in terms of biodiversity. Remarkably, patch size 
increased in countries with poorer state-centric governance while it decreased in countries 
with better state-centric governance (3.3. Results, Fig. 4, Table 5), for which there is more 
than one possible explanation. One possible explanation is that increasing patch size may be 
associated with land abandonment, which may in turn be associated with poor governance. 
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This is consistent with the occurrence of considerable abandonment of grasslands, due to 
major land reforms designed to privatize agricultural land in the CEECs after the fall of the 
iron curtain, particularly at the boundaries of agricultural and nature areas (Kuemmerle et al., 
2006; Hobbs and Cramer, 2007; Bakker et al., 2011). Another explanation is that compulsory 
purchase of land for the development of nature is easier in countries with poor governance, 
possibly allowing for more efficient implementation of ecological networks.
Nature needs to be protected from overexploitation by private parties, possibly resulting 
in removal, shrinkage, or fragmentation of nature through the government’s capacities 
for effective formulation and implementation of policies and regulations. Because these 
capacities are measured by “Government effectiveness” (Table 1), this dimension is likely 
to be negatively related to such removal, shrinkage, or fragmentation. Moreover, the 
extent to which these policies and regulations are properly enforced by law-enforcement 
agencies, measured by “Rule of law”, is therefore also likely to be negatively related to such 
removal, shrinkage, or fragmentation. Once policies and regulations have been formulated, 
implemented, and enforced, yet are of insufficient “Regulatory quality”, private parties may 
still overexploit nature. Furthermore, the extent to which officials are prone to temptations 
such as bribery and abusing their position and role by privileging specific private interests 
that will erode existing nature and harm the functioning of ecosystems, such as clearance for 
property development or illegal harvesting of wood, is measured by “Control of corruption”. 
Therefore, “Regulatory quality” and “Control of corruption” are also likely to be negatively 
related to removal, shrinkage, or fragmentation of nature. On the other hand, the greater 
the degree to which citizens are allowed to affect decision making through democratic 
voting processes, measured by “Voice and accountability”, the more likely the realization 
of formation, expansion, or connection of nature (Jones-Walters et al., 2009). The “Political 
stability and the absence of violence” dimension was excluded from the analysis, because 
there was no political instability leading to civil unrest or violence in the European countries 
included into the analysis during the period of study. As mentioned earlier (6.1.1. Empirical-
statistical modeling), any results of statistical analyses involving the World Bank dimensions 
of governance cannot be interpreted in the sense of their exact definitions (Table 1), as these 
are far too delicate and complex to be incorporated in crude statistical analyses. Furthermore, 
the separate World Bank dimensions are highly correlated between themselves (not shown), 
further preventing meaningful interpretation in this sense. Precisely because of this, however, 
a crude yet credible indicator of overall quality of governance could be constructed in which 
the influence of all the separate five dimensions was equally represented (3.2.1. Data, Table 
3), through Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
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Generally, lower scores of overall quality of state-centric governance are more likely to drive 
the processes of removal, shrinkage, and dissection of nature through changes in nature area 
(3.3. Results, Figs. 3–4, Table 5). Higher scores of overall quality of state-centric governance 
are more likely to drive the processes of formation, expansion, and connection of nature 
through changes in both nature area and patch size (3.3. Results, Figs. 3–4, Table 5). Although 
the data available for this research did not allow for analysis beyond the European level of 
geographical spatial scale, this approach may also be useful globally for reporting to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2020. That is, to give general trends in land cover 
and fragmentation and their potential relationships to state-centric governance.
6.1.1.3. Research question 3
If state-centric governance drives expansion and/or intensification of arable agriculture 
directly, does it also drive—and if so, how—processes of fragmentation of nature through 
these processes?
From the data used for the analysis presented in chapter 2, it is known that the countries 
analyzed in chapter 3 were predominantly “intensifying” countries. That is, Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, and Spain were “intensifying” countries over 1975–2007 (2.3.1. Between-groups 
analysis, Fig. 2), while there were no—separate—data available for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Slovenia. Bulgaria is the only country known to have been a “decline” country over this 
period, i.e., behavior characterized by contraction of arable agriculture and decreasing yield 
per unit area, while France is the only country that qualified as a “growth” country (2.3.1. 
Between-groups analysis, Fig. 2). However, the increase in agricultural area was negligible 
for France, making it more inclined toward “intensifying” behavior; consistent with what 
one might expect for a western European country such as France. Although “intensifying” 
behavior was clearly dominant among these countries, lower scores of quality of state-centric 
governance could still be more likely to drive the process of expansion of agriculture, while 
higher scores of quality of state-centric governance could still be more likely to drive the 
process of intensification (6.1.1.1. Research question 1). Furthermore, lower scores of quality 
of state-centric governance are more likely to drive the processes of removal, shrinkage, and 
dissection of nature, while higher scores of quality of state-centric governance are more likely 
to drive the process of formation, expansion, and connection of nature (6.1.1.2. Research 
question 2). These relationships have been established for different periods using slightly 
different methods. That is, those presented in chapter 2 hold across the globe for 1975–2007, 
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while those presented in chapter 3 only hold across Europe for 1990–2006. Furthermore, the 
former relationships were established using control indicators, which was not possible for 
the latter due to an insufficient number of countries (i.e., only 20 countries could be used 
compared to 173 for the global analysis). The World Bank governance dimensions also were 
not used in the same way for these studies. Multivariate-regression analysis was applied on 
separate indicators in chapter 2, while PCA was applied to construct an overall indicator of 
state-centric governance in chapter 3. That is, to resolve the issue of insufficient observations 
for multivariate-regression analysis, PCA was used to allow for reliable bivariate-regression 
analysis instead. Despite their—minor—methodological dissimilarities, chapters 2–3 do give 
rise to plausible interpretations of their combined results.
On the one hand, these results may imply that increased inclination toward expansion of 
agriculture could be commensurate with increased removal, shrinkage, and dissection of 
nature (i.e., negative change in nature area). Although tempting, the negative changes in 
nature area may not be assumed to be entirely attributable to changes in agricultural area 
alone. That is, for all countries with a negative change in nature area except three, changes 
in nature area could also be entirely attributable to changes in urban area alone (not shown). 
For two of the three countries for which this is not the case—Lithuania and Romania—the 
greater parts of the observed changes in nature area could possibly be explained by changes 
in agricultural area (not shown). For the remaining country—Bulgaria—only a small part of 
the observed change in nature area may possibly be explained by changes in agricultural area 
(not shown). On the other hand, these results may imply that increased inclination toward 
intensification of agriculture could be commensurate with increased formation, expansion, 
and connection of nature (i.e., positive change in nature area). Overall, the combined results 
of chapters 2–3 seem consistent with the finding that lower scores of quality of state-centric 
governance are more likely to drive the practicing of cheaper forms of arable agriculture 
(6.1.1.1. Research question 1), requiring less financial investment to keep up with the growing 
demand for food. In particular, expansion at the expense of nature, which is common in 
developing countries where nature is often abundant yet poorly protected (Kakonge, 1998). 
Furthermore, combined results suggest that increased inclination toward intensification of 
agriculture could be more commensurate with increased formation of smaller-than-average 
patches of nature (i.e., positive and negative change in nature area and average patch size, 
respectively). However, the latter would imply that increased inclination toward expansion of 
agriculture could be more commensurate with increased formation of larger-than-average 
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patches, expansion, and connection of nature (i.e., positive change in both nature area and 
average patch size). Clearly, the implication that increased inclination toward expansion of 
agriculture might go hand in hand with improved structural connectivity of nature could 
represent a contradiction. Moreover, privatization of land, through broad agricultural 
reforms that were the dominant drivers of land-use change in the Central- and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) located in the upper-right quadrant of the characterization of 
dominant spatiotemporal processes (3.3. Results, Fig. 3), has led to large-scale abandonment 
of agricultural land (Hobbs and Cramer, 2007). Therefore, it is likely that abandonment of 
agricultural land—and its effect on land cover—was often mistakenly recorded as a positive 
change in nature area for these countries. This is consistent with the explanation that 
increasing patch size could be commensurate with a greater degree of abandonment, i.e., for 
the apparently counterintuitive relationship between state-centric governance and change 
in average patch size (3.3. Results, Fig. 4, Table 5). Overall, it is less likely that formation of 
new patches and/or corridors of nature significantly contributed to structural-connectivity 
increases in these countries compared to e.g., Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands (Mandemaker et al., 2013).
Countries located in the upper half of the characterization of dominant spatiotemporal 
processes (3.3. Results, Fig. 3) typically still have large areas of forest, while those in the 
lower half have suffered considerable to severe fragmentation of nature (Mandemaker et al., 
2013). Furthermore, in countries with large areas of forest, farmers are known to behave in a 
classical Thünian way (De Groot, 2003). That is, they display frontier behavior based on positive 
feedbacks of growth between income, urban demand, agriculture, and extraction of natural 
resources and deforestation, while in countries with highly fragmented nature resulting from 
such frontier behavior, farmers are known to display immiserization behavior (De Groot, 2003). 
That is, frontier behavior tends to occur more in growing agricultural economies—e.g., the 
“growth” countries of chapter 2—that have yet to complete the transition into a service-based 
economy. While the latter type of economy often suffers from possible side effects of such a 
transition (e.g., fragmentation of nature). Instead of nature consumption at extraction frontiers, 
which have usually all but disappeared in such countries, remnants of nature are often at risk 
of being converted into agriculture. The lower farmers’ income the less means will be available 
for intensification of existing agricultural land, and the higher the risk of conversion of such 
remnants through expansion of existing agricultural land, which is a known characteristic 
of immiserization behavior (De Groot, 2003). As there is a clear relation between quality of 
governance and farmers’ income and stability (FAO 2009a, 2009b; IAASTD, 2009), it is likely that 
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farmers’ income is lower in countries in the lower-left- and upper-right quadrants compared 
to those in the lower-right quadrant (where quality of governance is highest). Therefore, the 
found significant relationship between quality of governance and change in nature area for the 
lower-left- and right quadrants of the characterization of dominant spatiotemporal processes 
(3.3. Results, Fig. 4, Table 5), may imply that immiserization behavior increased with lower 
quality of governance and increasingly negative change in nature area. That is, compared to 
countries with highly fragmented nature but relatively wealthy farmers such as Germany or 
the Netherlands (Mandemaker et al., 2013), where immiserization is far more unlikely to occur, 
also owing to better protection of nature. This is consistent with the result that increased 
inclination toward expansion of agriculture might be commensurate with increased removal, 
shrinkage, and dissection of nature, which was made apparent by combining the results of 
chapters 2–3. Should causal relationships be assumed, it is possible that poorer and better 
state-centric governance directly driving expansion and intensification of agriculture, also 
indirectly drive fragmentation of nature to a greater and lesser degree, respectively. That is, 
expansion of agricultural land in countries with already highly fragmented nature areas through 
immiserization, is likely to be more harmful to nature areas than intensification of already 
existing agricultural land.
6.1.2. Process-based modeling
By defining spatial and temporal units of analysis suitable to changes in agricultural land use 
for a particular study area, land-use changes may be recorded for each patch of land in this 
study area for each temporal observation, with the total number of patches determined by 
the chosen spatial resolution. If such changes are recorded over a sufficient amount of time, it 
should be possible to deduce what the systematic land-use changes were throughout the study 
area. That is, by calculation of the frequencies of specific land-use transitions for each patch 
of land in the study area, with the total number of patches determined by the chosen spatial 
resolution. If changes are monitored sufficiently long for random transitions to average out, 
the obtained frequencies should represent systematic change induced by human preference 
(rational or not). Furthermore, the systematic behavior and human preferences indicated by 
these—local—frequencies should also be reflected by the aggregate land-use pattern formed 
by individual decision-making. Therefore, it should be possible to link locally observed land-use 
change to aggregate land-use patterns, through studying the effects of modeled human behavior 
on simulated land-use patterns. In chapters 4–5 of this thesis, human behavior was assumed 
to be driven by a utility maximization rationale modeled by a multinomial-choice model. A 
conceptualization of individual decision-making processes was operationalized through a set 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
130
Chapter 6
of specific land-use transitions occurring with spatially varying probabilities. In turn, these 
probabilities were determined by the human preferences modeled by the multinomial-choice 
model introduced in chapter 4, based on the utility that is perceived to be gained from making 
specific land-use transitions. Utility was entirely identified with income in chapters 4–5, but 
real-world utility may also be gained through behavior based on non-monetary motivations. 
Although the proposed way of gathering local land-use data for a particular study area should 
be able to detect such subjective, yet still systematic decision-making, modeling this behavior 
would be beyond the scope of the agricultural model written for this research. Moreover, for 
agricultural land-use systems, economic rationales are known to be the major determinants of 
observed systematic behavior (IFPRI, 2006; FAO 2009c).
6.1.2.1. Research question 4
Is it possible—and if so, how—to systematically and verifiably approximate real-world dynamic 
complexity of agricultural land-use systems and their governance with a Pattern-Oriented 
Modeling (POM) approach based on individual decision-making processes?
Given that conceptualizations of decision-making and other mechanisms controlling behavioral 
and environmental constraints would approach those of a real-world study area sufficiently 
close, and that land-use change data of this study area would permit identification of the 
degree and composition of systematic influence on aggregate land-use patterns, meaningful 
comparison of empirical and simulated spatial statistics should be possible. Furthermore, it 
should be possible to approximate real-world land-use patterns with simulated ones, by 
minimizing differences between real-world- and simulated spatial statistics. These differences 
could be minimized by applying modeled mechanisms in a systematic way, iteratively comparing 
real-world- and simulated land-use patterns and making systematic adjustments to explore 
which mechanisms and settings deliver optimal results (i.e., by following the POM approach). To 
this purpose, a spatial statistic was proposed in chapter 4 of this thesis, based on the aggregate 
uncertainty associated with agricultural land-use systems that emerges from local transition 
probabilities: the transition entropy (4.3.4. Aggregate uncertainty, Eq. 1). The more systematic 
decision-making occurs, the lower the transition entropy of the aggregate landscape will be. 
That is, when farmers take only utility maximizing decisions, the aggregate landscape will be 
least random and its entropy minimized. Conversely, when farmers take no utility maximizing 
decisions at all, the aggregate landscape will be most random and its entropy maximized. In 
this sense, the chosen way of modeling farmers’ behavior resembles the modeling of ideal-gas 
behavior in thermodynamics. That is, the entropy of an ideal gas in a state of equilibrium is 
always maximized, calculated over the possible states of gas particles. Analogously, in this thesis 
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the entropy of a landscape is calculated over the possible land-use states of landscape units, 
through local transition probabilities associated with these land-use states. The entropies of 
landscapes that are “ideal” in the thermodynamic sense will be constant over time. However, 
this is not the case for landscapes that are shaped by systematic behavior. For such landscapes, 
the entropy and spatial distribution of land-use states may significantly vary over time until 
a state of statistical equilibrium is reached, while such states are generally characterized by 
small dynamic fluctuations (after stabilization). Therefore, the history of the landscape should 
be taken into account when determining the system-state variables associated with a particular 
state of statistical equilibrium. That is, by calculating the average values of these variables 
over a period of time that ensures a negligible deviation from averages that would have been 
calculated over an infinite period of time.
6.1.3. Comparing empirical-statistical- and process-based modeling
The semi-positivistic empirical-statistical and positivistic process-based modeling approaches to 
governance applied in this thesis are constrained by the same real-world complexity. However, 
where empirical-statistical methods merely provide us with the ability to cope with real-world 
complexity when sufficient process-based information is unavailable, process-based methods 
provide us with the ability to attempt verifiable incorporation of real-world complexity. The 
second and third chapters of this thesis attempted to capture the real-world complexity of 
nature-agriculture interactions by empirical-statistical means, while in the fourth and fifth 
chapters of this thesis verifiable incorporation of this real-world complexity was attempted 
through Pattern-Oriented Modeling (POM) based on individual decision-making processes 
(Grimm et al., 2005, 2006). The challenge posed by a positivistic approach to the modeling of 
governance and individual decision-making processes is how to address the overall insufficient 
availability of process-based information, so that minimal amounts of available or measureable 
local land-use change information could still be linked to aggregate patterns of land use in a 
meaningful and verifiable way (Parker et al., 2008a, 2008b). 
In chapters 4–5, the rationality parameter determines to what extent available information can 
be exploited by farmers to maximize utility, while the anticipation parameter determines how 
much—future—information is available for farmers to exploit. The ability of real-world farmers 
to process information on which they base land-use decisions is known to be related to general 
education and governmental educational programs designed to raise farmers’ entrepreneurial 
awareness (IFPRI, 2006; FAO 2009c; IAASTD, 2009). Therefore, it was assumed that the higher 
farmers’ entrepreneurial awareness, the more rational their land-use decisions will be. That is, 
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the rationality parameter was assumed to model farmers’ entrepreneurial awareness. In turn, 
the general level and quality of education and the ability to actually take preferred decisions 
depend on “Government effectiveness”, responsible for the delivery of such public services 
(Table 1). The rationality parameter could thus be interpreted to indirectly reflect the quality 
of this dimension of governance. Furthermore, for farmers to anticipate on projections of 
future revenue and invest in intensification, confidence in the resilience and stability of the 
investment climate is required (IFPRI, 2006; FAO 2009c; IAASTD, 2009). The higher the quality 
of the investment climate the more and further farmers are assumed to anticipate on these 
projections, modeled by a higher value of the anticipation parameter. In turn, the quality of 
the investment climate depends on “Regulatory quality”, responsible for the promotion of 
private-sector development (Table 1). The anticipation parameter could thus be interpreted to 
indirectly reflect the quality of this dimension of governance.
In chapter 4, resulting emergent behavior could sometimes be interpreted as intensification 
of agriculture (4.5.4. Intensification). That is, when the quality of the investment climate was 
high, emergent behavior that resulted from an increasing entrepreneurial awareness could 
be interpreted as intensification, but not when the quality of the investment climate was 
low. Furthermore, in a high-quality investment climate, two types of intensification could be 
identified: intensification through yield increase per unit area and through substitution of land 
for inputs. A transition from the former to the latter type of intensification was observed with 
increasing entrepreneurial awareness. If farmers did not participate in the sharing of costs 
through forming co-operatives, this transition occurred for lower values of entrepreneurial 
awareness compared to when they did participate in the sharing of costs. That is, sharing of 
costs causes yield increase per unit area to be the more dominant type of intensification in 
the model. Overall, this could imply that when “Regulatory quality” is sufficiently high to allow 
for a high-quality investment climate, intensification is facilitated by sufficiently high quality of 
“Government effectiveness”. This is consistent with the main result of chapter 2 stating that 
higher quality of governance is more likely to drive intensification than expansion. Furthermore, 
that intensification through yield increase per unit area is associated with a slightly lower quality 
of governance than intensification through substitution of land for inputs (4.5.4. Intensification) 
is consistent with the differences in production behavior of the “Growth” and “Intensifying” 
countries of chapter 2, respectively (2.3.1. Between-groups analysis).
In chapter 5, it was shown that high entrepreneurial awareness combined with a low-quality 
investment climate worked out best for nature (5.4.2. Between state-centric governance 
settings, Fig.11, Setting III). That is, nature required the least protection from farmers under 
these conditions. Furthermore, overall, nature was shown to be protected most effective by 
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applying fines for reclamation of land in a natural state for agricultural purposes, compared 
to subsidizing the use of land in a natural state. However, in the model, intensification is 
known to occur for high entrepreneurial awareness combined with a high-quality investment 
climate (5.4.2. Between state-centric governance settings, Fig. 11, Setting IV); the same model-
parameter values were applied in chapter 5 as in chapter 4. Moreover, nature required the 
second-least protection from farmers under these conditions. Therefore, nature could still be 
very well protected under these conditions, while at the same time the potential for agricultural 
intensification might also be realized by increasing entrepreneurial awareness, facilitated by a 
high-quality investment climate. Again, entrepreneurial awareness and quality of the investment 
climate might in turn be facilitated by “Government effectiveness” and “Regulatory quality”, 
respectively (Table 1). Furthermore, the observed land-use patterns for setting IV (5.3.2. Land-
use patterns, Fig. 10) show that application of fines results in overprotection of nature and 
marginalization of agriculture less easily than subsidies. This difference is not observed for the 
patterns generated by setting III (5.3.2. Land-use patterns, Fig. 9).
6.2. Key conclusions
• Governance can be meaningfully included into land-use modeling in both semi-
positivistic (i.e., empirical-statistical) and positivistic (i.e., process-based) ways
• The empirical-statistical result that occurrence of agricultural intensification is likely to 
be more commensurate with higher quality of governance can be reproduced as an 
emergent property of aggregated individual behavior of farmers constrained by state-
centric governance, through abstract process-based simulation (pattern-oriented 
modeling) of spatially explicit agricultural land-use systems 
• The empirical-statistical result that better protection of nature is likely to be 
commensurate with higher quality of governance can be reproduced as emergent 
properties of aggregated individual behavior of farmers in different policy scenarios, 
through abstract process-based simulation (pattern-oriented modeling) of spatially 
explicit agricultural land-use systems
• Abstract process-based simulation (pattern-oriented modeling) of spatially explicit 
agricultural land-use systems allows for identification of different and verifiable 
governance conditions and policy strategies regarding protection of nature
• Abstract process-based simulation (pattern-oriented modeling) of spatially explicit 
agricultural land-use systems allows for identification of the optimal verifiable optimal 
governance conditions and policy strategy for protection of nature and the economic 
interests of farmers in agricultural land-use systems
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6.2.1. Recommendations for further research
In this thesis, it has been shown that governance can be meaningfully included into land-
use modeling in both semi-positivistic (i.e., empirical-statistical) and positivistic (i.e., 
process-based) ways. However, the relationship between empirical specificity and degree 
of abstraction has not been addressed. Fig. 2 shows a conceptual representation of land-
use models, characterized by empirical specificity and degree of abstraction. Every point 
on the circular curve represents a different model. The curve is circular to represent that 
all land-use models on it are equally valuable in their own right, although characterized by 
different empirical specificities and degrees of abstraction. However, different combinations 
of empirical specificity and degree of abstraction, i.e., different models, describe the same 
real-world complexity differently.
Fig. 2. Conceptual representation of land-use models characterized by empirical specificity and degree 
of abstraction.
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According to this representation (Fig. 2), there are three main classes of land-use models, 
each characterized by a different way of describing the same real-world complexity. There 
are those models that more empirically specific than abstract (α < ε), indicating the more and 
more empirical-statistical model, to the extreme of overly empirical models (α → 0). In case 
of the latter extreme, there is a wealth of information allowing for empirical validation, but 
key processes cannot be sufficiently captured by empirical-statistical relationships. That is, 
despite all the information available, there is no predictability beyond the variance and other 
statistical properties of model output (i.e., compared to real-world data). Furthermore, there 
are those models that are more abstract than empirically specific (α > ε), to the extreme of 
oversimplification (ε → 0). In case of this extreme, all is predictable in theory, but in practice, 
chosen variables and theorized relationships prove unverifiable because there is simply no 
way of empirical validation. However, if a model of a real-world land-use system could optimize 
the empirical specificity with which this model can be validated and the degree of generality 
to which this system can be understood, then its predictive power might be maximized. That 
is, the class of models for which empirical specificity is equal to the degree of abstraction 
(α = ε) might represent a class of models for which predictive power is potentially maximal. 
If so, these models would be most suited to describe the real-world complexity encountered 
in land-use systems. 
However, the research in this thesis suggests there is still a considerable gap between the 
empirical-statistical models (α < ε) and the developed pattern-oriented model (α > ε) used 
for the inclusion of governance into land-use modeling. Therefore, it is recommended that 
research efforts be devoted to the development of models that further reduce the gap 
between empirical specificity and degree of abstraction, that is (α – ε) → 0. Moreover, to 
apply and validate such models successfully, large amounts of data would be required that 
are currently unavailable. This is why even more research efforts should be devoted to the 
development of high-resolution monitoring systems of land-use change, to allow for larger 
and better databases.
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Summary
Summary
An improved understanding of complex processes of both socio-political and economic 
governance may help to abate negative effects of increasing pressures of rising global food 
demand and agricultural land use on nature. Therefore, in this thesis, relationships between 
governance, agriculture, and nature were quantified, and it was investigated to what extent 
governance can be meaningfully included into land-use modeling. As outlined in the general 
introduction of this thesis, two main approaches to the inclusion of governance were 
distinguished: a semi-positivistic empirical-statistical approach and a positivistic process-
based approach. Therefore, this thesis consists of two parts: one that includes governance 
through empirical-statistical modeling, and one that includes governance through process-
based modeling. 
In the first part of this thesis (chapters 2–3), relationships between quantified perceptions 
of state-centric governance, arable agriculture, and nature were identified through semi-
positivistic empirical-statistical approaches. To investigate whether state-centric governance 
directly drives—and if so, how—expansion and/or intensification of arable agriculture at the 
global level (chapter 2), empirical-statistical relationships between agricultural production 
dynamics and state-centric governance indicators were identified for 173 countries between 
1975 and 2007. Four groups of countries were distinguished: those with both area and 
yield increases (“growth” countries); those with increasing yields but decreasing area 
(“intensifying” countries); those with decreasing yields but a growing area (“expansion” 
countries); and those with both declines in yields and area (“decline” countries). Differences 
between these four groups were analyzed, and also governance-production relationships 
within these groups. The analysis of governance-production relationships within the four 
groups suggests that countries with a lower quality of governance are more inclined to 
achieve production increases by expanding agricultural area rather than increasing yields. 
Moreover, as quality of governance becomes higher, this orientation of countries towards 
production tends to flip from expansion towards intensification. Overall, higher quality of 
state-centric governance is more likely to drive the intensification of arable agriculture, while 
lower quality of state-centric governance is more likely to drive the practicing of cheaper 
forms of arable agriculture, requiring less financial investment to keep up with the growing 
demand for food.
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To investigate whether state-centric governance directly drives—and if so, how—dominant 
spatiotemporal processes of fragmentation and expansion of nature, empirical-statistical 
relationships between overall quality of state-centric governance and such processes were 
identified through cross-national comparison for 20 European countries for the period 1990–
2006 (chapter 3). Land-cover change trends were detected by comparing CORINE land-cover 
maps from the years 1990 and 2006. Dominant spatiotemporal processes of change in nature 
were characterized by capturing past developments in two indicators: overall change in nature 
area and change in average patch size of nature. This resulted in four different dominant 
spatiotemporal processes of structural change: “Formation of larger-than-average patches 
of nature and/or Expansion of nature and/or Connection of nature”; “Formation of smaller-
than-average patches of nature”; “Removal of smaller-than-average patches of nature”; and 
“Removal of larger-than-average patches of nature and/or Shrinkage of nature and/or Dissection 
of nature”. The majority of countries expanded their total nature, although this is likely not to 
have been the result of deliberate nature restoration alone but also of land abandonment or 
afforestation for production purposes, which do not necessarily lead to positive development 
in terms of biodiversity. For the period 1990–2006, overall quality of governance was found to 
be positively related to expansion of nature, and negatively to increasing patch size of nature. 
Generally, lower scores of overall quality of state-centric governance are more likely to drive 
the processes of removal, shrinkage, and dissection of nature through changes in nature 
area. Higher scores of overall quality of state-centric governance are more likely to drive the 
processes of formation, expansion, and connection of nature through changes in both nature 
area and patch size. Overall, it appears that quality of state-centric governance indeed drives 
the deliberate development of nature for the purposes of restoration and conservation, halting 
fragmentation and the ongoing decline of biodiversity in Europe. 
On the one hand, the combined results of chapters 2–3 may imply that increased inclination 
toward expansion of agriculture could be commensurate with increased removal, shrinkage, 
and dissection of nature (i.e., negative change in nature area). On the other hand, the combined 
results of chapters 2–3 may imply that increased inclination toward intensification of agriculture 
could be commensurate with increased formation, expansion, and connection of nature (i.e., 
positive change in nature area). Overall, this would be consistent with the fact that lower scores 
of quality of state-centric governance are more likely to drive the practicing of cheaper forms 
of arable agriculture, requiring less financial investment to keep up with growing demands 
for food. In particular, expansion at the expense of nature, which is common in developing 
countries where nature is often abundant yet poorly protected (chapter 2).
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In the second part of this thesis (chapters 4–5), a positivistic process-based approach was 
applied to include governance into land-use modeling. To investigate to what extent found 
the semi-positivistic empirical-statistical relationships could be simulated, a spatially explicit 
pattern-oriented individual-based land-use-transition model was constructed (chapter 
4). Given that conceptualizations of decision-making and other mechanisms controlling 
behavioral and environmental constraints approach those of a real-world study area 
sufficiently close, and that land-use change data of this study area permit identification of the 
degree and composition of systematic influence on aggregate land-use patterns, meaningful 
comparison of empirical and simulated spatial statistics is possible. Furthermore, it is possible 
to approximate real-world land-use patterns with simulated ones, by minimizing differences 
between real-world- and simulated spatial statistics. These differences could be minimized by 
applying Pattern-Oriented Modeling (POM), iteratively comparing real-world- and simulated 
land-use patterns, and making systematic adjustments to explore which mechanisms and 
settings deliver optimal results. It was concluded that the empirical-statistical result that 
occurrence of agricultural intensification is likely to be more commensurate with higher 
quality of governance (chapter 2), can be reproduced as an emergent property of aggregated 
individual behavior of farmers constrained by state-centric governance (by the constructed 
model).
To investigate under which conditions nature could be protected from agriculture in an 
optimal way, individual farmers were subjected to different state-centric governance settings 
in the constructed model (chapter 5). One state-centric governance setting was assumed to 
be determined by the quality of the investment climate, reflected by the quality of the state-
centric governance dimension “Regulatory quality”. Another was assumed to be determined 
by the level of entrepreneurial awareness, reflected by the quality of the state-centric 
governance dimension “Government effectiveness”. Together, these assumptions could be 
combined into four state-centric governance settings: “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and 
Low Quality of Investment Climate” (I); “Low Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of 
Investment Climate” (II); “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and Low Quality of Investment 
Climate” (III); and “High Entrepreneurial Awareness and High Quality of Investment Climate” 
(IV). Furthermore, farmers were subjected to two different top-down policy instruments in 
each state-centric governance setting: subsidies and fines. The most effective- and second-
most effective protection of nature was generated by applying fines in state-centric governance 
settings III and IV, respectively. It was concluded that the empirical-statistical result that 
better protection of nature is likely to be commensurate with higher quality of governance 
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(chapter 3), can be reproduced as aggregate emergent properties of individual behavior of 
farmers in different policy scenarios (by the constructed model) (chapter 4). Furthermore, 
that abstract process-based simulation (pattern-oriented modeling) of spatially explicit 
agricultural land-use systems allows for identification of different and verifiable governance 
conditions and policy strategies regarding protection of nature, and for identification of the 
optimal verifiable governance conditions and policy strategy for protection of nature and the 
economic interests of farmers in agricultural land-use systems.
It was concluded that governance can be meaningfully included into land-use modeling in both 
semi-positivistic (i.e., empirical-statistical) and positivistic (i.e., process-based) ways. However, 
different combinations of empirical specificity and degree of abstraction, i.e., different models, 
describe the same real-world complexity differently. Therefore, a conceptual representation 
of land-use models characterized by empirical specificity and degree of abstraction was 
proposed (chapter 6). According to this representation, there are three main classes of land-
use models. There are those models that are more empirically specific than abstract (α < ε), 
indicating increasingly empirical-statistical models. Furthermore, there are those models that 
are more abstract than empirically specific (α > ε), indicating models that are increasingly 
process-based. It was observed that if a model of a real-world land-use system could optimize 
the empirical specificity with which this model can be validated and the degree of generality 
to which this system can be understood, then its predictive power might be maximized. That 
is, the class of models for which empirical specificity is equal to the degree of abstraction 
(α = ε) might represent a class of models for which predictive power is potentially maximal. 
However, the research in this thesis suggests there is still a considerable gap between the 
used empirical-statistical models (α < ε) and the constructed pattern-oriented model (α > ε). 
Therefore, it is recommended that research efforts be devoted to the development of models 
that further reduce the gap between empirical specificity and degree of abstraction, that is 
(α – ε) → 0. Moreover, to apply and validate such models successfully, large amounts of data 
would be required that are currently unavailable. This is why even more research efforts 
should be devoted to the development of high-resolution monitoring systems of land use, to 
allow for larger and better databases.
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Een verbeterd begrip van complexe sociaal-politieke- en economische governance-processen 
kan wellicht helpen om negatieve effecten van de toenemende drukken van agrarisch 
landgebruik en de groeiende globale vraag naar voedsel te verminderen. Hierom zijn in 
deze dissertatie relaties tussen governance, landbouw en natuur gekwantificeerd, en is het 
onderzocht tot op welke hoogte governance zinvol geïncludeerd kan worden in het modelleren 
van landgebruik. Zoals aangegeven in de algehele introductie van deze dissertatie, zijn hierbij 
twee aanpakken onderscheiden: een semi-positivistische empirisch-statistische aanpak en 
een positivistische proces-gebaseerde aanpak. Daarom bestaat deze dissertatie uit twee 
delen: een deel dat governance includeert door middel van empirisch-statistisch modelleren, 
en een deel dat governance includeert door middel van proces-gebaseerd modelleren.
In het eerste deel van deze dissertatie (hoofdstukken 2–3), zijn relaties geïdentificeerd tussen 
de akkerbouw, natuur en gekwantificeerde percepties van staat-gecentreerde governance, 
door middel van semi-positivistische empirisch-statistische methodes. Om te onderzoeken 
of–en als dit zo is, hoe– staat-gecentreerde governance direct expansie en/of intensivering 
van akkerbouw drijft op globaal niveau (hoofdstuk 2), zijn empirisch-statistische relaties 
geïdentificeerd tussen landbouwproductie dynamieken en staat-gecentreerde governance 
indicators voor 173 landen voor de periode 1975–2007. Hierbij zijn vier groepen van landen 
onderscheiden: landen met zowel areaal- als opbrengst-toename (“groei” landen); landen 
met areaal-afname maar opbrengst-toename (“intensiverende” landen); landen met areaal-
toename maar opbrengst-afname (“expansie” landen); en landen met zowel areaal- als 
opbrengst-afname (“afname” landen). Verschillen tussen deze vier groepen zijn geanalyseerd, 
zowel als governance–productie relaties binnen deze groepen. De analyse van governance-
productie relaties binnen deze groepen suggereert dat landen met een lagere kwaliteit van 
governance meer geïnclineerd zijn om productietoename te realiseren met expansie van 
areaal, vergeleken met intensivering. Bovendien, als de kwaliteit van governance hoger 
wordt, dan heeft deze oriëntatie van landen met betrekking tot productie de neiging om 
te slaan van expansie naar intensivering. In het algemeen is het waarschijnlijker dat hogere 
kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde governance intensivering van akkerbouw drijft, en dat lagere 
kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde governance het praktiseren van goedkopere vormen van 
akkerbouw drijft, die dus minder financiële investering vereisen om de groeiende vraag naar 
voedsel bij te kunnen houden.
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Om te onderzoeken of–en als dit zo is, hoe–staat-gecentreerde governance direct dominante 
spatio-temporele processen van fragmentatie en expansie van natuur drijft, zijn empirisch-
statistische relaties geïdentificeerd tussen algehele kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde 
governance en dergelijke processen, door middel van transnationale vergelijking voor 20 
Europese landen voor de periode 1990–2006 (hoofdstuk 3). Dominante spatio-temporele 
processen van verandering in de natuur zijn gekarakteriseerd door ontwikkelingen uit het 
verleden te vangen in twee indicators: algehele verandering in natuuroppervlak en verandering 
in gemiddelde natuurpatch-grootte. Dit heeft geresulteerd in vier onderscheidbare 
dominante spatio-temporele processen van structurele verandering: “Formatie van groter-
dan-gemiddelde natuurpatches en/of Expansie van natuur en/of Connectie van natuur”; 
“Formatie van kleiner-dan-gemiddelde natuurpatches”; “Verwijdering van kleiner-dan-
gemiddelde natuurpatches”; en “Verwijdering van groter-dan-gemiddelde natuurpatches en/
of Contractie van natuur en/of Doorsnijding van natuur”. Het merendeel van de bestudeerde 
landen heeft het algehele natuuroppervlak vergroot, hoewel het waarschijnlijk is dat dit 
niet alleen maar het resultaat is geweest van opzettelijke natuur restoratie. Maar ook van 
bijvoorbeeld processen zoals landverlating of aanplanting van bos voor productiedoeleinden, 
welke niet noodzakelijk een positief effect hebben op biodiversiteit. Voor de periode 
1990–2006 is de algehele kwaliteit van governance positief gerelateerd aan expansie van 
natuur bevonden, en negatief aan toenemende natuurpatch-grootte. In het algemeen is het 
waarschijnlijker dat lagere scores van algehele kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde governance 
de processen van verwijdering, contractie en doorsnijding van natuur drijven, door middel van 
veranderingen in het algehele natuuroppervlak. En dat hogere scores van algehele kwaliteit 
van staat-gecentreerde governance de processen van formatie, expansie en connectie van 
natuur drijven, door middel van veranderingen in zowel het algeheel natuuroppervlak als de 
gemiddelde natuurpatch-grootte. Over het geheel genomen, suggereren de resultaten dat 
de kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde governance inderdaad de opzettelijke ontwikkeling van 
natuur (met als doel de restoratie en conservatie daarvan) drijft, een halt toeroepende aan 
fragmentatie en de doorzettende trend van afname van biodiversiteit in Europa.
Aan de ene kant zouden de gecombineerde resultaten van hoofdstukken 2–3 kunnen 
impliceren dat een toegenomen inclinatie richting expansie van de landbouw gelijk op zou 
kunnen gaan met een toegenomen verwijdering, contractie en doorsnijding van natuur 
(i.e., negatieve verandering in algehele natuuroppervlak). Aan de andere kant zouden 
de gecombineerde resultaten van hoofdstukken 2–3 ook kunnen impliceren dat een 
toegenomen inclinatie richting intensivering van de landbouw gelijk op zou kunnen gaan 
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met toegenomen formatie, expansie en connectie van natuur (i.e., positieve verandering 
in algehele natuuroppervlak). Over het geheel genomen, zou dit consistent zijn met het 
feit dat het waarschijnlijker is dat lagere scores van staat-gecentreerde governance het 
praktiseren van goedkopere vormen van akkerbouw drijven (in plaats van het intensiveren 
hiervan). En in het bijzonder expansie ten koste van de natuur, wat veelvuldig voorkomt in 
ontwikkelingslanden waar natuur overvloedig aanwezig is, maar slecht beschermd door de 
lage kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde governance (hoofdstuk 2).
In het tweede deel van deze dissertatie (hoofdstukken 4–5), is er een positivistische proces-
gebaseerde aanpak toegepast om governance te includeren in landgebruiksmodellering. 
Om te onderzoeken tot op welke hoogte de gevonden semi-positivistische empirisch-
statistische resultaten gesimuleerd konden worden, is er een ruimtelijk expliciet, patroon-
georiënteerd en individu-gebaseerd landgebruikstransitiemodel geconstrueerd (hoofdstuk 
4). Als gegeven is dat conceptualisaties van beslissingsmaking en andere mechanismen die 
de randvoorwaarden van gedrag en omgeving bepalen, diegene van een fysiek studiegebied 
dicht genoeg benaderen, en dat landgebruiksverandering data van dit studiegebied het 
toestaan om de gradatie en compositie van systematische invloeden op het geaggregeerde 
landgebruikspatroon te detecteren, dan is zinvolle vergelijking van empirische en 
gesimuleerde ruimtelijke patroonstatistieken mogelijk. Verder is het dan mogelijk om 
empirische landgebruikspatronen te benaderen met gesimuleerde patronen, door middel 
van het minimaliseren van de verschillen tussen empirische en gesimuleerde ruimtelijke 
patroonstatistieken. Zulke verschillen zouden geminimaliseerd kunnen worden door het 
toepassen van patroon-georiënteerd modelleren (POM): het op iteratieve wijze vergelijken 
van empirische en gesimuleerde landgebruikspatronen, waarbij telkens systematische 
aanpassingen worden gemaakt aan modelinstellingen om te verkennen welke mechanismen 
en sterktes ervan optimale resultaten opleveren (i.e., simulaties die de werkelijkheid zo dicht 
mogelijk benaderen). Het kon worden geconcludeerd dat het empirisch-statistische resultaat 
wat zegt dat intensivering waarschijnlijk gekoppeld is aan hogere kwaliteit van governance 
(hoofdstuk 2), gereproduceerd kan worden als een emergente eigenschap van geaggregeerd 
individueel gedrag van boeren die gelimiteerd worden door staat-gecentreerde governance 
(door middel van het geconstrueerde model).
Om te onderzoeken onder welke omstandigheden natuur op een optimale manier tegen 
landbouw beschermd zou kunnen worden, zijn individuele boeren blootgesteld aan 
verschillende staat-gecentreerde governance instellingen in het geconstrueerde model 
(hoofdstuk 5). Van een van de staat-gecentreerde governance instellingen werd aangenomen 
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dat deze werd bepaald door de kwaliteit van het investeringsklimaat, gereflecteerd door 
de kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde governance dimensie “Kwaliteit van Regelgeving”. 
Van een andere werd aangenomen dat hij werd bepaald door het niveau van bewustzijn 
waarmee boeren ondernemen, gereflecteerd door de kwaliteit van staat-gecentreerde 
governance dimensie “Overheidseffectiviteit”. Samen konden deze aannames worden 
gecombineerd tot vier staat-gecentreerde governance instellingen: “Laag Ondernemend 
Bewustzijn en Lage Kwaliteit van Investeringsklimaat” (I); “Laag Ondernemend Bewustzijn 
en Hoge Kwaliteit van Investeringsklimaat” (II); “Hoog Ondernemend Bewustzijn en Lage 
Kwaliteit van Investeringsklimaat” (III); en “Hoog Ondernemend Bewustzijn en Hoge Kwaliteit 
van Investeringsklimaat” (IV). Verder zijn boeren blootgesteld aan twee verschillende top-
down beleidsinstrumenten in elke staat-gecentreerde governance instelling: subsidies en 
boetes. De meest effectieve en de op één na meest effectieve bescherming van natuur werd 
gegenereerd door het hanteren van boetes in staat-gecentreerde governance instellingen III 
en IV, respectievelijk. Het kon worden geconcludeerd dat het empirisch-statistische resultaat 
wat zegt dat betere natuurbescherming waarschijnlijk gelijk op gaat met hogere kwaliteit 
van governance, gereproduceerd kan worden als geaggregeerde emergente eigenschappen 
van individueel gedrag in verschillende beleidsscenario’s (door het geconstrueerde model) 
(hoofdstuk 4). Verder kon het worden geconcludeerd dat abstract proces-gebaseerd simuleren 
(patroon-georiënteerd modelleren) het identificeren van verschillende verifieerbare 
governance instellingen en beleidsstrategieën betreffende natuurbescherming toelaat. Deze 
wijze van simuleren laat ook het identificeren van de optimale verifieerbare governance 
instellingen en beleidsstrategie toe, i.e., die instellingen en strategie die zowel resulteren 
in effectieve natuur bescherming en in de bescherming van de economische belangen van 
boeren in agrarische landgebruikssystemen.
Het kon geconcludeerd worden dat governance zinvol kan worden geïncludeerd in 
landgebruiksmodellering, op zowel semi-positivistische (i.e., empirisch-statistische) 
en positivistische (i.e., proces-gebaseerde) wijze. Hoewel, verschillende modellen met 
andere combinaties van empirische specificiteit en abstractieniveau beschrijven dezelfde 
wereldlijke complexiteit op andere wijze. Daarom werd in hoofdstuk 6 een conceptuele 
representatie voorgesteld die landgebruiksmodellen karakteriseerde met empirische 
specificiteit en abstractieniveau. Volgens deze representatie bestaan er drie hoofdklassen 
van landgebruiksmodellen. Er zijn die modellen die meer empirisch specifiek zijn dan 
abstract (α < ε), de klasse van steeds meer statistisch-empirische modellen. Verder zijn er die 
modellen die meer abstract zijn dan empirisch specifiek (α > ε), de klasse van steeds meer 
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proces-gebaseerde modellen. Het werd geobserveerd dat als een model van een wereldlijk 
landgebruikssysteem de empirische specificiteit waarmee dit model zou kunnen worden 
gevalideerd en de algemeenheid (abstractie) waarmee dit systeem kan worden begrepen zou 
kunnen optimaliseren, dat dan de voorspellingskracht van dit model wellicht gemaximaliseerd 
is. Dat wil zeggen, de klasse van modellen waarvoor de empirische specificiteit gelijk is aan 
het abstractieniveau (α = ε), zou wellicht een klasse van modellen kunnen representeren 
waarvoor de voorspellingskracht potentieel maximaal is. Hoewel, het onderzoek in deze 
dissertatie suggereert dat er nog steeds een aanzienlijke kloof aanwezig is tussen de gebruikte 
empirisch-statistische modellen (α < ε) en het geconstrueerde patroon-georiënteerde 
model (α > ε). Daarom wordt het aanbevolen dat onderzoeksinspanningen gewijd moeten 
worden aan de ontwikkeling van modellen die deze kloof tussen empirische specificiteit en 
abstractieniveau verder reduceren, i.e., (α – ε) → 0. Bovendien, om zulke modellen succesvol 
toe te passen en te valideren, zouden er grote hoeveelheden data benodigd zijn die nu nog 
niet beschikbaar zijn. Daarom moeten er nog meer onderzoeksinspanningen gewijd worden 
aan de ontwikkeling van monitoringssystemen van landgebruik met hoge resolutie, om 
grotere en betere databases te kunnen realiseren.
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